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JViy point is that there a.re deeps· 
in ma.n, and in the attempt to 
plumb him, depths which tax the 
most disciplined of minds, as 
also, which is much more, the 
most enlightened soulso I am 
with those who wish for a lar-
ger cup to grasp the ocean. But 
••• we do not enlarge the cup 
by a snap of the finger nor by 
a "fanciful, flowery and heated 
imagination;" only • • • 11 by 
careful and ponderous and sol-
emn thoughts Land feelings, and 
flashes of intuitiog7." 11 By 
contrarieties ••• truth is 
made manifest. 11 
--Truman G. I'-'Iadsen 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
I. THE FIRST LEVEL OF CREATIVITY: 
IMITATION • • • • 1 
Introduction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 
Imitative Reality Versus Natural 
Reality • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3 
The Synchronization of Inner and 
Outer Ontologies • • • • • • • • • • • • 6 
The Inner Nature • • • • • • • • • • • • 9 
Creativity and Genius • • • • • • • • • • • 9 
Passion • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 14 
Soul • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 15 
Perception • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 18 
Practica • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 19 
Line Drawing • • • • • • • • • • • • • 20 
Literary Arts • • • • • • • • • • • 23 
Photography, Film, and 
Television • • • • • • • • • • • • • 25 
Acting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 26 
Essay Composition • • • • • • • 26 
Note to Reader • • • • • • • • • • • • 27 
Pedagogical Implications • • • • • • • • 28 
Conclusion • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 29 
II. THE SECON:O LEVEL OF CREATIVITY: 
TRANSPOSITION • • • • • • 30 
Introduction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 30 
Transposition as Struggle • • • • • • • • 31 
Narration • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 38 
Hidden Versus Revealed • • • • • • • • • • 44 
Utility Versus Beauty • • • • • • • • 45 
Beautiful Versus. the Grotesque • • • • 47 
Summary • • • • • • • • • • • • 49 
Several Aspects of Narrative 
Considered • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 50 
Primary Particles • • • • • • • • • • 57 
The Process of Converting 
Discreti • • • • • • • • • • • • • 58 
The Communal Spirit • • • • • • • • 58 
The Partnership of the Gods • • • • • • • 60 




The Boundaring of Objects into 
Narrative •••••••••••••• • • 
Active and Passive Transposition • • • • • 
•r: • 
f·!USl C • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Practicum • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Transposition and Intellectual and 
Imaginative Activation ••••••••• 
Imitation Versus Copying ••••••••• 
Attention ••••••••••••••••• 
Avoidance of Outside Impingements ••••• 
Pedagogical Implications ••••••••• 
Conclusion •••••••••••••••• 
THE THIRD LEVEL OF CREATIVITY: 
SYNECDOCHE ••••••••••• • • . . . . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Introduction 
Codification • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Thematics ••••••••••••••••• 
Alienation Versus Contextualization •••• 
















Ontology •••••••••••••••• 102 
Transformation of Ontology •••••••• 106 
False Synecdoches ••••••••••••• 121 
Synecdoche and Direction ••••••••• 122 
Synecdoche as Reflection ••••••••• 128 
Synecdocheic Symbol Versus 
the Copied Gimmick ••••••••• 130 
Synecdoche as a. Bridge of 
Thought •••••••••••••• 137 
Artistic Perception •••••••••••• 138 
Creative Stenosis •••••••••• 138 
Artistic Evaluation ••••••••• 139 
Coding •••••••••••••••• 139 
Contradictions ••••••••• 140 
Defarniliarization of 
the Familiar ••••••••• 142 
Synecdoche as Simultaneous 
Projection ••••••••••••••• 145 
Common Forms of Synecdoche •••••••• 146 
Pedagogical Implications ••••••••• 154 
Summary •••••••••••••••••• 156 
THE FOURTH LEVEL OF CREATIVITY: 
CLASSICAL MODELING • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 157 
Introduction ••••••••••••••• 157 
The Original Classical Modelers 
in Western Culture ••••••••••• 158 
Acceptance of Heritage •••••••••• 160 
Value Commitments ••••••••••••• 161 
The Two Levels of Value ••••••• 162 
Communal and Artistic Consensus •••••• 165 
iv 
Communal and Artistic Consensus • • • • • • 165 
Consensus Versus Individuation • • • • 171 
Reconciliation and Synthesis • • • • • 172 
Process Context . • • • • • • • • • • 173 
Certainty and Familiarity • • • • • • • • • 177 
Control, and New from the Old • • • • • • • 181 
Style •••••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 182 
Exegetical Dissection • • • • • • • • • • • 188 
General Thematics and Individualized 
Particulars • . • • . • • • • • • • • • • 194 
Dangers of Community • • • • • • • • • • • 200 
Community as Inspirational 
"Mitochondria" • • • • • • • • • • • • • 200 
Golden Age • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 207 
Pedagogical Implications • • • • • • • • • 209 
Conclusion • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 211 
v. THE FIFTH LEVEL OF CREATIVITY: THE 
REORG.AJ:HZ ING OF OUR INNER CHAOS • • • • . ·214 
Introduction • • • • • • • • • • • • 214 
Inner Chaos • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 215 
Mind • • • • • •. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 222 
Imagination • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 224 
Image • • • • • • • • • • • • . 226 
Mysticism . • • • • • • • • • • • • • 227 
Reversal of Inner Chaos • • • • • • • 246 
Penultimate Summary • • • • • • • • 246 
Taxonomy of Mysticism • • • • • • • • • • • 247 
Pedagogical Implications • • • • • • • • • 249 
Rational Reorganization of Inner 
Chaos • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 255 
Summary and Conclusion • • • • • • • • • • 262 
VI. TRANSPOSING A BEHAVIORAL OBJECTIVES 
MODEL INTO A CREATIVE PROCESS MODEL • • • • • • 263 
Introduction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 263 
Control • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 266 
Liberation ·• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 271 
VII. CONCLUSION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 288 
Creativity and Freedom • • • • • • • • • • 288 
The Creative Taxonomy • • • • • • • • • • 289 
Humanism • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 290 
Flux • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 291 
The Near Future • • • • • • • • • • • • • 293 
Scope and Method of Study • • • • • • • • • 295 
Findings and Conclusions • • • • • • • • 296 
Summary • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 297 
BIBLIOGRAPI-IY • • • • • • • • • 298 
V 
APPEHDIXES . . . . • • 
APPENDIX A - J:AXONOMIES OF TB--:E FIVE LEVELS 
OF CREATIVITY IN LINELR 
REPRESENTATIOlT • • • • • • • 
JtPPEND IX :S TAXONOMIES OF TI{E Fiv.8 LEVELS 
• • 335 
•• 336 
OF CREATIVITY IN ORGANIC 
REPRESENTATIONS ••••••••• 342 
APPENDIX C - SYNTHESIZED LUTE.AR AND ORGANIC 
GRAPHIC REPRESENTA·J:IONS OF 












LIST OF· FIGURES 
Page 
Tree . . . . ·- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
Tree Showing Directional Dynamics . • . • . 33 
Flowing Lines . • • . . • . . • . • • • • . • • • 35 
Woman . • • • • . . • • • • • . • • . • . . . 37 
Tree . • • . • • • • • • • . • • . • • . . • • • 38 
Flowing Directional Lines • . . • . . . . . • • • 40 
Flowing Directional Lines of a ·:rree . . . • . 41 
Tree with Root System . . . . . • • • • . . • • • 43 
Artist, Whole, Audience • . . . . . . . . • • 109 
10. Artist Moving Towards Whole (Part) . . . • • 11 0 
111 11 • 
1 2 • 
1 3 • 
14. 
1 5 • 
1 6 • 
1 7. 
18. 
A Disgorging of a Part . . . . . . . . . . . 
Beginnings of Synthesis • • • • • . . . . • • 112 
The Holism of Artist, Part, Audience, and 
\'Jhol e • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . . 113 
Molecule of Part and Artist, Whole, and 
Audience • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 114 
Paraphrase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 147 
Paraphrase, Another View 
Taxonomy of Mysticism • • 
Inverted Taxonomy • • . . 
. . . . . . . . 
• • • • • • • • 
. . . • • . . . 
. . • • 148 
248 . . 
•• 254 
19. Kemp's Behavioral Objectives Model . . . • • 265 
• 270 20. 
21 • 
Beginning of Process Model . . . . . . . . . . 























Second Step of Process Model •••••••••• 274 
Third Step of Process Model ••••••••••• 276 
Fourth Step of Process Model •••••••••• 278 
Fifth Step of Process Model •••••••••• 280 
Sixth Step of Process Model ••••••••••• 282 
Seventh Step of Process Model • 
Completed Process Model •••• 
. . 
• • 
• • • • • •• 284 
• • • • • 
Imitation • • • • • . . . . • • • • . . . . . 
• • 286 
•• 337 
Transposition • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 338 
Synecdoche • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Classical Modeling . . . . . . • • • • 
Reorganizing of Inner Chaos • • • • • • 
Imi ta.tion, Organic View • • • . . . . . 
•••.. 339 
• •••• 340 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
341 
343 
Transposition, Organic View. • • • • • • • • • • 344 
Synecdoche, Organic View •••••••••••• 345 
Classical Modeling, Organic View •••••••• 346 
Reorganizing of Inner Chaos, Organic View •••• 347 
The Five Levels of Creativity, Linear View ••• 349 




Abaddons: the place of lost souls; hell; 
the bottomless pit •••••••••• 
Page 
. . . . . . 294 
abiogenesis: production of life from 
lifeless matter •••••••••• 
' 
. . 
a cheval: straddling •••• • • • • • • 
. . . . . 
• • • 
• 293 
4 • • • 
declivitously: fairly steep downward sloping • • . . 
dimissory: giving permission to . . . . . . . . . . 
exegesis: interpretation •• . . . . . . . . 





Fafnir: dragon (and enemy to Sigurd) •••• 106 
. ; 
faineants: lazy, idle persons . . . . • • 
f a.rnuli: apprentice to a. sorcerer or scholar 
. + 
. . . . • 106 
106 . . . . 
farrago: medley, mix vure • • • • . . . . . . . • • • 106 
fascia.ted: bound together . . . . . . . . • • . . . 106 
fasciculates: grows in bundles or clusters • • • • • 106 
laches: inexcusable delay in forwarding a claim 
obliquy: abuse, vituperation • • • • • • • • . . . . 
parcenary: partnership in inheritance • • • • • 





giving birth . . . . .· . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
parturition: giving birth . . . . . . . . . . . 
•• 167 
167 . . 
prirnus: first basis . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
stenosis: a narrowing . . . . • • • . . . . . . . . 138 
ix 
Term 
Sigurd: slayer of Fafnir • • • • • . . • • • • • 
solipsistic: looking inwardly only • • • • • • • 
Page 
• • 106 
• • 6 
sustenuto: sustaining • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 61 
syndesmotica.lly: bound together • • • • • • • • • • 103 
syndetic: connected by conjunctions • • • • • • •• 102 
160 tabescence: a drying up and withering away. 
talion: punishment that reproduces the crime 
(an eye for an eye) •••••••••••• 
zygosis: conjugation; joining together • • • 
X 
• • • • 
• • • • 




THE FIRST LEVEL OF CREATIVITY 
IMITATION 
At length the Vision closes; and the mind, 
Not undisturbed by the delight it feels, 
':Vb.ich slowJ,.y settles into peaceful calm, 
Is left to muse upon the solemn scene. 
--William Wordsworth 
Introduction 
Imitation is the attempt to realistically 
reproduce some object or some chronology. 
Imitation is natural to man from child-
hood, one of his advantages over the 
lower animals being this, that he is 
the most imitative creature in the world, 
and learns at first by imitation. And 
it is also natural for a.11 to delight 
in works of imitation. The truth of 
this second point is shown by experi-
ence: though the objects themselves 
may be painful to see, we delight to 
view the most realistic representations 
of them in art, the forms for example 
1 
of the lowest animals and of dead bod-
ies. The explanation is to be found 
in a further-fact: to be learning some-
thing is the greatest of pleasures not 
only to the philosopher but also to the 
rest of mankind, however small their 
capacity for it; the reason of the de-
light in seeing the picture is that 
one is at the same time learning •• 
2 
1 
This learning aspect, on the part of the 
spectator (or reader) is important. As we shall 
later see, creativity in general and imitation 
in particular, can be the joining together, the 
zygosis, of more than one object or process. 
However, creativity rnor~ likely, more often, is 
the selection of one or more aspects from a whole 
context. Instead of joining, it is separating. 
In other words, the most realistic film ever made 
is a fantastical concentration and condensation 
of all that did occur or might have occurred in 
real life. By highlighting a selected single 
aspect of reality (or a zygosis of single aspects), 
the artist enables us to better comprehend. Thus, 
most importantly, the artist is always a teacher 
1Aristotle, The Rhetoric and The Poetics of 
Aristotle, with an Introduction and Notes by Fried-
rich Solmsen (New York: The Modern Library, 1954), 
pp. 226-7. 
3 
of "truths" ( just as a teacher of truths is al-
ways an artist), never a purveyor of lies, such 
as can often be found.2 
Therefore, imitation is a realistic, though 
highly selective, reproduction of something from 
life; and it is meant to "teach" one's fellow 
man. 
Imitative Reality Versus Natural Reality 
Imitation is not the rendering by the artist 
of reality itself, but rather a rendering of a 
simplification of reality. Thus, it is a new 
reality and a new kind of reality, no matter how 
closely it resembles the original reality. It 
is ontology axiolized by man. It is the libera-
tion of reality by freeing it from its natural 
context with all of the contextual botanical, 
biological, accoustical, and visual fetters and 
frivolous accoutrements. 
2rn a lecture for one of this author's uni-
versity classes, one such "poet" boasted confidently 
that to be a poet was great because being a poet 
meant that he could tell all kinds of gross lies 
and have people believe them; he then illustrated 
some of his lies contained in his ovm "poems." 
A systematic liar--as opposed to a teacher of 
4 
There can be doubts concerning the proper 
interpretation of an ontology when it is buried 
half or fully in its context and when we stand 
apart from it, in a different context, trying 
' to decipher components--a cheval the gulf between. 
A particular ontology (or an aspect of it) buried 
in its immediate context is specific. Imitation 
dislodges a particular aspect or component from 
its partic~lar aspect of context, and thus eman-
cipates it from its particular and specific and 
idiosyncratic situation. By thus dislodging it 
from its particularity and specificity and idio-
syncracy, imitation frees and emancipates it so 
that it can belong to all, democratically. Thus, 
this dislodging of the particular from the spe-
cific, generalizes the particular into the uni-
versal. 
Ontology, at least in its outward manifes-
tations, is in a state of perpetual mutation be-
cause of its roots within a changing context. 
Imitation, by dislodging an aspect of ontology 
truth--is not fit to reputationally live. Repu-
tational death is a fit talion for those who mur-
der accuracy and truth. 
5 
from its changing and evolving context, saves it 
from further mutation and thus gives it eternal 
and unchanging form; i.e., eternal life. 
Tentativenessof our perceptions concerning 
a contextual aspect of mutational ontology and 
la.ches of conceptions a.re replaced by conviction 
of vision regarding eternal and unchanging form. 
Frustrated passion and raging, uncertain, baffled 
reason give way to calm and delightful musing. 
Obsti:nant resistance to flux, with its furious 
determination of realizing a system of security 
at a stroke, gives way to pregnant acceptance. 
Sufferings of incessant counteraction, inflamed 
by supposed natural or deistica.l treachery and 
artifice, wrought up to a. desperate state of im-
aginings, are replaced by public happiness as 
an effectual ally of the individual. Individual 
motives to censure and complain are replaced by 
an altruistic concern for the true interest of 
mankind in terms of the emancipated aspect of 
ontology. Whatever of the flux of life has been 
secured into eternal form and life by the artist, 
we undertake to entail to both the la.test and 
final posterity, reversing our genuine propensi-
ties for good from declivitously solipsistic rev-
olutions to inclivitously altruistic radiation, 
and teaching us to look outward rather than in-
ward. 
6 
Imitation arrests the human nature from de-
generacy and advances it and teaches it to advance. 
It stabilizes the world and gives us intimations 
of that life which is perfection and completion. 
The Synchronization of Inner and 
Outer Ontologies 
The first level of creativity, whether of 
freshman composition, poetry, fiction, playwrit-
ing, engineering, studio art, chemistry, or media 
is imitation (or realism). In all of creativity, 
we can demarcate two separate, yet joined and 
all-inclusive areas of consideration: outer and 
inner ontologies--self and context. Although 
these are separate and dichotomized, they are 
yet co-joined in a true sense: one is not possible 
without the other; in fact, "self is the beginning 
of context ••• ; 11 3 "it is in the encounter of these 
two that creativity takes place: Creativity occurs 
3sasser, 11 Connotations, 11 1. 13. 
7 
in a.n act of encounter, and is to be understood 
with this encouter as its center. 11 4 And "truth 
is Lrnere1y7 the conformity of inte11ection with 
its object. 11 5 That is, the perception of the ou-
ter (i.e., its therefore perceptual and percep-
tional existence) is only possible when there 
is an inner able to perceive it. Kant's four 
categorical imperatives explain this to us: 
How ••• can there be in the mind 
an external perception, which is ante-
cedent to objects themselves, and in 
which the conception of those objects 
may be determined§. -priori? Manifestly, 
only if that perception has its seat in 
the subject, that is, if it belongs 
to the formal constitution of the sub-
ject, in virtue of which it is so af-
fected by objects as to have a direct 
consciousness or perception of them; 
therefore, only if perceptign is the 
unused form of outer sense. 
4Rollo May, "Crea ti vi ty and Encounter, 11 The 
Creative Imagination: Psychoanalysis ••• , 
p. 284. 
5Etienne Gilson, "Creation--Artistic, Natural, 
and Divine," Creativity in the Arts, ed. by Vincent 
Tomas (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1 964 ), p. 5 7. 
6John Watson (trans. and ed.), The Philosonhy 
of Kant: As Contained in Extracts from his .Q.}:fil 
WritI°rigs (Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 
Publishers to the University, 1908), pp. 26-7. 
In other wo::ds, 
We have experience when we hold toge-
ther before the mind different sensi-
ble qualities as qualities of one ob-
ject. This could not happen unless 
these qualities were given to sense. 
But equally it could not happen unless 
these qualities, given to different 
senses at different times, were held 
together before the mind in accordance 
with certain principles which cannot 
be given to sense at all and so are 
~ nriori.7 
The outer ontology can consist of nature 
8 
evolving, it is true, over millenia but unchang-
ing and unchangeable at lea.st in terms of human 
temporal perceptional spans--i.e., that is, the 
human life is not long enough to witness thee-
volution of species or the onset, duration, and 
result of an ice age. 8 Other outer ontological 
aspects, these capable of human notation of their 
changing and changeability, are such things as 
other human natures, society, and psychologies. 
7H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative: 
A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy (Chica.go: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 22. 
8of course, a nuclear holocaust or destruc-
tion of the ozone layer by commercially manufac-
tured sprays is capable of compressing change 
in nature so that it could be encompassed within 
the span of a human life. 
9 
We can characterize these aspects as the histor-
ical, or 11 soft 11 technologies.9 
The Inner Nature 
However, the "inner" nature, while capable 
of being considered a science if looking at the 
psychological aspect of it, yet has at least two 
other dimensions to it, which have so far eluded 
the scientific bounds of investigation: these 
two dimensions are the spirit (or soul), posses-
sed by all, and the genius faculty, possessed 
by some. Here, the distinction is being made 
between creativity and genius. 
Creativity and Genius 
Bruner points out, and correctly so, that 
there is a difference between creativity and gen-
911 Technology11 is being used here in its orig-
inal sense: a systematic treatment. Physical 
nature of science can be considered in terms of 
applied science; society also can be considered 
by applying science to it, if we consider science 
as "fact 11 opposed to intuition or belief, and as 
a systematized corpus or process of knowledge 
based upon observation, study, hypothetical ex-
perimentation; "inner" nature (in this case, psy-
chology) also can be considered in terms of ap-
plied science. 
10 
ius.10 Genius is some form of creativity, but 
a form of creativity raised to a much higher de-
gree. Genius is creativity as creation. Crea-
tivity itself 11 is a process extended in time and 
characterized by originality, adaptiveness, and 
rea.lization.n11 Creativity is effective surprise:12 
that is, suddenly we are surprised ontologically 
by an ideational and/or emotional reorganization 
of phenomena, which effects within us a new met-
aphoric effective perception; it is a predictive 
effectiveness: A+ B = JBor (C).13 Any 11 creative 
act is an act of re-creation. 11 14 11 The necessary 
reconstruction Lof one's conceptual worl17 is 
the beginning of a creative process n 1 5 . . . . 
As we have pointed out several times before, ev-
eryone has (or at least had) this faculty of ere-
10on Knowing . . . ' p. 29. 
11 ;v1ackinnon, p. 160. 
12Bruner, On Knowing ••• , p. 18. 
13Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
14Jacob Bronowski, "The Creative Process, 11 
Creativity: A Discussion ••• , p. 13. 
15"'yri nr::r .,.., 1 ..w - a, 1-'• • 
1 1 
ativity, no matter how embryonic, stunted, or 
repressed: creativity 11 is the birthright of ev-
ery person of average talent." 16 It is therefore 
democratic. 
Genius, on the other hand, "is a class formed 
of a single individua1.17 Genius is the sudden 
astonishment of metaphysically and eptistemolog-
ically ideational and emotional reorganization 
and the resultant new discovery and creation of 
existing noumena, which affects us with a new 
conception. Whereas "creativity is that ability 
to see (or to be aware)' and to respond 11 18 and 
the disposition to make and to recognize valuable 
innovations, 11 19 the creative process of genius 
is 
16Ernest R. Hilgard, "Creativity and Problem 
Solving," Creativity and its Cultivation ••• , 
p. 162. 
17Gaston Bachelard, On Poetic Imagination 
and Reverie: Selections from the Works of, trans. 
with an Introduction by Collette Gaudin "'(New York: 
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1971), p. 42. 
18Erich Fromm, "The Creative Attitude, 11 Cre-
ativity and its Cultivation ••• , p. 44. 
19Harold D. Lasswell, "The Social Setting of 
Creativity," Creativity and its Cultivation ••• , 
p. 203. 
the emergence in ac~1on of a novel re-
lational product, growing out of the 
uniqueness of the individual on the 
one hand, and the materials, events, 
peonle, or circumstances of his life 
on the other.20 
Therefore, 
creation is a genuine phenomenon and 
not, as the majority of psychologists 
and philosophers today believe, some 
sort of complex shuffling of what has 
already been acquired empirically. I 
believe that in the act of creation 
the mind adds something to what was 
there before the act took place.21 
In this sense, something new has been brought 
11 into birth. 11 22 
12 
Therefore, creativity, on its first level, 
is perception:23 it allows and enables us to 11 see 11 
anew what has always been there but not before 
beheld; it 11 discovers the essential corresponden-
20carl R. Rogers, 11 Towa.rds a Theory of Cre-
ativity," Creativity and its Cultivation ••• , 
p. 71 • 
21Eliseo Vivas, Creation and Discovery (Chi-
ca.go: Henry Regnery Co., 1955),p. xi. 
22Rollo May, "The Nature of Crea.tivity, 11 
Creativity and its Cultivation ••• , p. 57. 
23Robert B. Macleod, 11 Retrospect and Pros-
pect," Contemporary Approaches to Creative Think-
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dences that exist between separate entities . . . .n24 ' 
it is thus a 11 synthetic activity, 11 25 11 a new .£.QI!l-
bination formed from pieces already in the mind 
by symbolic manipulation during dissociated thought. 11 26 
In short, creativity is the appreciation of 
the world, while genius is the adding to the world, 
or on a lower level, a recreating of the world. 
It is "the occurrence of .§1 composition which is 
both new and valuable. 11 27 Creativity is the light 
of the sun allowing us to see what is already 
there; genius is the intensification and conden-
sation of light until it becomes solid, like a 
laser. Genius is the creation of a new sun, or 
a new earth. • • new stars, new galaxies--the 
creation of a new heaven and a new earth. Crea-
tivity allows us to perceive and appreciate this 
ing: A Symposium Held at the University of Colo-
rado (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), p. 190. 
24Philippe Malrieu, La Construction de l' 
Imaginaire (Bruxelles: Charles Dessart, Editeur, 
1967), p. 2J.7. ·rranslation mine. ·J:he original 
is «Elle decouvre les correspondances virtuelles 
qui existent entre les domaines separes • • • .)} 
25David Beres, "Communication," The Creative 
Imagination: Psychoanalysis ••• , p. 212. 
26Haefele, p. 5. 
27He:nry A. Murray, 11 Vicissi tudes of Crea ti v-
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new heaven and this new earth besides perceiving 
and appreciating our old heaven and earth. 
Passion 
Passion (that is, emotion) is important for 
both creativity and genius: passion is one's 
impulses expressing themselves in one's life through 
one's work; 28 it is "urgent vitality. 11 29 Certainly, 
In art it is the feeling that cre-
ates, not the mind; the main role and 
the initiative in art belong to feel-
ing. Here the role of the mind is purely 
auxilliary, subordinate.30 
Passion is the impetus for and the claxity of 
the reorganization of phenomena in creativity; 
passion is the bridge crossing the metaphysical 
dichotomy from phenomena to noumena in genius • 
it is the white hot heat burning away the dross 
ity," Creativity and its Cultiv::ition ••• , p. 
99. 
28Bruner, On Knowing ••• , p. 24. 
29rbid. 
• • 
30stanislavski, Creating.§: Role, trans. by 
Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood, with Foreward by Rob-
ert Lewis (New York: Theatre Arts Books, 1961) 
p. 8. 
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of phenomena until we have left a new epistemol-
ogy, and consequently a new ontology. Because 
this new ontology is beautiful, we have a new 
axiology. Whereas creativity enables us to ap-
preciate aesthetics, genius adds to the store 
and fund of aesthetic objects and thus incipient 
aesthetical experience, both on the part of the 
genius-facilitator and also on the part of the 
guest(s) of the genius-facilitator. In creativ-
ity, one assumes the joyous responsibility of the 
11 Freedom to be dominated by the object. 11 31 Vfi th 
genius, one becomes the object in one's creation 
of the object. \'Jhen we look at a Gauguin, we 
are truly looking at more than just a piece of 
paint-covered canvas; we are truly looking at 
a part, ever a part (even though perhaps a small 
part) of the man and artist Gauguin. But even 
more, much much more, we are beholding--even now, 
years after the pictoral realization--the genius 
(or a manifestation of a pa.rt of it) of Gauguin. 
Soul 
Creativity is a revelation of the physical; 
31 r- · ct Dl • , p. 31 • 
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genius, of the soul. 
Vfhat is soul? 
Many things. 
Soul, is among other things, the invisible 
bounds and visible function of a structure. Any-
thing that is given discrete form and structure 
(and if it has awareness of other selves) has 
a soul. Once again, we must recall the activated 
complex in the theory of chemical reactions. 
vlhereas, in a. physical body any two molecules 
are held together by a chemical bond of recipro-
cal and reciprocating electrical chaxges, in the 
same body all of the molecules are held together 
in a form by similar reciprocal and reciprocating 
spiritual charges. The structuring into a form 
of moistened clay is itself the act of breathing 
into it the breath of life • .Any half-way intelli-
gent mechanic, for example, will tell you that 
an automobile has a soul. Of course the soul of 
an automobile or a house or whatever is as nrimi-
tive and rudimentary in comparison to the human 
soul as is the machinery of the automobile or 
the physical construct of the house or whatever 
in comparison to the construct and machinery of 
the human body. But, nevertheless, primitive 
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and rudimentary though it may be, a soul is pres-
ent in whatever form that is discrete and :purpo-
sive. 
Creativity is that gift, or faculty or facil-
ity, that enables us to perceive the discreteness 
and purposiveness and the uniqueness and beauty 
and marvel of the form and the wonder of its bounds, 
the soul. Genius is that gift that allows us to 
fashion and construct a beautiful, unique, marvel-
ous, and discrete and purposive form and thus 
its bounds, its own soul. 
Thus, creativity and genius a.re pa.rcenary 
to soul; they are inner faculties that allow us, 
in the first place, to commune with the outer, 
and, in the second place, to re-create or create 
the outer. They are the inner means of, in the 
first place, perceptions of and communication with, 
and, in the second place, re-creation or creation 
of, the outer matter. 
Soul determines soul. Soul is credited with 
feeling and willing and hence determining all 
creation. 
The ideational and incipient and imminent 
noumenal soul of any object is the predetermined 
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shaper a.nd former and predeterminer of its phe-
nomenal, discrete, and purposive form. It is 
the Idea-meaning32 that calls forth the substance, 
or form, or a.xiologic bounds. The Idea origin-
ates in one soul; because it is the Soul (in its 
original meaning) that feels, thinks, and wills 
and thus determines all behavior. Thus, soul 
gives birth to Idea, which in turn gives birth 
to another Soul, which in its turn gives birth 
to its corporate manifestation, or form. In short, 
soul determines soul. 
Perception 
This first level of creativity, imitation 
(or realism), is not usually concerned with gen-
ius, but rather with creativity, on the part of 
perception (bei~g able to~ the object), and 
then of course talent, skill, and practice in 
rendering the object by means of boundaries. 
This level of creativity is, of course, of the 
32 11 Idea11 here is used in its original mean-
ing of form as opposed to substance, or content. 
It is "accident" rather than "matter." Form may 
or may not reflect substance. 
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most elementary kind. But this first, this ele-
mentary level, of creativity is the result of a 
keen power of observation and naive receptvit:,r.33 
·I1his means that one both sees and accepts what 
he sees (both of which a.re, of course, very diffi-
cult for the vast majority of humans). l'he ob-
servation and receptivity are subsumed under one 
of the four major creative process stages, prepar-
ation.34 11 During the preparation stage, the in-
dividual is studious and gives sustained attention 
to the problem II 3 c:; . .,, 
Practica 
Our first exercise on this level of crea.-
33r,1ay Seagoe ( 1976) in Edward L. Neyen, Ex-
ce-otional Children and Youth: An Introduction 
(Denver: Love Publishing Co., 1978), p. 482. 
34see J. J. Gallagher, Analysis of Research 
on the Education of Gifted Children (Springfield, 
Illinois: Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
1960) and his Teaching the Gifted Child, 2nd ed. 
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1975). 
Andrew Crosby, in his Creativity and Perfor-
mance in Tndustrial Orga.."'1.i zation (New York: Tav-
istock Publications, 1968), lists these four sta-
ges as a process of motivation (active and sus-
tained search, p. 52-3), incubation (p. 60), il-
lumination (i.e., insight, p. 61)~ and verifica-
tion (both inner and outer, p. 62). 
35Meyen, p. 475. 
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tivity is seeing an object (or hearing, or f_eel-
ing it), receiving and accepting what we see--with 
no distaste, skepticism, impatience, arrogance, 
scorning, o~ looking down our nose upon what we 
see--and then as accurately--but not yet as com-
pletely--as we can, rendering the object in area-
listic yet simplified manner. 
Line Drawing 
Therefore, if we please, please, wherever we 
are, we must now stand up--and, if we happen to be 
inside of a building, we must walk to the nearest 
window and look out. We must not perceptually sweep 
the area. We must look straight ahead and then "see" 
the first object in our field of vision. Is it a 
tree? A building? A walkway? A lamp post? A tele-
phone pole? Whatever it is, we must draw it now. We 
cannot draw? We should have a little faith in our-
selves, should we not? Anyway, we are not after great 
art here. At this moment we are not even after art, 
great or otherwise. We are after a drawing, no 
matter how good or how bad. The correlation be-
tween our eyes and our hand may be out of synchron-
ization. What do we expect, if we have not been 
practicing drawing a great deal lately? But time 
on task improves all concerned. Besides, this 
is, presently, more of a practice in seeing than 
in rendering. Later, we shall expect achievement 
in both. 
As we look out our window, what do we see? 
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A large tree? That is what we see and here is our 
line drawing of it. (See Figure 3.) What is it 
characterized by? Verticality? Plumpness? What? 
What happens when we look at it? Does our eye round, 
continue, stop-start? What? In an examination of 
the tree and its outline, a number of features im-
pose themselves on our consciousness. Perhaps first 
among these is the widespread leafage. Throughout 
the boundaries the tree is expressing itself in its 
abundant leaves. We consider, for example, the ra-
tio of the distance from leaf edge to leaf edge with 
the diameter of the trunk. 
If this narrative of leaves looks simple, it 
does so because it is. It is also a common narra-
tive found in the Ideas of mushrooms, hairdos, nu-
clear explosions, clouds, pancakes, hamburgers, and 
so forth. We have seen it countless times, from our 
earliest nursing days to the present. It has become 
part of our perceptional and conceptional philosophy. 
It is an attractive narrative to us because it is so 
deceptively simple and because it has been an integral 
and prominent part of our perceptions for so long. 
\ 
1 Tree Figure • 
22 
Thus far, our simple little exercise with 
pen has enabled us to practice briefly the first, 
the most elementary level, of creativity, simple 
imitation, or reproduction, in the visual mode 
(for use in drawing, painting, sculpting, ceram-
ics, architecture, set design, and so forth). 
But we have yet to apply this concept of line 
drawing (that is, the simple rendering of boun-
daries), for example, to the practices of the 
literary and cinematic and television arts. 
Literary Arts 
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For literary art, we can just begin and end 
with a drawing or design. If we look at the graphic 
arts of older books, we find so often design embell-
ishments of the title page, chapter numbers and/or 
headings, and letters of the alphabet. Writers to-
day must revolt again~t their present ignorance, 
laziness, intimidation, and subservience to the pub-
lishing cartel; vlI'i ters must once again take an act-
ive and aggressive hand in the physical realization 
of their works (i.e., the actual printing of their 
own works). Why not? Indeed why not? Perhaps the 
present trend of vlI'i ters publishing their own works 
on their own presses must continue, not as merely 
an expedient of getting their works before the 
24 
people, but rather as an integral part of the 
artistic process. This means that the literary 
artist must do everything in the preparation of 
the manuscript for printing, except possibly the 
press run itself, but even this he might consider 
as a. desirable, if not necessary, part of the ar-
tistic process. 
An analogy might be drawn with the life pro-
cess of human beings: the act of sex is not the 
end of the life process, but rather might be merely 
the beginning; the conception itself is not the 
end either, but merely another step; the gesta-
tion period is still another one; even the birth 
itself is not the end of the process--so much, 
much more is to follow. How long is it before 
the child can be considered ready to go out on 
his own? The same is true of a literary work. 
Do we think that changing diapers is nasty work? 
Then we should not have children--beca.use diapers 
is a part of the whole package. The same is true 
of printers ink. To see a beautifully bound vol-
ume of fine paper and type, one would never guess 
at the messiness of the ink and the type (and 
today of the preparation and development of the 
plates), and. the inking of the press. Who sees 
messy diapers when he looks at and appreciates 
a beautiful young woman in a bikini or a.n even-
ing dress smelling deliciously of perfume? Who 
thinks of the nasty mess of a one-year old baby 
girl when he looks at the panties or bikini cov-
ering the same general area of an 18 year old 
young woman? 
Therefore, we may, if we like, include our 
first line drawing as a part of a poem, essay, 
article, short story, or novel--just as well as 
we might include it as part of a drawing, a char-
coal, pastel, or painting. We can also film it 
or tape it as part of the opening or closing of 
our film, or anywhere in between (as has been 
done before in films). 
Photography, Film, and Television 
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But for photography, film, and television, we 
also have an equivalent. Remembering that this first 
level of creativity is simple reproduction or imita-
tion, in cinematic or photographic or television 
terms, we can substitute the camera. for our eye and 
leave out the line reproductive step; that is, instead 
of drawing a picture of a tree (or a house, or a 
face, or whatever), we merely frame the object 
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in the viewfinder of the camera and film it. 
The normal lens must be used because a wide angle 
or telephoto lens would distort (i.e., interpret 
the object); in like manner, we must not use any 
artificial lights or filters • 
.Acting 
Remember our tree? We did not "realistic-
ally" reproduce the entire tree. We left out 
the individual leaves, the different colors, and 
so forth. We could have put them in had we so de-
sired. But we exercised choice and selection. 
We did not want to copy the tree; we wanted to imi-
tate it. Our task was to perceive and then to 
imitate (realistically replicate) only the bound-
aries (i.e., the outline) of the tree. Well, in 
acting we want to do the same thing: we go out 
and observe a person, animal, or thing. We choose 
one aspect of what we are observing: the way a 
person walks, eats, holds his head, and so forth. 
Then we mimic the broad, general 11 outline 11 of 
that one aspect. This is one way to start put-
ting together a character. 
Essay Composition 
In like manner, if we are writing an essay 
and, furthermore, if we decide that it is going to be 
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a descriptive essay, then we describe our tree, 
or building, or whatever. If we wish to write 
a chronological theme or essay, then we record 
some process that we have chosen to imitate in 
words. If we wish to write a character essay, 
then we write a physical description of pa.rt or 
the whole of the person who is our subject. An 
opening paragraph containing a physical descrip-
tion places the subject in a context, introduces 
him to the reader, and provides a frame of refer-
ence--a set of boundaries--in which the reader 
may place or may anchor the subject so that it 
does not slip or slide away; such an introductory 
paragraph in a character essay provides the rea-
der with a handle affixed to the subject so that 
the reader may hold fast the subject and steadily 
view it. 
Note to Reader 
There can be no other way: if we are true 
craftsmen (or wish to be), we shall do every exer-
cise contained in this book. If we do not know mu-
sic, then we must learn it. But we must be careful 
about taking music or any axt--or anything--in 
a college or university: many incompetent and/ 
or vicious little people are teaching them, and 
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they can really damage us. However, it is easy 
to protect ourselves: all we have·to do is to 
march away and not come back and tell all of our 
friends. We must, however, look around and do 
some shopping because there are also many unbe-
lievably good people teaching, people whom we 
need to meet and work with, and about whom we need 
to tell our friends. 
Pedagogical Implications 
Teachers and professors are, or should be, 
or must be, imitators much of the time. Their 
job, usually, is to simplify, ever how much is 
needed, so that the student may grasp and under-
stand. If a teacher presents something and does 
not simplify--if simplification is needed or de-
sired--then he is merely a copier or merely an 
empty conduit through which the lesson flows un-
impeded. When a teacher explains anything to 
students, whether it be a poem by T. S. Eliot 
or Flanders' Verbal Interaction Analysis, that 
teacher is simplifying; and, when the teacher 
is simplifying, that teacher is engaged in imi-
tation. 
If the teacher, instead of simplifying, makes 
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more complex a lesson than what it is, then he 
is either an incompetent bungler, or, like Saul 
Maloff, trying desperately to show how much more 
he knows or how much more intelligent he is than 
the students. 
Much of teacher training should be devoted 
to practice in imitation: in simplifying concepts 
and phenomena and processes. 
The effective teacher is a good imitator 
(i.e., simplifier). 
Conclusion 
In short, imitation is our rendering of the 
boundaries of an Idea, a relationship of Ideas, 
or Ideas in motion. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE SECOND LEVEL OF CREATIVITY 
TRANSPOSITION 
••• good sense is the 
body of poetic genius, fancy 
its drapery, motion its life, 
and imagination the soul 
that is everywhere, and in 
each; and forms all into 





In the first level of creativity, imitation, 
we have adhered to and fulfilled six out of the 
seven divisions of praxiology: these seven di-
visions are cooperation, precision, purity, econ-
omy, coherence, simplicity, and struggle.1 Our 
1These seven divisions of praxiology are 
30 
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line drawing of the tree, for example, is simplic-
ity itself; if we have any skill at all, the imi-
tation is coherent (that is, it makes sense by 
being recognizable to most others); it is econ-
omical (only the outline, the boundaries, of the 
object has been used); it is pure (in the sense 
that no alien ingredients are included--it is 
just the outline, the boundaries, of the object, 
the Idea, itself); depending upon our skill and 
practice, it is precise; · and it reflects our co-
operation with the object (i.e., we have merely 
reproduced the object; we have not set up tensions 
between ourselves and the object, nor among our-
selves, the object, and viewer, by abstracting 
part of the object (symbolism), nor by presenting 
all aspects of the object equally (cubism), nor 
by distorting the object or parts of it (impres-
sionism or expressionism). 
Transposition as Struggle 
We are now ready to proceed on to the sec-
" listed in Alicja Iwanska, "Praxiology and Curric-
ulum," Curriculum Inauiry: The Study of Curricu-
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ond level of creativity: transposition of imita-
tion. On this level, we set up a struggle between 
an object in its unique, boundaried form and the 
same object (or Idea) transposed to another form. 
In drawing and painting and sculture, for 
example, we take our first, original line draw-
ing of the tree and look at it, steadily and eas-
ily, with fantastic, yet relaxed, intensity and 
concentration. To operationalize this percep-
tion of boundaries it is sometimes helpful to 
first determine the center of the horizontal and 
vertical thrusts of the Idea. (See Figure 2.) 
Once this centered nexus is discovered, we more 
easily may find its envelope (i.e., its outer 
narrative). 
This procedure requires the establishment 
of an intersecting nexus that is complete and 
stable. If we establish such nexus and directions 
of thrust in light of our perceptions-plus-pre-
vious-knowledge, we conclude and summarize sim-
plified rather than simplistic dynamics. 
lum practice (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 
1979), p. 288. Pra.xiology is "the general the-
ory of good works (or efficient action) in all 
areas of human behavior. 
\ 
Figure 2. Tree Showing Directional Dynamics 
34 
We are looking and searching for its feeling of 
form ultimately so that we may liberate the feel-
ing of form from the form itself and from the bound-
aries in order to contexualize it into another 
yet related conceptualization. We find the feel-
ing of form and sketch its flowing lines. (See 
Figure 3.) 
The most important consideration of this prin-
ciple is that the "goal" of the object (here, the tree) 
as manifested in its "will" must be discovered and as 
accurately as it is in our power replicated definitely, 
yet tentatively. This "goal" must be discernible to 
the audience as well as the artist--or at least, its 
value must be discernible. If this 11 goal 11 is not at-
tainable by the artist (that is, if it is beyond the 
technical grasp of and rendition by the artist), then 
the artist must not attempt it just yet. Or, he 
must be aware that the attempt is beyond his grasp 
and that his attempt therefore is an 11 experimental" 
one (that is, a private exercise). But, even so, 
such experiments can be dangerous, for they may 
lead to frustration and self-doubt. Shall we 
experiment or shall we do? So many times the 
.. 
designation "experimentationil is merely a preemp-












What do we see in these lines of feeling besides 
a tree? Many things, of course. One of the things 
that we see is a woman, with flowing lines, head 
inclined forward with tresses of hair falling 
forward and down. (See Figure 4.) 
In literary a.rt, Robert Frost has shown us, in 
his poem "Birches," how to so perceive. In that 
poem, the bent-over birch trees remind the poetic 
ego, first, of such trees as boys have swung in 
and bent dovm to the earth; then, the trees remind 
the poet of girls throwing their wet hair over in 
front of them so as to dry it in the sun. 
The most important principle in such separat-
ing of form from Idea, is that the goal of the 
Idea must not be violated; its 11 will" must be 
absolutely definite; it must be recognizable by 
both artist and audience. What we are doing is 
accepting the large goal of the total Idea and 
then subdividing it so that the progress of a part 
of it is obvious to us all. 
In its most basic aspect, this abstraction 
of lines of feeling from an Idea is a process 
designed to insure that a.ny individual artist 
may determine for himself the validity and appro-




Figure 4. Woman 
38 
We have transformed, by transposition, simple, 
direct imitation, or reportage, of a tree, first 
into an abstraction of its form and then into one 
of many manifestations of its incipient form (i.e., 
its flowing lines) and then, last, into a like, 
yet different realization of its essential form. 
Narration 
Such tra.nspostion is made possible by the 
meta.physical nature of form. All form is essen-
tia.lly narrative, in that....-form is composed of 
~ ' line and mass. Both line and mass ~e the dual 
,,,,,,-- / \._ ' 
attributes of interpenetration and alienation. 
/ . \ 
The lines (and the resultant included, boundaried 
/ \ 
mass) of our tree delimits, demarcates a tree: 
I ~ \ 
'· 
\__ 
Figure 5. Tree 
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We look at the tree itself or at our line draw-
ing and perceive and conclude, "That is a tree. 11 
It is made up of a trunk, limbs, branches, and 
leaves. Hov1ever, if we follow the narration of 
its vertical lines flowing down the form of the 
tree and then dramatically svJeeping out horizon-
tally, we are informed of the existence of the 
tree-form as part of a context--its narrative 
vertical lines sweep out into horizontal lines 
and become part of the ground, of the earth. 
(See Figures 6 and 7.) 
Like most processes which involve a balancing 
of contrary sweeping and thrusting and flowing 
dynamics, narration can be perceived and conceptu-
alized successfully only if preconceived notions 
and educational and axtistic objectives axe re-
sisted and ignored. One mechanism for insuring 
such a clear perception is process freedom. The 
eye and emotions must be liberated from the beginning. 
Process freedom, as the term implies, would 
never prescribe anticipated perceptional conclu-
sions. In other words, process freedom establishes 
nothing except the joy of discovery. Thus, the em-
phasis is not on greater initial demands that the 
"correct" direction be determined at the outset. 
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Figure 6. Flowing Tiirectional Lines 
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Figure 7. Flowing Directional Lines of a Tree 
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If we, with our mind's eye of imagination, 
continue the trunk's lines down vertically, flow-
out of and through the bottom of the Idea, rather 
than allowing our eye the easy sweep of vertical-
ity flowing into the horizonta.li ty of the ground, 
we are informed of the existence of another part 
of the tree, below ground, a part that may or 
may not be (depending upon the species of tree) 
larger, smaller, or the same size as the pa.rt 
above the ground: (See Figure 8.) 
The impact of this dual nature of reality takes 
different forms of course, but foremost is the impact 
on what is considered desirable in our world of percep-
tional values. Perceptional values whose quality is 
judged in terms of aesthetic response of the per-
ceiver tend to emphasize what the eye sees. This 
means that the areas not seen are considered less 
important than those that are seen. Or it means that 
the unseen areas are regarded as nonexistent. At 
the primary level, art is replaced by "science." 
In education, art is considered a frill; science, 
a necessity. A football star is manly; a music vir-
tuoso in the band, a half-time diversion. The 
highest salaries go to science professors and to 
manipulators of the tangible, administrators. 
Figure 8. Tree with Root System 
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The :portion of the tree above ground is the supra-
structure, surstructrure, or suprasystem of the 
entire Idea of tree; the part below ground is 
the subsystem or substructure. 
Hidden Versus Revealed 
That which is hidden is eq_ual to (sometime s 
superior to) in mass that which is revealed. 
This is a hint to us of the metaphysical nature 
of ontology: what we do not see is nevertheless 
there and equal to (or greater, at least in im-
portance, if not in actual size, than) what we 
do see, wh2.t is revealed easily to us. A."'1.d what 
is revealed to us is directly dependent upon what 
is hidden from us. I'fost philosophers recognize 
and celebrate this truth. But we must also realize 
that what is hidden from us is just as dependent 
upon what is revealed, as what is revealed is de-
pendent upon what is hidden. That is, the root 
system of our tree provides intake of moisture 
for the above-ground structure (and also provides 
security ••• so that it is not, for example, 
blovm a.way); in its turn, the supra.structure, 
in this instance (specifically, the leaves), pro-
vides photosynthesis for the entire structure, 
and so forth. 
Utility Versus Beauty 
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Whereas the primary axilogical nature of the 
hidden subsystem of our tree and of all phenomena 
(and ontology) is its utility, the primary axiolog-
ical nature of the supra.system is its aesthetics. 
We might apply all of this, by way of illus-
tration, to another phenomenon: woman. (And of 
course, the following can. be said equally well 
of man.) A man looks a.ta woman; depending upon 
the arrangement and texture of her outer (her 
revealed) being (her skin, shape, eyes, hair, 
lips, neck, arms, and so forth), the man receives 
an aesthetic and/or sensual impression and reac-
tion. If this man, however, looks beyond (that 
is, below) her surface (her revealed) form, and 
could see the red and mucoused, and bloody arrange-
ment of tissue, muscles, and her stomach filled 
with partly-digested food, and her white coiled, 
serpentined intestines and filling bowels and 
bladder--he might be impressed with the utility 
of all this that he perceives; but rare would 
be the man who would receive an aesthetic and/ 
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or sensual impression and thrill from it. In 
fact, a. man would, most likely, perceive this 
hidden physical reality of a woman with shock, 
if not disgust. (And of course we speak nothing 
of the hidden spiritual, moral, and psychological 
nature of woman.) A literary example of such a 
familiarization of the unfamiliar is the follow-
ing: 
Fred stood up, swayed. There were 
bells in his ears. There were spots 
before his eyes. He went into the bed-
room, found his wife asleep in bed with 
her clothes on. She was drunk, and 
full of chicken and mayonnaise, as she 
always was after a luncheon with Amanita. 
Fred tiptoed out again, thought of hang-
ing himself from a pipe in the cellar.Z 
The author in so presenting the substructure and 
subsystem of this woman (her stomach full of booze, 
chicken, and mayonnaise) is attacking her by shock-
ing the reader. (The reader is shocked because 
the II grotesqueness' of the hidden part of the on-
tology of the woman has been revealed: metaphysic-
ally, reality has been reversed.) 
2Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., God Bless You, Mr. Rose-
water; .Q£, Pearls Before Swine (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), p. 160. 
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Beautiful Versus the Grotesque 
Thus, in creativity and genius, when we look at 
an object with the view of presenting it as part of 
a work of art, we must decide, select, which of its 
two general realities it is that we are going to 
present, or both; the metaphysical choice oi its 
ontology will decide the impact, the reaction, on 
the part of the audience: whether the axiolog-
ical impact will be aesthetic or "grotesque. 11 
Anything that is familiar to the sight and 
expectant psychology of men and women may or may 
not be aesthetic; the hidden aspects of ontology 
may or may not be aesthetic; however, if the hid-
den side is of an aesthetic phenomenon, it will 
almost always impact the audience with the effect 
of grotesqueness. ~l\.nother example is the natural 
smells of woman (to the male initiate) as compared 
with her cosmetized, perfumed, assumed fragrances. 
Some of these hidden realities, such as the 
natural smells of a woman, can be experienced 
directly. But overwhelmingly, most of these hid-
den realities must be surmised, by a combination 
of reality and previous experiences through such 
things as other artists' or illustrators' repre-
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sentations of the hidden realitites or through 
the actual digging up of roots, or whatever. 
In other words, we learn about the 11 grotesq_ue" 
either through knowledge first hand (empirical) 
or second hand (vicariously artistic, et cetera). 
But, when we dig up the root system of a tree, 
for example, even then we are experiencing only 
a part of the hidden reality of the tree; that 
is, we are experiencing this particular hidden 
reality out of its context and thus very incom-
pletely. Therefore, we must use our intuition 
or creative insight to supply its discarded con-
text and to replace the abstracted part back into 
its whole. 
And too, we have just been talking about 
the hidden reality of phenomena; the other dimen-
sion to the hidden part of ontology, the spirit-
ual aspect, we can never see with our physical 
eye (except infrequently such manifestations of 
it as ghosts and spirits); we must behold it with 
our inner eye of imagination. 
Regardless of whenever an artist presents 
the hidden part of reality--whether phenomenal 
or spiritual--the reaction on the part of the 
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audience is shock (mild or severe) as a result 
of the grotesqueness of the hidden part of the 
ontology being suddenly revealed. Therefore, the 
purpose of the artist--whether aesthetic communion 
and celebr_ation or grotesque. shock--determines 
his choice of subject (or, to be more precise, 
deterr.iines which half of a particular subject 
will be presented, the revealed part or the hid-
den). 
Summary 
In summary, "Speaking broadly we can approach 
the world of reality directly and perceptually 
or we can approach it indirectly and conceptu-
ally.113 But the latter is dependent upon the 
former; we can only accomplish the second by way, 
by means, of the first. Indeed, unless we stunt 
ourselves (or allow others to stunt us) with bad 
education or other unfortunate life-traumas, there 
is an ineluctable progression or propulsion or 
propagation from the direct and perceptual approach, 
3Nelson B. Henry, Community iBducation: Prin-
ci nles and Practices from 1'/orld-Wide Experience, 
The Fifty-eighth Yearbook of the National Society 
for the Study of Education (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 288. 
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of the epistemology a.nd ontology, to the indirect 
a.nd conceptual approach. ThB first stage of the 
approach to reality is concerned with the areas 
of important societal functions such as education 
and information; the second stage of the approach 
(to the hidden ontology of phenomena) is concerned 
wi th--because of its 11 na.tural 11 affinity for nar-
rative--to its true domain, the 11 mind" of God 
and man. Here, of course, we are conceptualiz-
ing 11 mind 11 in the way that Wordsworth did: 
This spiritual Love acts not nor can exist 
Without Imagination, which in truth, 
Is but another name for absolute power 
And clearest insight, amplitude of mind, 
And Reason in her most exalted mood.4 
Mind uses its power and insight and amplitude 
in accomplishing its perception of Ideas by grasp-
ing the narrative of each Idea. 
Several Aspects of Narrative Considered 
Freire brilliantly and correctly points out 
that 11 narrative 11 in an educational setting is an 
undesirable situation: 
4The Prelude, 1850, XIV, 188-192. 
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A careful analysis of the teacher-stu-
dent relationship at any level, inside 
or outside the school, reveals its fund-
amentally narrative character. This 
relationship involves a narrating Sub-
ject (the teacher) a~patient, listen-
ing objects (the students). The con-
tents, whether values or empirical di-
mensions of reality, tend in the pro-
cess of being narrated to become life-
less and petrified. Education is suf-
fering fr;m narration sickness.5 
Opposed to this narrative oppression is dialog-
ical liberation: 
Liberating education consists in 
acts of cognition, not transferrals of 
information. It is a learning situa-
tion in which the cognizable object 
(far from being the end of the cogni-
tive act) intermediates the cognitive 
actors--teacher on the one hand and stu-
dents on the other. Accordingly, the 
practice of problem-posing education 
entails at the outset that the teacher-
student contradiction be resolved. Di-
alogical relations--indispensable to 
the capacity of cognitive actors to 
cooperate in perceiving the same cog-
nizable object--are otherwise impossi-
ble. 
Indeed, problem-posing education, 
which breaks with the vertical patterns 
characteristic of banking education, 
can fulfill its function as the prac-
tice of freedom only if it can overcome 
the above contra.diction. Through di-
alogue, the teacher-of-the-students and 
the students-of-the-teacher cease to 
5page 57. 
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exist and a new term emerges: teacher-
student with students-teachers. ~he 
teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-
teaches, but one who is himself taught 
in dialogue with the students, who in 
turn while being taught also teach. 
They become jointly responsible for 
a process in which all grow. In this 
process, arguments based on ° authori tyr1 
are no longer valid; in order to func-
tion, authority must be Q!l the side of 
freedom, not against it. Here, no one 
teaches another, nor is anyone self-
taught. Men teach each other, mediated 
by the world, by the cognizable objects 
which in banking education.are 11 owned 11 
by the teacher.6 
All of the above is true; we must not, however, 
allow Freire's brilliance and verity in the sit-
uation and context that he has chosen, to blind 
us in other contexts. Narrative per~ (as with 
anything~ se) is not pernicious; it is only 
when narrative is frozen by false outside author-
ity into an abstracted stasic fragment that it 
is bad. When narrative freely and fluidly chan-
ges back and forth between two or three or more 
agents, it is then that we have Freire's long-
sought-for dialogue. When narrative is freely 
and mutually chosen at the moment by the concerned 
6roid., p. 67. 
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agents, because of the exigencies of the context, 
it is liberating; wheri it is forced upon one or 
more agents by another agent, then it is oppres-
sion. \'!hen the narrative issues forth from ~ 
finite human agent, it is arrogant stupidity; 
when narrative is celebrated in a. communion of 
finite agents in awe of the infinite nature or 
world, then it is liberating education. Nature 
is the true narrative; when man usurps this nar-
rative, he falsifies it by breaking off what small, 
infintesimal chunk of it that he is able to handle 
with his little dirty grimes. The person-a.gents 
must present themselves, clean of mind and soul, 
humbly before nature; then it is that nature will 
reveal its narrative to supplicating suppliants. 
Teacher at most (if at best) only mediates, 
for a very short time, because of more experience, 
between student-a.gent and the cosmic narrative. 
The student-agent, because of freshness of per-
ception, then, in the chronology, in thankfulness 
is willing to assume the teacher-mediation role 
and to, in return, mediate between the teacher-
now-student and the narrative of the world and 
of nature. This priesthood of mediation is ever-
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changing; if ever it becomes frozen, oppression 
and distortion and death are the inevitable result-
ing states. 
What is this narrative of nature? 
Narrative is continuous interpenetration; 
we are using "narrative" here, in this context, 
in a very specific and technical sense: it is 
the 11 relating 11 of a "story." A story is the sum 
of a connected series of discreti. In literature, 
discreti a.re a connected series of any of the 
following: events, descriptions, dialogue, com-
mentary; in music, the most elementary discreti 
are tone, interval, and pitch; in speech and writ-
ten language the most elementary discreti are 
tone, pitch, interval, phoneme (vowels and con-
sonants); in drawing and painting, the simplest 
discretus is a dot--of whatever size--(a dot sus-
tained over a period of space becomes a series 
of connected dots--or a line; that is, if at any 
place in a line or a mass of color we remove all 
except where an original pencil, pen, brush, char-
coal, makes contact with the surface of the con-
text--i.e., a piece of paper, canvas, and so forth--
we have a dot.) 
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In whatever medium, the artist connects into 
a series discreti which a.re similar, dissimilar, 
or a combination of similar aid dissimilar, into 
shapes, syllables, words, measures, and forms. 
In a line drawing of a tree, we first touch our 
pen to paper, resulting in a dot: ~; ~e then sus-
tain that dot over space: 
And so forth. 
In music, we sustain the 
original discretus (whether pitch, 
tone, or interval) over, not a spatial 
continuum, but rather over a temporal 
This sustention in music has its 
counterpart in all creativity. Susten-
tation is the gradual manifestation of narrative. 
It takes the form of a line (in drawing and paint-
ing), and a melodic line in music, and an exposi-
tory, descriptive, or argumentative line of affec-
tive or rational reasoning in spoken (rhetorical) 
or written language (speech, novel, article, poem, 
short story, or whatever). 
These discrete dots--no matter how sustained, 
nor for how long--remain the sustentacular primus 
of any form; these discreti always remain the sus-
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tension of any Idea. (It is no gratuity that 
the first physical make-up of a television pie-
ture tube took the form of an arrangement of dis-
crete dots.) 
A film is a series of discrete static forms 
flashed in a succession of separate and frozen 
triads. Just as the mind joins these technolog-
ical stati into a synthesized motion, just so does 
the mind (colored by the emotions of course) recog-
nize and then synthesize into combinations the 
static discreti of the natural technology, the 
phenomena. This process of converting static 
discreti into continuous, flowing (i.e., joined 
forms--that is, Ideas) is called Phi-phenomenon: 
some theorists accounted for 
the illusion of moving pictures by 
recourse to the theory of."retention 
of visual stimulus. 11 Munsterberg char-
acteristically went beyond this passive 
view to an active one in which the mind 
at its most primitive level confers mo-
tion on stimuli. 
He recognized that the retina does 
retain visual impressions momentarily 
after a stimulus has been removed, as 
when we close our eyes after looking 
at the sun, but he shows that this pas-
sive phenomenon does account for this 
by emphasizing the active powers of 
the mind which literally make sense 
(motion) out of distinct stimuli. Mun-
sterberg describes this pehnomenon by 
recounting some famous experiments in 
perception, but he never tries to ex-
plain it. The phi-phenomenon is for 
him a given. It shows that at its most 
basic level the mind has its own laws 
and constructs our world in exercising 
them. It shows as well that the tech-
nology of film implicitly recognizes 
these laws and works its effects on 
the mind itself. The complex machin-
ery (camera, projectors, and all the 
processing gadgetry) producing inter-
mittent still pictures has been devel-
oped to work directly on the raw mater-
ial of the mind.7 
Primaxy Particles 
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The fact that creativity is a succession of 
discreti should not surprise us since all of the 
natural world itself is made up of discreti, dis-
creti which we call atoms: 
atoms from which nature creates a.11 
things and increases and feeds them 
and into which, when they perish,_na-
ture a.gain resolves them. • • • lThese 
atoms a.re thfil 'raw material', or 'gen-
erative bodies' or 'seeds' of things 
I " t" 1 I 8 •••• primary par ices •••• 
7J. Dudley Andrew, The Major Film Theories: 
An Introduction (London: Oxford University Press, 
1976), p. 18. 
81ucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, 
trans. and introd. R. E. La.tham--rNew York: Pen-
guin Books, 1951), p. 28. 
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In like manner, the various discreti which compose 
the various art forms are the raw materials, the 
generative bodies, the seeds of the artifacts, 
and the primary particles of the creative process. 
The Process of Converting Discreti 
The process of converting the natural discreti 
of a tree, or house, or land.scape into a synthesized 
narrative is the result of the perceptual powers 
of an individual; to recreate this synthesis in 
an art form, it is first necessary to disconnect 
the series of discreti and then to reconnect them 
into a new synthesis; the new synthesis may not 
be isomorphic in regards to the original synthe-
sis because the reconnection is a process of per-
sonal intent; and personal intent is just that, 
personal, idiosyncratic. The ideal is not artis-
tic cloning but the aesthetic (pleasing) connect-
ing of discreti into an aesthetic Idea. Skill 
and sophistication in art and also in valuation 
moves one's perceptualizings and conceptualizings 
more and more away from isomorphism to the idio-
morphic. 
The Communal Spirit 
Of great importance to narrative is the com-
munal spirit: this means that a narrative 
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representation of a tree is recongizable immedi-
ately by the artist's co~munity (i.e., the people 
of his world's society); whereas, a presentation 
(whether symbolic, impressionistic, expressionis-
tic, or v.rha tever) of the same tree may or may 
not be recognizable by this community. The nar-
rative representation of a tree presents a bound-
aried Idea that represents the experience (and 
perceptive experience) of the group rather than 
merely an idiosyncratic, or personal, experience 
of the artist. Hence, on this level, of narrative 
Idea, we look not so much for individuality of 
style as of a mome:".ltarily frozen segment of our 
oscillation between experienced reminiscence and 
personal, though communally representative, improv-
isation of eye, mind, heart with the raw mater-
ials of object (tree, et cetera) and tools (paper, 
pen, and so forth). Because of the communal spirit 
saturating all, we don't mind the re-creation of 
the same common objects; we only ask that the 
artist 1 s personal, idiosyncratic intent be mani-
fest in his resynthesis of the discreti of the 
object into his Idea. The communal narrative 
has been classified as primitive; the more indi-
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vidual, as sophisticated. Happy is that skilled 
artist who is master of both a~d thus able to 
use both in the same work, where needed and/or 
desired. ( See an example o.f such in Dvorak' s 
The New ':!orld Symphony, Symphony No • .2. in ~ Minor, 
Opus 95.) Primitive narrative is just as capable 
of allegory or symbol as is the sophisticated 
kind: the context (or background) in which the 
Idea. is placed determines its significance of 
reference: a rose may be just a rose; or it may 
symbolize passion, or whatever. \'Jhen is an is-
land more than just an island? ( See Wa ttea.u' s 
Embarkation for the Island of Cythera.) Identi-
fication of context, or background, is essential. 
By merely labeling our tree, standing physically 
alone in the pasture, we infuse its content and 
boundaries with significance: loneliness, strength, 
and so forth. 
Without context narrative becomes beset with 
tabescence. 
The Partnership of the Gods 
After having considered the nature of the 
contiguous and continuous ontology of phenomenal 
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objects, and have judged it to be therefore of 
a narrative nature, we now must look at the re-
lationship of this narrative to the :9erceiving and 
perceptualizing creative artist. How shall we 
proceed? What shall be our method? 
Because Freire's explication of dialogue 
is so beautiful and so true, let us use, initially, 
his explication as our form and by parallelism 
seek out and build our perception of the nature 
of the narrative interaction between artist and 
object. Thus we shall allov1 Freire to be our 
formal carrier until our exegesis organically 
assumes its own form and life. 
Dialogue 
Obviously, the essence of dialogue is the 
word;9 the word is not an instrument (a slave) 
of dialogue, doing its bidding (doing its work); 
rather, dialogue is the word continued in a temp-
oral sustenuto; it is an interpenetra.ted series 
of temporal sustenutos: one word--in its true 
authentic and undegenerate form--contains two 
constitutive elements: reflection plus action.10 
9Freire, p. 75. 
1 Oibid. 
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During the reflection of the word, the word's 
input and import are sustained and at the same 
time strengthened; during the action, the sustained 
and climactically strengthening reflection bears 
fruit in kinesis; this actional ..C' • .J-. ' ... ~ruiuion con~rio-
utes to and continues the temporal sustenuto. 
An artist looks at an object. First, he must see 
it; if he sees it, he then must perceive it--he 
must perceive it as a boundaried mass contained 
within yet distinct from its context. If he per-
ceives this, then he ideates its dimensions; this 
he conceptualizes into a word (such as tree, woman, 
hair, and. so forth). T1his word evokes a combin-
ation emotion-idea. This much so far is intellec-
tualisrn (on a very low plane, to be sure). If 
the idea.tor then reacts to the intellectual stim-
ulus (goes to the tree, smiles at the woman--or 
kisses her, or whatever--strokes the hair, and 
so forth), kinesis has resulted. Reflection plus 
action has eq_ualled praxis. If a person cuts 
down the tree without reflecting upon the nature 
of the tree and himself and upon the physical, 
moral, ethical, and philosophical implications 
of the act, he is guilty of activism (action with-
63 
out reflection). Dr. Albert Schweitzer never 
stertlized his surgical instruments without re-
gretting the multitude .of bacterial life that had 
to be sacrificed so that a larger life, the life 
of a human being, could be saved. Such reverence 
for life is praxis suprerae. '.:-.'hen a.n India.n--back 
in the days before his conquest by the white man--
would kill a deer, for example, he would ask it.s 
forgiveness, and explain the necessity for the 
deed--he and his wife and children needed the 
sustenance of the venison so as to live; the In-
dia.n would turn the head of the deer towards the 
east (the direction of Paradise), put a bowl of 
grain in front of it, and humbly. request that 
it speak to the spirits a.bout how well the hun-
ter had treated it, in the dire tragic necessity 
of the hunt and kill. This is praxis perfected. 
Compare with the white men who shot and killed 
buffaloes (bison) from speeding trains. Such 
was activism. The valuation of praxis (here, 
moral praxis) versus activism is implicit in the 
preceeding examples and needs no comment. 
The naming of an object (please notethe dis-
tinction of actively naming an object, on the one 
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hand, and merely accepting one's cultural desig-
nation, on the other) is an act of dialogue. One 
perceives a tree; the tree communicates its form 
and substance (its Idea) to the perceiver; the per-
ceiver conceptualizes the Idea and gives it a name. 
'.L1he Indian's "communication" with the dead deer 
was a dialogue • .Schweitzer's naming of his sit-
uation of sterilizing the instruments by killing 
a multitude of life was a dialogical ideation 
of the situation. 
The world.presents the artist with an object 
(such as a tree); this is a. gift of communication; 
the artist paints the tree. This portraiture 
(or posterization) is also a gift, a gift to the 
world, to life. A dialogue ha.s ensued here, also. 
Dialogue joins; interuenetration (and holism) is 
the constituent of life. Narrative, however, 
which does not become dialogue, is a process of 
dichotomization; dichotomization leads first to 
ta.bescence, and tabescence leads to ossification 
or death. 
The artist, by engaging· in dialogue with na-
ture (painting an Idea of an object, or whatever) 
has transformed the world by adding to it. There 
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are two choices, with nothing in between: we 
either add to the world or we subtract from it. 
Adding to the world is not the right of an indi-
vidual; it is his duty. Subtraction from the 
world is a crime, under which all classifications 
of sins, of a.11 religions (including the ten com-
mandments of one religion) are subsumed. Dishon-
oring one's father or mother subtracts from the 
glory and the fruit of their pain, sorrow, suffer-
ing, and sacrifice that the parents have endured 
in the process of their parenthood. Adultery sub-
tracts from the happiness and stability of the 
present family unit; fornication subtracts from 
the happiness and stability of the immanent family 
unit; murder subtracts life from the world. And 
on and on. On the other hand, love adds; love--
true and pure love--always adds; and by adding 
transforms the world. Subtraction does not trans-
form; it deprives, warps, and destroys. No man 
is an island; there is no such thing as a private 
dialogue or a private sin. A pebble thrown into 
one ocean eventually sends its ripples into ev-
ery one of the seven seas. There is always, no 
matter how precarious, a refuge and salvation 
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from thoughts; but once the thoughts have been 
crystalized into words and the words spoken, the 
chain has been forged and put into place 
Idea has assumed concretized reality. 
• • • the 
It is in putting their words into action (such 
as painting a tree or stroking hair or kissing 
lips) that men--by adding to the phenomena of the 
world's ontology--thus transform the world, and 
in so doing begin to approach the status of gods. 
A man is never II just a man. 11 He is always either 
more or less than a man. If he transforms the 
world by acting upon his reflection of a word or 
words, he is more; if like a brute he neither re-
flects nor acts upon the reflection, then he is 
a parasite, sucking his sustenance from the trans-
formations of others, men-artists and God-artist; 
these para.si tes--like ticlrn on cattle--take from 
the world (subtract) and contribute only disease. 
Dialogue with the world and subsequent transforraa-
tion of the world is therefore an existential 
necessity. (We here are using "existential" in 
its original, late seventeenth century meaning 
Hof and pertaining to existence" and not in the 
more modern Sa.rtrean or humanistic meaning.) Di-
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alogue in this sense is man's encounter with his 
destiny, for a man forges his destiny by his re-
flective deeds: nBy your deeds shall ye be known. !I 
A man thus lives his future in his present deeds: 
and his future is either metamorphosis and tran-
substantiation; or it is a regression into bru-
tish senselessness. An oppressor is as much of 
a slave as is his oppressed. A man by transform-
ing his world, through synthesis, leads himself 
and his fellows ever upwards towards liberation 
of mind, body, and soul; "freedom is a synthesis 
of spirit • rt 1 1 . . . A man by parasitically fas-
tening upon the transformations of others drags 
himself and others down into the raorass of insen-
sitive bondage and spiritual and intellectual deg-
radation. Transformation by word plus deed is 
creativity. Nan is his own God, fashioning him-
self in the image of his finest and grandest con-
ceptualized Idea, subject always to both the con-
strictive and liberating (inspirational) aspects 
of his context. This is literal and ultimate 
creativity: the self-liberation and self-actual-
11 sasser, "Connotations,!! 1. 4. 
68 
ization and self-realization in the conquest of 
one's self. 
Dialogic na.rrative with nature and with fel-
low man as well as dialogic narrative with self 
is only possible as co-operant with deep, sincere, 
a.biding, and profound love. Love opens one's 
eyes to what is significant and allows one to 
discard the irrelevant. Love can o~ly function 
where there is mutual and communal equality of 
respect and admiration and wonder. Since the 
world of man and nature and god is one (that is, 
interpenetrative)--and one of admiration and won-
der--lcve is a natural state and process, and 
will activate itself if not stifled by oppression 
and the opposite of love, hate and envy. This 
interpenetration of self and context--this open-
ness and dynarnicism of systems--is necessary for 
creativity: 
Since it is a. ques~1on of beauty, 
the first fa.ct to observe is a sort 
of interpenetration of nature and of 
man. This interpenetration is of a 
singular nature, for it has nothing 
of a reciprocal absorption. Each of 
the two parties retain their identities, 
keep their essential identities and 
affirm them more strongly at the very 
moment in which each submits to the 
contagion or impregnation of the other. 
But each thereafter is no longer alone; 
they are now mysteriously enmeshed.12 
Creative scientists, for example, 
have low body boundaries as measured 
by Rorschach, indicating that th~y main-
tain a more 11 open11 relationship to the 
environment and do not conceive of their 
bodies as having a hard protective shell 
which separates them from the world. 
They do not develop as much as most 
people do a. perception of themselves 
as distinct individuals interacting 
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with other distinct individuals. In-
stead, the environment appears to re-
main as a 11 part of themselves" long 
after most people have withdrawn them-
selves more distinctly from the envi-
ronment. So music may appeal to sci-
entists because it promotes a feeling 
of 11 oneness 11 with the environment •••• 13 
12Jaccues Maritain, I I Intuition cr:atrice 
dans l'Art-et Dans la Po~sie (Paris: Desclee 
de Brauner ,-19~ p. 3. Translation mine. The 
original J-s' «Des qu' il s I agi t de beaute, ,lei' prem-
ier fa.it a observer est une sort d'interpenetra-
tion de la nature et de l' homme. Cette internene-
tration est d'une nature toute particuliere, car 
elle n'a rien d'une absorption_reciproq_ue. Cha.-
cune des deux parties en cause reste ce qu'elle 
est, garde son- identi te essentielle et 1 1-a.ff irme 
m~me plus fortement,au moment ou elle subit la. 
contagion ou l'impregnation de l'a.utre. ,Mais 
aucune n~e~t p~us seule; elles sont mysterieuse-
ment emmelees .)) 
13:David C. McClelland, HOn the Psychodyna.m-
ics of Creative Physical Scientists," Contempor-
ary Approaches to Creative Thinking ••• , pp. 
168-9. 
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True education is thus the participation 
in dialogic narrative, which is, in a very true 
sense, a revealing and a conceptualizing of on-
tology and consequently a participation in the 
creatiqn of the world--a process never-ending but 
always continuing. 3y thus participating in the 
creation of the world, man becomes even as the 
gods; because nature also participates in this 
dialogue with man, nature too is a divinity, as 
has been pointed out by peoples from the begin-
ning. In this process of dialogic narrative we 
have at least incipiently a cosmogony of godhood, 
investitute of which is a democratic process; ere-
ativity is democracy raised to the level of uni-
I 
versal elitism (resulting in a higher dialectic); 
creativity is the apotheosis of nature and of man 
into coeQuality with God. 
The Boundaring of Objects into :-Tarra ti ve 
Thus, experience, or experiencing, is the 
ability, faculty, of the oind, by means of sen-
sory impressions, to connect parts and, even more 
so, to place parts in their appropriate contexts, 
or wholes; the mind does this by its faculty of 
Ideation: tri.e boundaring of "objectsir into a 
narrative. 
Munsterberg, also, 
Like the Gestalt psychologists, 
whom he preceded by only a few years, 
••• felt that every experience is 
a relation oetween a part and whole, 
between figure and ground. It is the 
mind which has the ability to resolve 
this relation and organize its percep-
tual field. He ascribes the sensation 
of viewing movement to the displacement 
of a figure on its ground and mentions 
that we can, through willed attention, 
reverse that relation, altering our 
perception of the movement.14 
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'.'·1unsterberg was an Idealistic Kantian: he 
felt that "the mind at its most primitive level 
confers motion on stimuli,n15 and that 11 the mind 
animates the sensory world with motion. 111 6 
When we transcribe our simple imitation, 
we either animate it, by our minds, with motion 
(or the semblance of motion) or we invest it with 
another dimension. Thus, our tree can be a wogian's 
shape or an afro hair-do, or whatever; or, if we 
14 Andrew, p. 1 6. 
15rbid., p. 1a. 
,6Ibid. 
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are filming it, we can agitate it with fans to 
give it motion (if a wind is not handy). 
Therefore, the first level of transcription 
is the changing of media for the representation 
or presentation of the object; the second, is 
the transcription of the narrative into another Idea. 
Active and Passive Transposition 
Transposition may be either active or passive: 
we may either actively transpose the simple lines 
of our line drawing of the tree, for example, 
into a woman, or a hair-do, or a cloud; or, we 
may seek into the object for its essential lines; 
these lines are true of many "narrative" forms: 
woma,n' s physical shape, shape of an afro, or what-
ever. The point here is not a quibbling one; the 
point is that there are undreamed of dimensions 
and perspectives in each and every Idea; two, 
moreover, are better than one. The more ways 
in which we can see, eauals the more that we can 
see; the more that we can see, the greater choi-
ces we have; the greater choices we have, the 
greater freedom we have; the greater freedom we 
have, the closer, as we have said before, we ap-
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proach God. 
For drawing and painting, we take our line 
drawing and search to perceive its outline; once 
found, we transpose it into another idea. We keep 
it simple. For sculpting, we similarly transpose 
the lines of our line drawing into another idea, 
on paper. Then we realize it in our sculpting 
medium, whether welding, clay, stone, or v1hatever. 
~e do the same kind of process in ceramics, music, 
and rhetorical composition (whether written or 
spoken). 
In poetry, fiction, playwriting, for example, 
we describe in words, that is, we transpose by 
transcribing the drawing (or the original object, 
preferably the original, but, regardless, with 
help from our simple imitation) into words and 
thought-units. Concerning our tree, we introduce 
it by placing it in its context; our concern in 
this instance is therefore object-centered: 
Outside my window, in the pasture, on 
the west side close to the fence that 
separates my land from my neighbors, 
stands a beautiful tree. 
Or, we have other choices: we may introduce it 
by orientating it to the perceiving-ego's view-
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point; it is, in this instance, subject-centered: 
I can see out in my pasture, on the west 
side, near the fence that separates my 
la.nd from my neighbors, that beautiful 
tree, under which I have the buckets 
of water placed for my calves to drink 
from. 
Or we can introduce it by means of the context-
centered orientation: 
The morning sun, not yet hot, molds and 
ca.uses to burst into cool green fire the 
leaves of the beautiful tree, that stands 
alone in my pasture, on the west side, 
near the fence that separates my land 
from my neighbors. 
Or we can introduce it by means of the object-
centered orientation in terms of its mood: 
The big beautiful tree, stands quietly 
and lonely against the brilliant indif-
ferent blue of the sky behind it. It 
stands off by itself, there in the empty 
pasture, for companionship, close to 
the fence, that separates its domain 
from the neighbors busy chicken coup 
and fruit trees, hurrying to drop their 
fruit, fat pears and juicy peaches and 
tart cheeries. Sweet cheeries don't 
grow very well here, for some reason. 
It looks westward, towards ian-lacking 
nature. 
Or, we may introduce it by means of the subject-
centered orientation in terms of the perceiver's 
mood: 
Or, 
Sitting here at my desk, I watch the 
big beautiful old tree, standing out 
there, quietly and lonely against the 
brilliant indifferent blue of the sky 
behind it. It just stands there, on 
the west side of the pasture, close 
to the fence that shuts it out from 
the trees on our neighbor's land. It 
gazes westward. Gh, westward! How 
long it's been since I came this way 
from westward! 
The rounded outline of that beautiful 
tree, standing out there by itself, 
reminds me of Dorothy's afro. Except 
that it is green, and Dorothy's afro 
was black. But she was green. Ch, 
and so was I! But I guess we ripened 
together ••• until we rotted ••• 
Or, we can concern ourselves with the tree in 
.J... mo 1.,lon: 
The big, beautiful tree, standing alone 
in the pasture, on the west side, next 
to the fence that separates it from the 
neighbor's, sways in-the southwest wind. 
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And so forth. Really, our choices are about lim-
itless. 
To transpose in photography, one way is to 
use a. lens, other than a "normaln one, to ndis-
tort" the tree (or whatever object it is). With 
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a motion camera, we also can use a different lens. 
We can also use different camera angles. 
Therefore, in summary so far, the second 
level of creativity (transposition) can involve 
changing media, such as making merely a simple 
verbal description of an object (e.g., transcrib-
ing a line drawing into words, or ma.king a draw-
ing from someone's writings) or it can involve 
transposing the boundaries of one Idea into an-
other Idea (such as, turning the form of a line 
drawing of a tree into an afro hair-do). 
Transcription is also called decadence. 
Music 
Transposition, the second level of creativ-
ity, is the first level of creativity on which 
we are able to compose music. In other words, 
the nature of music itself requires, at the very 
least, a translation. 
Practicum 
One way of beginning a music composition is 
to practice imitating a sound, any sound, and 
then to find its pitch, time (duration and inter-
val) and limits on a music instrument; then we 
record it on music composition paper. 
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For example, there is a bobwhite bird that 
calls, from time to time, outside my window. I 
reply, sometimes, imitating its call as well as 
I can, \vhich seems to satisfy him because we carry 
on, now and then, a kind of conversation. Now 
that I have his call down, pretty well (at least 
to our seemingly mutual satisfaction), I shall 
go down the hall into the living r6om and pick 
out its tone and pitch and direction on the pi-
ano. ( ' T 11,e could do this also on a flute . . . 
or violin • or whatever we might ha.ve, or 
whatever we can find access to. If we happen 
not to have access to a musical instrument, then 
we must display initiative and aggressiveness 
enough to find access.17 
Here is my rendition, on the piano, of the 
call of my friend, the bobwhite; since he seems 
to be a serious fellow, let us put his call in 
17once, when I was sort of vacationing in 
the San Bernardino Mountains, I had need of a 
piano. I called around on the phone until I found 
a church willing to let me practice on its. And 
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We notice that the interval of the two notes is 
an octave. Actually, the bobwhite, on his high 
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Let us thumb through some songs to see whether 
there are any similarities. Sure enough, we find 
one right away. Skipping the introductory mea-
sures, we find exactly the same kind. of beginning 
(in a different key, of course) in J. Massenet's 
, f 
haunting and beautiful "Elegie:" 
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;e do not know where Massenet got his idea; 
the source of his idea, here, is unimportant. 
What is important is that we know where we can 
get our ideas. ~henever we find ourselves in 
trouble (not knowing which way to go or even how 
to get started), we can always return to our mo-
ther, nature. We may let ourselves down, now 
and then, but she will never. 
Transposition and Intellectual and 
Imaginative Activation 
Our focusing on an object with intent to 
transpose activates the mind's very way of work-
ing, which l':Iunsterberg calls n a.ttention, n 18 and 
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which Haber!Ila.s calls "knowledge. 11 19 By so a.cti-
vating the mind in the correct direction we re-
verse the monologic process of abstracting fact 
from value; we place fa.ct into a context of value. 
By focusing on the sensation (taste, olfac-
tory, visual, aural, tactile) of phenomena., our 
"attention" reveals to us the Idea (boundaries) 
of an object; then our memory (of similar or com-
parable Ideas) activates our imaginations, which 
then, either restructure the memory into slightly 
or grotesquely different Ideas or replace the 
Ideas into different contexts. Thus, the mental 
operations of memory and imagination have carried 
us "beyond a simple attention, to give this world 
{of phenomen~7 a sense, an impact, a personal 
direction. rr 20 This "personal direction" is im-
portant. On a level lower than the lowest level 
of creativity, we have, for example, the Holly-
wood, and correspondingly in the academic circles 
the Brustein,mode of copying of an imitation. 
18Dudl ey, p. 1 9. 
19~1acdonald, 11 Curriculum and Human Interest, 11 
p. 286. 
20Dudley, p. 1 9. 
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Imitation Versus Copying 
We had a good imitation of a nightmare in 
Hitchcock's film, The Birds. The film is dis-
tinctive; it is typically Hitchcock: it shows 
the personal direction of Hitchcock's imagination 
and creativity. Hitchcock did not merely copy 
into film du Maurier's novel; he transposed it. 
:'.:hen we had a whole host of copyings of Hitchcock's 
transposition: rats, ants, rattlesnakes, and so 
forth; and then that copying, not only of Hitch-
cock's transposition, but an almost-direct photo-
stat of the plot from Melville's great work, Moby 
Dick, Jaws. Melville may or may not have read 
Reynolds' account of a large coffee-colored whale's 
attack on a ship;21 but he certainly had read 
Chase's account of an attack on a ship by a large 
2'"' whale, c:.. and he used it, openly and proudly (ma.k-
ing explicit reference to iB in his own novel. 23 
21 J. N. Reynolds, nMocha Dick, 11 'I'he Knicker-
bocker, New York Mo:dhly Magazine, Vol-.-13 (Ha.y, 
1839), 377-392. 
22owen Chase, Narrative of the Most Extra-
ordinarv and Distressing Shi nwrec°k of the \•!hale-
Shi 'J :2ssex, of Nantucket; which~ Attacked and 
Finally Destroyed }2y .@; large Supermaceti- 1;/ha.le in 
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But he did not simply copy it; he incorporated 
it. He used it to help widen his own fabulous 
perceptions and conceptions and thus will remain 
immortal, and the novel, Moby Dick, will remain 
forever a. living monument to the greatest of ma.n's 
creativity. But who knows, who can remember who 
wrote (and nroduced and directed the movie versions) 
of the asinine Jaws or those other equally pitiful 
copyings? (Who would want to?) 
/u1other example of unimaginative and unin-
tellectual copying is The Theatre of Revolt: 
the bit a.bout dirty consciences being at the root 
of our present-day charities, Brustein copied 
from Eric Bentley,24 without even giving him credit 
for it, attempting, we imagine, to fool us into 
thinking that he was capable (intelligent enough) 
to think of it himself. The general idea of the 
the Pacific Ocean • • • (New York, 1821). 
23Melville makes extended reference to Chase's 
book in Chapter 45 of Moby Dick. 
24 11 From Strindberg to Bertolt Brecht," Theatre 
and Drama in the I··'.aking, ed. by John Gassner and 
Ralph G. Allen(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1 964) , II, 770. 
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entire book Brustein copied from John Mason Brown's 
~~p ~O(lP~TI rn·n· P8+urc in ~evolt 25 
- .J...I. ..J .l. l '- '-' ..... .l.- -'-- ~ '-' • \_, -- - ..I.... - ..., • In genera.l 3ru-
stein finds good copying in Gassner. 
Almost everything Gleckner ever wrote was 
copied from someone else. 
Why these people do this kind of thing can 
be explained by their lack of self-confidence or 
their lack of intelligence. Norman Rabkin takes 
concepts from the works of nuclear-physicists, 
and tells us forthrightly and proudly that he 
is doing so, and transposes these concepts of 
others into a magnificent critical work on Shake-
n d , . . 2.:; speare, Shakespeare and the Common un erst:anaing. v 
Rabkin shows us how it can be done. 
Attention 
In acting, we h2.ve an .Archie Leach's person-
ally-directed imitations and transpositions of 
characters; on his coat tails trying desperately 
to copy accurately we have--or had--a Tony Cur-
tis. In fiction, we had Robert Rua.rl~ pathetically 
25 c- t . · h · .... •T v • J:-'Or ii8.S _ing uOn, ii. o. •• 
Cor:p., 1929). 
Kinnikat Press, 
26(:i>Tew York: The Free Press, 1967). 
trying to out-Hem.:j_ngway Hemingway. In singing 
we have the Linda Ronsta.dts copying hit songs 
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of the near-past, even down to the arrangements. 
In fact, in the seventies and early eighties, 
popular music is characterized by blatant copy-
ing. 
Lea.ch, Hemingway, Hitchcock, and Iv'iel v.ille 
will always be remembered--beca.use their creativ-
ity was personally directed; these other hacks 
a.re already forgotten (or soon will be)--as will 
be all hacks--because the work of parasitical 
hacks (among other reasons) have no personal di-
rection; they merely have a suction action that 
enables them to hold onto other people's work 
for awhile, but then they inevitably slip away 
into blissful oblivion. 
We have here artistic attention versus money 
attention. For an a.rtist--or anyone with any 
talent--the perception of any Idea is a personal 
one, which then personally directs the rendering 
of that Idea into a medium; on the other ha.nd, 
lucre attention is the same for everyone because 
lucre is the same for everyone (in this sense): 
it is filthy whichever way you wash it. Of course 
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money is necessary in our society; but it is ne-
vertheless--maybe because it is outwardly neces-
sary--filthy. And thus, since money-attention 
is the same, it is a nuniversal" rather than a 
personal attention: whatever manifestation it 
inspires will likewise be the • .j... • same as l v is. 
And thus we have the same tired copying of the 
creativity of others, that flows like diarrhea 
out of Hollywood, Nevi York, 11 creative writing" 
divisions of English departments, and similar 
places • .And like diarrhea., the tiny obnoxious 
germs of copying converts whatever is fed into 
the organism--steak and garbage alike--into the 
same putrid, runny, stinking mess. 
Avoidance of Outside Impingements 
Any work of a.rt is a material analogue--or, 
if you will, objective correlative--of each stage 
of int ellection and cor:responding to each level 
of our creativity; it is the phenomenal manifes-
ta.tion of the individual :perception and resultant 
personally directed rendering. Thus, the artist 
gives of himself to the world, to his fellow man 
and woman; he shares in a uniquely :personal way 
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the most intimate of all sharings: his very in-
most self. On the other hand, the Hollywood-New 
York-academic hack27 shares--not himself--but 
the labors and intimate givings of others, dis-
guised a oit to pass muster for :payday. 
The wise artist--whether fledgling or pro-
fessional--would therefore be wise to avoid out-
side impingements, impacts, directions, and moti-
vations when he is considering creating. lhese 
outer disturbances--a.nd that is wha.t they are, 
disturbances--destroy some or all of the neces-
sary praxitic conditions for effective work; they 
destroy the purity of the "attention11 by outside 
d • ' h ( • ' 1 Td lS"CUruances l. e •, -cne 1.'- ea can not be conceived, 
conceptualized, entirely--or maybe even partly--
by an outside 11 authority" imposing itself and its 
repertory of ideas: what film made money in the 
past, for example) upon beth the mental process 
of attention and the object itself. The economy 
27The only difference in these groupings 
seems to be that Hollywood and New York hacks 
have more courage (or connections) to go after 
the greater monetary rewards; the Bourjailys 
and others like are content with lesser rewards 
because their intellects are (even) smaller, their 
talents more modest, a.nd their courage lesser. 
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of the attention and object is partly or wholly 
destroyed because the boundaries (and of course 
the context is determined by the boundaries--there-
fore, whenever we sneak of boundaries we are by 
necessity also including the context) and the 
intent are complexed by considerations other than 
the (relatively speaking of course) faithful and 
true rendering of the Idea. With no outside adul-
terating and obliterating impingements, the intent 
to render an Idea is pure and economical and sim-
ple; the Idea tends to cooperation, especially 
once the boundaries are in process of being 11 drawn11 ; 
and the cooperation increases with the progressive 
forming of the Idea. 
Outside impingements also include (besides 
the crass inducements of fame, fortune, full pro-
fessorships, or departmental chairmanships) appro-
bation from loved ones. Creativity is a lonely 
process, by definition. One-cannot create so 
that loved ones will be proud. Finally, for one-
self--singly and alone--is the process of creativ-
• .J.. l vY. Afterwards, there can be sharing of the 
glory. Cf course there are -+-. vlr.1eS v,hen we all 
desperately need encouragement. If it comes, 
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then we must appreciate and treasure it. But, 
if we must have it in order to function, then 
we are to that extent of whatever the necessity 
and requirement, a deficient artist. ':!e should 
remember these words: 
••• I was as trusting and as stupid 
as a bird dog who wants to go out with 
any man with a gun, or a trained pig 
in a circus who has finally found some-
one who loves and appreciates him for 
himself alone. That every day should 
be a fiesta seemed to me a marvelous 
cuscovery. I even read aloud the pa.rt 
of the novel that I had rewritten, which 
is about as low as a writer can get 
and much more dangerous for him as a 
writer than glacier skiing unroped be-
fore the full winter snowfall has set 
over the crevices. 
vihen they said, 11 It's great, Er-
nest. Truly it's great. You cannot 
know the thing it has, 11 I wagged my 
tail in pleasure and plunged into the 
fiesta concept of life to see if I could 
not bring some fine attractive stick 
back, instead of thinking, "If these 
bastards like it what is wrong with 
it?" That was what I would think if 
I had been functioning as a professional 
although, if I had been functioning as 
a professional, I would never have read 
it to thern.27 
Any act of creativity, even on the very lowest 
level, is one of journeying a.lone strange seas. 
27u . 209 nemingwa.y, p. • 
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It takes a. gre2.t act of courage and great strength 
to endure the loneliness of it and the suspicions 
and envy and misunderstandings and ridicule of 
fellow creatures a.nd even sometimes on the pa.rt 
of one's loved-ones. It is a price that must 
be paid. Every act of creation is a decision that 
the effort is worth the cost. 
Pedagogical Implications 
The :Snabling Strategy is an especially ap-
propriate method of teaching to be used when trans-
nosition is utilized with it.28 The enabling 
strategy is that teaching method in which 11 the 
students engage in some activity, most often un-
der the supervision of the teacher. Generally and 
preferably the activity concerns a problem to 
be solved. n29 .An example would be to have stu-
dents take a laboratory exercise--such as frog 
dissection--a.nd transpose it to literature. ~he 
students could use a ;'scapel 11 of the Neo-Aristo-
28For a discussion of the three main types 
of teaching strategies--exe~plifying, enabling, 
and presenting--see Hyman's "Teaching Strategies 
for Pluralistic Teaching," pp. 242-52. 
29-, . d ~45 .l. Ol • , p. c.. • 
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telian School of criticism (or any other school) 
and dissect a short story, or play, or chapter 
of a novel, or a poem, to see how the vertebraic 
(plot line) joins together the head (introduction, 
or point oi' attack, or hermeneutic construct, et 
cetera), to the body (development, a.nd so forth), 
and to the extremities (conclusion, answers, und 
.§Q weiter); how the systems of organs (character, 
diction, music, spectacle) contribute; and how 
the cells (action and/or words) function. 
Highschool biology and English teachers (and uni-
versity physiology and literature teachers) could 
work wonders together. If the students could 
cio their laboratory dissection on frogs first 
and then the next day go to literary dissection, 
what a transfer of learning could occur! What 
an association of ideas! 
The same kind of dissective procedure could 
be performed on a painting, or a thunderstorm, or 
an organization of an economic or civic structure. 
Students taking drama could a.ct out the com-
plementary structure and functioning of any pair 
( or pairs) of body muscles. ( There is a fa.mo us 
play that enacts the functioning of the human 
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body, specifically the effects of a conflicting 
morality on the mind and heart. This play would 
be ideal for the team-teaching and cross-class 
learning of morality and ethics (religion), so-
ciology, psychology, and physiology. Since this 
play, 11 r:::1he Thea.tre of the Soul, 11 a monodrama -by 
!Ukolai Fikolayevich Yevreinov, first produced 
in 1912, is a Russian play, it would also be suit-
able for the study of cultural anthropology.) 
A dance class could be used, not only for 
learning, practicing, and appreciating traditional 
dances, but also for the study of how atoms are 
linked together and how molecules and chains of 
molecules behave. In order to do this, students 
and teachers would first ha.ve to study chemistry 
and then they would have to do their own original 
choreography. 
Natural philosophy, logic, and art as form 
can all be studied in terms of chemistry; and, 
in like manner, chemistry can be studied in terms 
of natural philosophy, logic, and the formal prop-
erties of art: 
••• organic chemistry can ••• pro-
vide a fascinating area of "natural 
philosophy" for the student who wants 
only to obtain a broad liberal arts 
education •••• you will find it to 
be an extremely stimulating intellec-
tual pursuit. Organic chemistry has 
a highly logical structure •••• We 
make much use of symbolic logic, the 
logical principle of analogy, and de-
ductive reasoning •••• 
Finally, organic chemistry has 
a uniaue content as an art form. The 
building up of complex molecular archi-
tecture by appropriate choice of a se-
quential combination of reactions pro-
iide syntheses that are described ~s 
11 elegant 11 and "beautiful." The design 
of an experiment in reaction mechanism 
can be similarly imaginative. Such 
elegantly conceived experi~ents can 
evoke that delightful feeling of plea-
sure that man obtains from the appre-
ciation of man's creativity--but only 
in the mind of the knowled2:ea.ble snec-
tator.30 ~ 
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Science students could devise their own trans-
posed activities, such as the writing and perform-
ing of plays concerni:r_g cellular activity, and so 
forth; literature students, besides dissecting 
literary works, could operate on and repair sick 
or injured or deficient or crippled works of art; 
sociology students could study the cooperative 
30Andrew Streitwieser, Jr. and Clayton H. 
Heathcock, Introduction to Or12:anic Chemistry 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1976), 
p. 4. 
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systems of the multitudinous and multifarious 
symbionts in the human cells; government and civic 
students could chart the power a..n.d influence struc-
ti1.res of ant colonies and compare with their ovm. 
The possibilities are endless. 
The use of ~ransposition in the classroom 
situation, not only could help prevent the atrophy 
of students' brains by boredom, but also could 
help combat teacher burn-rout: the constant cut-
ward pressure on pedagogical and intellectual 
and emotional boundaries can promote a freshness 
and cooling vigor within a teacher, in the face 
oi' the onslaught of student antipathy and lethargy, 
community fear and resentment, colleagueal vicious 
envy, and administrative cautious stupidity. This 
use of creativity will make the teacher a better 
person. 
In addition, this use ?f creativity will 
make the students better people (because they 
are being self-actualized) and also, better stu-
dents: one transposition would last a teacher 
and all of her classes for a full week. If a 
teacher does use an exciting activity for one 
class, every other one of her classes will, not 
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only hear about it, but come cla,noring a.nd demand-
ing that it also be afforded the same participa-
tion. 
Conclusion 
'l1ransposi tion, the second level of crea.tiv-
ity, is simply the translation of an imitation 
of the boundaries of an Idea or a group of Ideas 
into something else: either another media or 
another Idea. T-'-_ l., can be used for any art form; 
this is the first level of creativity that can 
be employed in music composition. It possibili-
ties in teaching a.re both numerous a_nd exciting. 
CHAPTER III 
THE THIRD LEVEL OF CREATIVITY 
SYNECDOCHE 
God scatters beauty as he 
scatters flowers 
O'er the wide earth, and 
tells us all are ours. 
A hundred lights in every 
temple burn, 
And at each shrine I bend 




After imitation and transposition, the next 
level of creative complexity (and difficulty; i.e., 
requiring more intellectual and artistic percep-
tion and conception and manipulation) is synec-
doche (a form of Romanticism), which is, on the 
one hand, the using of part for the whole with 
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the whole implied in the part, and, on the other 
hand, using the whole for the part, with the part 
implied in the whole. 
Codification 
In the process of converting--by condensing--
the whole into a part (or by expanding the part 
into the whole), we have--by means of dialogue 
and dialectic--the simultaneous projection of 
two different situations by means of a symbolic 
code. This simultaneity reinforces our natural 
joy in the perception of the interpenetration of 
all life. This process of synecdoche presents 
the codified,specific essential by means of the 
cerived contextual, auxiliary; or of the codified 
general essential by means of the specific. That 
is, when the young man asks the father for the 
hand of the daughter, he really and truly wants 
more than just her hand. Her hand is an auxil-
iary to that which the young man wants: her en-
tire self--her body (probably all of it), her 
mind, and her soul. When the soldier appears, 
and the onlooker says, "Here's the army," the 
specific phenomenon is presented by means of the 
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general context. In the first issue, ontology 
is presented by litotes: the young man is very 
much understating what it is that he wants and 
desires. In the second issue, the carrier of the 
interpenetration is hyperbole. Litotes presents 
a quite serious interest and intent; hyperbole 
presents just the opposite: humorous interest 
and intent. Thus, artistic choice of either ser-
iousness (litotic carrier) or humor (hyperbolic 
carrier) is determined by interest and axiological 
intent. 
This reduction and compression of a whole 
into a part, yet still retaining the identity and 
complete set of whole implications--and the ex-
pansion of a part into a whole, simultaneously 
retaining the characteristics and implications 
of the part while adding to them the identity 
and implications of the whole--these are codifi-
cations of ontological aspects. Codification is 
the organization of interests into a perceivable 
and conceivable system of communication. 
Thematics 
In this process of codification and synthe-
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sis, the participants--first the artist and then 
his audience--internalize their thematics. Thema-
tics refer to the direction and activity of the 
reality that men perceive and by which they are 
thus mediated. Mediation is that process by which 
man is reconciled both to himself and then too-
ther men, the former necessary both in and for 
itself and also as necessary for the latter. Med-
diation is the reconciliation by placing abstrac-
ted man back within his own natural context; within 
his context, man is then enabled to relate to 
himself because wherever he reaches and whatever 
he touches are part of his context and thus by 
spiritual conduction reaches and touches himself. 
Within his own natural context, man is enabled 
to reach out to touch and communicate with his 
fellow man because whatever he touches is part 
of himself and part of his fellow humanity, and 
thus his touch and his vibrations are conducted 
throughout the context and passes through all 
that is within the context. Context (and one di-
mension of this context is community) is a natural 
conductor of spiritual pulsations; whenever a man 
is abstracted from his context, the pulsating cir-
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cuitry of spirituality is short-circuited, and 
the context is the poorer for it. There is no 
such thing as contextual dimissory abstraction; 
any abstraction is traumatizing and dilacerating 
of both the component and the context. Reconcil-
iation back within context does not mean diluent 
loss of individuality, but rather, it is a diodic 
relationship in which reconciled man becomes a 
conduit through which may and does flow the spir-
ituality of the context. Thus, excitation of 
each man is initiated and increased. It is in 
this sense that reality mediates between man and 
himself and other men. By binding together, it 
sets free. With no excitation, there is no life, 
no generation of thematics. Excitation enables 
an individual to make possible and promote more 
direct and increased flow of both spirituality 
and ontological insight; by so becoming and doing, 
a man is more a part of his community and general 
context; but he is also, by excitation, more of 
himself, and thus more of an individual. 
Alienation Versus Contextualization 
There is no true freedom in alienation; true 
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freedom is in contextualizing, because only in 
contextualization is a man involved in the pro-
cess of being a man. In alienation, a part--a man--
becomes the whole ••• without the accretion of 
context. By spiritual bloating he becomes his 
own context, but he is merely distending his id-
iosyncratic boundaries and distending the bound-
aries of his personal Idea--distortion and weaken-
ing are the inevitable results. In contextualiz-
ing, man--a part--also represents and symbolizes 
the whole--of his community a~d general context. 
By so doing, he adds to his individuality by sur-
rounding it with context; he strengthens his per-
sonal Ideational boundaries by outside support 
rather than letting them distend until they burst 
like a balloon. With community and extended con-
text, man becomes an open system, characterized 
by dynamic stability, adding to his own dimensions 
and strengths by receiving input from his commun-
ity and context and at the same time strengthen-
ing and adding to his community and general con-
text by giving of his self to them. This receiv-
ing and giving is the process of generating themes; 
and it becomes the individual's and his context's 
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partial thematic universe. In this state and 
process, reality is being shaped as well as shap-
ing; reality is in a process of kinesis rather 
than a state of stasis. This generating of themes 
becomes dialogic and dialectical: in a free ex-
change between individual and context, complexi-
ties are defined, perceived (and thus divided) 
into conceptual levels, reconciled when perceived 
and shared with context in a new axiology. When 
another perceives one of my complexities, and con-
ceptualizes it into its various levels and shares 
the process's results with me, I no longer have 
just the original complexity; I do have it still, 
of course; but I also have it illumined; and thus 
reality becomes enriched and doubled for me; and 
I am now a double possessor, a double owner. 
Extrapolate this example to all of situations, 
and we have the dialogic and dialectical ontology 
of thematic generation. 
This process of the individual becoming more 
individualized by becoming more a part of the whole--
and of the whole becoming more of a whole by re-
newing itself in the individual--this is phenom-
ena of the process of synecdoche. It is thus a 
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gathering together. 
Synecdoche as a Doubling of Ontology 
Synecdoche thus is an enriching, a signifi-
catizing, a pluralizing, a transforming, a simul-
taneitizing of different aspects of ontology into 
a holistic context of one, without fusing the bound-
aries of the component constituents. That is, 
synecdoche doubles reality by presenting it first 
as a part and then as a whole (with the part still 
distinct from the whole--or vice versa); this simul-
taneity of part plus whole (or whole plus part) 
enriches our perceptional process. There is in 
all of life a natural inclination to dispersion; 
synecdoche is the counter-inclination to this disper-
sion; synecdoche is inspersion, by reconciliation 
and combination. Thus it is syncretistic. The 
syndetic combination of part and whole is effected 
through thematic conjunction: the flow and di-
rection of reality, for this reconciliation to 
be effected, must be incipiently confluent. When 
this confluence becomes patent rather than latent, 
no syrnphysis occurs--the individualities of the 
two comprisants certainly remain idiosyncratic. 
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Rather, now, the thematics hold the two comprisants 
together syndesmotically as a federation of equals. 
Synecdoche is the reflected completion of 
the direction of reality from individuation to 
complementarity. Apparently superficial distinc-
tions of boundary delimit potential action of 
each life-space. Because man's activity is an 
extension of his boundaried Idea, such activity 
is thwarted and stifled by false constrictive 
boundaries. If I see my boundaxies as constricted 
and restricted within the confines of my physical 
self, then my actions are limited to whatever kines-
thetic activity my body is capable of. However, 
if I extend my boundaries to include the power 
of speech, the power of writing, of communicating, 
of thinking, of sending out messages of love--
then my powers are vastly increased. If my bound-
aries include my family, my beloved, my friends--
then how much more is increased the scope of my 
powers and influence? The extension of my bound-
aries out beyond my physical Idea increases my 
own existential experience and at the same time 
extends, expands, and increases the existential 
experience of others within the sphere of my ex-
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tension; their existential experiences in turn 
react upon me, further extending my existential 
experiences. This symbiotic process knows no 
limits, and has never been tested--historically--
to any noticable degree. It is an untapped source 
of power and transformational ability. 
Such urgent potential needs more attention. 
The world--and man of course--is uncompleted. 
(Note: 11 un" rather than "in.") The process of 
completion (or perhaps, becoming) is ever contin-
uing; continuation is its nature. The direction 
of continuance can be controlled by reflection. 
Reflection entails the simultaneity of perceptions 
and conceptions. Synecdoche enables me to sepa-
rate part from whole without destroying either, 
but, rather, instead, augmenting and celebrating 
each by means of the other simultaneously. This 
process of synecdoche separates momentarily part 
and whole from their process of being, and thus 
allows for reflection upon the activity of being 
and becoming of part and whole as distinct from 
the activity of both as one and as only being 
and not as becoming. Metaphysical separation 
of part and whole--while simultaneous celebration 
105 
of part and whole as one--enables the perception 
of reflection on the process of becoming, rather 
than merely of being. It allows for the percep-
tion of the fact that activity is not merely an 
extension of being, but is an inseparable aspect 
of process. When this perception is internalized, 
it thus becomes an ability of the perceiver and 
thus enables him to transform ontology into tran-
sient matrices of Ideas; this in turn makes possi-
ble the next step of conceptualizing permanent 
Ideational constructs; these constructs, by be-
ing added to the world, transform the world. 
This "objectifying" of subject into two spur-
iously and speciously distinct components chal-
lenges the perceiver by confronting him with a 
startling configuration of heretofore familiar 
phenomena or ideas. It requires the perceiver 
to take a risk in confronting and grappling with 
old as new, with familiar as exotic and bizarre. 
Risks are challenges; challenges awaken one to 
the possibilities of new thematics; challenges, 
if accepted, require commitment; and commitment 
requires both reflection and action. The resul-
tant praxis disrupts, agitates, and redirects the 
flow of reality into new channels of~ thematics. 
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New thematics revolutionize transforming intexts 
into contexts; and thus is the world transformed, 
and each man, caught up in the revolution, becomes 
a fabricant of a new society of Ideas; and the 
last become, by engaging in the revolutionary 
transformation, facile princeps; and factious 
elements are, during that moment of transforma-
tion, reconciled into harmony, and Fafnir lies 
/ 
down in love with a Sigurd; even faineants are 
part to joyous ideational work; and the famuli 
become the sorcerer and scholar; the fasciated 
farrago of phenomena fasciculates in astonished 
turmoil and then centrificulates into a harmon-
ious and unified ontology. 
This is true creativity. 
Transformation of Ontology 
In these moments, existence becomes atemp-
oral; and the world is re-created and transformed 
by becoming self-conscious; the self-conscious-
ness calls for reflection and then joy in new 
creation. The limits of intext and context are 
surmounted by the "here" and "now. 11 This self-
consciousness calls for and necessitates a dialo-
gic and dialectical process between the former 
determination of boundaries and limits and the 
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present liberation, synthesis, and freedom. As 
part separates itself from whole, both are object-
ified in their activity as they locate their es-
sences--in the process of separation--in their 
mutuality and interdependence; and by so doing 
they overcome their own finite limitations. Once 
well-perceived as mutually fettered, these now 
reveal their true nature as ontological independ-
ents but spiritual interdependents. Thus, in 
active separation plus integration, they negate 
their own static boundaries and renew again, vi-
cariously, for man, man's ability to be both one 
and the other, simultaneously. Space is shattered; 
time and history thrown down, and eternity glimpsed. 
A critical perception is embodied in this activ-
ity, which inspires man to joy in intellected 
conceptions. The concrete is amortized in activ-
ity. 
These transformations of reality supersede 
,, 
the old hierarchy of elitism; now each part demo-
cratically exists in equality with the whole, 
and even augments the worth of the whole. 
108 
An artist, by employing, or rather construc-
ting or composing, synecdoche,exhibits a decisive 
attitude towards the world: he separates a part 
from the whole (or the whole from a part) and by 
so doing objectifies both in either process; and 
by so doing, he transforms both part and whole 
(in either process); and by so doing, he transforms 
this part of the world; and by so doing, he trans-
fcrms--even if only in a minute way--the entire 
world. He intensifies the organic bond between 
the part and the whole by causing them each to 
interact more vigorously with the other; and in 
this way, he extends the organic bond to himself 
by causing himself to interact first perceptually 
and then conceptually with the part and whole; 
and in this way he extends the organic bond from 
the part and whole through himself out to his 
audience by causing the audience to interact more 
vigorously perceptually with the part and the 
whole and also with himself, the artist. 
Before the synecdoche takes place, we have 
three distinct and discrete units, usually frag-
mented: artist, whole, audience. (See Figure 
9.) 
Figure 9. Artist, 
Whole, 
Audience 
(Note the hierarchy.) 
During the process of artistic synecdocheic 
perception, we still have, initially in the pro-
cess, three distinct and discrete units, but one 
of the units is now having its boundaries broken 
down by a perceptual bond with the artist. (See 
Figure 10.) 
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Figure 10. Artist Moving Towards 
Whole (Part) 
(Note the beginnings of equality.) 
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During th~ actual process of synecdocheic 
reorganization, the boundaries of the whole have 
been broken, with its disgorging of its part; 
and we have interaction in dialectic of the com-
ponents. (See Figure 11.) 
Figure 11. A Dlsgorging of a Part 
But in the process of having its boundaries burst, 
the whole has had itself (in more than compensa-
tion) included within a greater boundary, the 
artist's perceptual-conceptual construct. (See 
1 1 2 
Figure 12.) 
Figure 12. Beginnings of Synthesis 
Then, the audience perceives the artist's 
synechdoche, and the formerly three distinct and 
discrete units have been organically confined 
under a common boundary. (See Figure 13.) 
Figure 13. The Holism of Artist, 
Part, Audience, and 
Whole 
The part (which formerly had had no existence 
of its own) now becomes the center of our new 
molecular atom of ontology. (See Figure 14.) 
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The last has become first; the least, the great-
est. But in so becoming, nothing is taken away 
from others. To the contrary, the others partici-
Figure 14. Molecule of Part and .Artist, Whole, 
and Audience 
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pate and become greater themselves by being a 
part of the process and product. 
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Thu~ the entire artistic process is completed. 
It is essential we understand that the entire 
artistic process includes and requires for com-
pletion, the audience interaction. 
Therefore in this small portion of the uni-
verse is reality transformed; but even such a mi-
nute transformation sends its ripples out to the 
fartherest corner of the cosmos, touching all in 
at least a little way. Each unit--artist, whole, 
part, and audience--subordinates itself for the 
good of the organic whole; but in such subordina-
tion each actually (and paradoxically) exhalts 
its own uniqueness and strengthens it. Their 
individual, idiosyncratic product-self is subor-
dinated to the satisfaction of the entire, organic 
process; such challenge of making a new addition 
to reality has stimulated each egoistical product-
self into altruistic process, and by so doing en-
ables each self-product to confront itself as part 
of an organic whole and process, and thus, by such 
confrontation, enables itself to be synthesized 
into organic exhaltation. 
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Only a process that results from the product 
of a being but does not belong to its usual mani-
festation (though this process may--or may not--
bear its impress) can give a new perception of 
meaning to the context, which thus, in turn, slightly--
or greatly--modifies, or transforms, the world. 
A process capable of originating from any such 
product ( which thereby is necessar.ily II self-con-
scious") could no longer become if it were not 
in the evolution of becoming from and to; just 
as reality would no longer be in the process of 
being modified--or transformed--if this process 
did not operate. 
The difference between products (which, be-
cause their activity has been segmented into a 
"finished" state, cannot generate processes de-
tached from themselves) and processes (which through 
their action upon reality create the realm of pro-
ducts) is that only the latter are phenomena of 
conceptualizing; the former are objects of per-
ceptualizing. Conceptualizing assumes prior per-
ceptualizing and subsumes it under its process--
as an.§: priori first step of function--and uses 
it as part of its creating process. Thus, it, 
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a.s the greater, is valuated the more. Conceptu-
alizing, after incorporating perceptualizing, 
then reflects upon it and constructs a new relation-
ship of whole and part, and thus creates a new 
construct. This reflection plus creation (action, 
here of mental, rather than physical, processes) 
is praxis. Praxis, "as the reflection and action 
which truly transforms reality, is the source of 
knowledge and creation.n1 
Synecdoche, as a transforming and creative 
process, removes men from their permanent isola-
tion from the world of outside reality, by involv-
ing them in the ideational flux of disgorging parts 
from the whole and reuniting them in an equality, 
with man, of valuation. It destroys the old spur-
ious hierarchical valuation of the superiority 
of quantity, and replaces it with the celebration 
of equality of quality. It tri-dimensionalizes 
part, whole, and conceptionalizer; it tri-dimen-
sionalizes the temporal arrangement of reality 
by processing the past (whole, man), the present 
(whole, part, man), and the future (new construct 
1 Freire, p. 91. 
of concept) and the renewed flow and change of 
direction of reality. 
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Synecdoche, as a function of man's creativ-
ity, develops along a temporal path as a constant, 
yet fluxing, process of transformation within which 
discrete units separate only to re-synthesize 
in a higher order of existence. The Hegelian 
dialectic is perfected in that each thesis con-
tains within itself its own antithesis, which, 
together, contain within themselves their own 
synthesis. How perfect! The old provincial near-
sightedness of looking for ill and aid outside of 
one's own boundaries is discarded on the rubbish 
heap of falsity. Within the Idea, its own bound-
aries,are to be found its own Heaven and Hell, its 
own sickness and salutariness. Thus, the dialec-
tic conflict of strength and growth are not closed 
units, which bombard those on the outside. They 
are merely latent or patent processes within each 
"organism,"2 but also irretrievably linked to 
other organisms. 
Synecdoche activates this natural dialectic. 
2such as cancer. 
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The artist, by employing the creative process 
of synecdo~he, allows this dialectic to operation-
alize; and thus he promotes the evolution of pro-
cess, thereby increasing the plenitude of the joy 
of life. Life (reality) is never naturally iso-
lated, alien, or static; it rather is naturally 
a process or a series of processes causing objects 
to interact dialectically within themselves and 
without with other objects. 
The conceptualizing of a new process and 
relationship of part and whole confronts reaction-
ary complacency in a dialectical antagonism. 
The result is never guarranteed; but, before the 
harvest can be considered, the sowing must be 
completed. 
Even the crude and uncomplimentary use of 
synecdoche (such as the use of the word "pussy" to 
designate a woman) causes man--on the one hand 
to celebrate the powerful nature of the form and 
function of sex in woman, but also to reconsider 
his attitude toward woman (belittling her human-
ity in relation to one of her anatomical functions). 
Antagonisms between alienated beings--such 
as artist, world, reality, and audience--disappear 
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during the duration of the process of synecdoche. 
This occurs because their individual spiritual 
boundaries, instead of excluding the other two 
from the one, now include the three in a harmony 
of perception of conceptualized idea-construct. 
This climate of rationality and cosmopolitanism 
endures, not only during the duration of the synec-
docheic process, but also beyond, fading of course 
with the temporal passage. Eut during this new 
climate, the new theme(s) of reality are infused 
with deeper and truer significance and are improved 
in terms of dynamic stability; each individual 
closed system--of the three--(before beset by 
entropy) is now infused with dynamic stability. 
This theme of a critical and dynamic view of on-
tology and axiology transforms discrete and frag-
mented reality into a holistic stability. 
In the first and last analysis, these themes--
of synecdocheic process--explode and dissolve lim-
its and situations; the limits of idiosyncratic 
boundaries become porous and fluid, and merge with 
other boundaries; situations--forzen moments of 
product--dissolve and move in currents of thematic 
process. When false personal limits and situations 
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are revealed for what they are by the theme of sy-
necdoche, and thus clearly perceived by all par-
ticipants in the process of synecdoche, the cor-
responding tasks--ma.n's responses in the form of 
transformation acceptance--can be both authentic-
ally and critically fulfilled. In this process, 
man is able to transcend his alienation-because-
of-false-limits-and-situations, and to discover 
that beyond these falsities and falsehoods--and 
in contradiction to them--lies the feasibility 
of new heavens and new earths. 
False Synecdoches 
Of course there are--as with anything--false 
(or bad) synecdoches. The process is always true; 
but evil or cruel or ignorant men are always able 
to subvert and pervert the good, by diverting the 
true process into false and unclean channels. 
Thus, the synecdoche "pussy," for example, can 
work to destroy the dimensions of intellect and 
humanity and incipient divinity in women by re-
ducing their entire being and process into a spe-
cific anatomical locale. In such a case certain 
men will unite their boundaries in glorification 
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of this falsehood.3 Such is a partnership and 
association, but never a triad, for the object--
woman--never in its (her) entirety submits to 
the subsumption of her boundaries under such de-
grading and delimiting boundaries of the· artist 
and audience. The frontier between man and wo-
man thus is made less transversible but instead 
more desolate, barren, and da~gerous.4 Such in-
stances of wounded sensibilities preclude crit-
ical scrutiny and resultant critical movement 
and direction towards praxitical feasibility. 
Synecdoche and Direction 
Synecdoche, with its generation of themes, 
thus can move either from the general (whole) 
to the particular and specific (part), or from 
the specific to the general. In either case, 
3of course, some individual women--maybe many--
can adequately be so described (their essential 
worth and history and probable future) by this 
synecdocheic epithet of "pussy." 
4The same is usually not true when woman 
uses the epithet "prick" to newly conceptualize 
man because man willingly joins in the triad here, 
because man is so concerned with desiring and 
having a large phallus. He gladly takes such a 
label literally. Thus the intended insult is 
gladly embraced by man as a compliment. 
123 
the mutual interpenetration of boundaries (of the 
triadic community) moves the triadic society from 
a provincial to a cosmopolitan one, from narrow-
ness of existence to broadness of perception and 
conception. Fortuity gives way to teleology. 
Partial vision gives way to clarity of perception, 
with the fragments of ontology becoming holistic 
again: 
When men lack a critical understanding 
of their reality, apprehending it in 
fragments which they do not perceive 
as interacting constituent elements of 
the whole, they cannot truly know that 
reality. To truly know it, they would 
have to reverse their starting point: 
they would need to have a total vision 
of the context in order subsequently 
to separate and isolate its constitu-
ent elements and by means of this analy-
sis achieve a clearer perception of 
the whole.? 
Synecdoche first places constituent elements 
back into their proper context, then separates 
the constituents, but by -so doing reconciles in-
text and context. 
Properly done, synecdoche ideationalizes the 
significant dimensions of man's contextual ontol-
5Freire, p. 95. 
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ogy, the critical valuation of which, by man, 
enables him to end his subjugation to the blurred 
unknown, and enables him to facilitate the mutual 
interaction of the various intexts. This all makes 
possible a new critical attitude towards reality. 
This critical attitude in turn makes possible 
man's ontological dialectic, which is the first 
indispensible step towards a true dialogue. 
The dialectic of, first, perception and, 
then, conceptualizing by means of coding requires 
the intellectual movement from abstract (and ab-
stracted) acceptance to concrete criticality; 
this necessitates the moving from the whole to 
the part and then back to the whole (or from the 
part to the whole and then returning to the part). 
This maintenance of both elements (part-whole, 
or whole-part) as opposites yet the same, inter-
relates them with themselves and with man dialec-
tically in the process of reflection. Each sub-
ject and each object become their opposite: ob-
ject and subject. 
In all of these stages of coding, man inter-
iorizes his view of the world; by so doing, the 
world contracts itself to within the bounds of 
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man and becomes part of him, rather than a hostile 
environment; in his turn, man expands his unnatur-
ally contracted self to a space big enough to 
include all (or part of the world), and becomes, 
no longer, a small, insignificant alien in the 
face of a terrifying, overwhelming monstrosity 
of a world, but now an aegisifier of all the world. 
We must not make the mistake of believing that 
themes exist, in their original objec-
tive purity, outside men--as if themes 
were things. Actually, themes exist 
in man in their relations with the world, 
with reference to concrete facts.6 
Man is the prism that breaks down the white light 
of reality into the colors of themes; a rainbow 
of perception is a process, not a thing. This 
is an existential process by man: 
The same objective fact could evoke dif-
ferent complexes of generative themes 
in different epochal sub-units. There 
is, therefore, a relation between the 
given objective fact, the perception 
men have of this fact, and the gener-
ative themes. 
A meaningful thematics is expres-
sed by men, and a given moment of ex-
6 Ibid • , p • 9 7 • 
pression will differ from an earlier 
moment, if men have changed their percep-
tion of the objective facts to which 
the themes refer. From the investiga-
tor's point of view, the important thing 
is to detect the starting point at which 
men visualize the "given" and to verify 
whether or not during the process of 
investigation any transformation has 
occurred in their way of perceiving 
reality. (Objective reality, of course, 
remains unchanged. If the perception 
of that reality changes in the course 
of the investigation, that fact does 
not impair the validity of the inves-
tigation.) 
We must realize that the aspira~ 
tions, the motives, and the objectives 
implicit in the meaningful thematics 
are human aspirations, motives, and 
objectives. They do not exist "out 
there" somewhere, as static entities; 
they are occurring. They are as his-
torical as men themselves; consequently, 
they cannot be apprehended apart-from 
men--it is necessary that the men con-
cerned understand them as well. The-
matic investigation thus becomes a com-
mon striving towards awareness of re-
ality and towards self-awareness, which 
makes this investigation a starting 
point for the educational process or 
for cultural action of a liberating 
character. ·r 
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The tendency of pedagogues (on whatever level), 
because of self-conscious ignorance, tends to shift 
the true focus of the investigation from the pro-
cess of creativity (here synecdoche) to either 
7rbid., pp. 97-8. 
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the artist himself, or to the object, the product 
of the synecdoche. We must always, however, start 
with the process. By so doing, we have creation 
rather than slavish and childish copying. 
Creation is not a mechanical act; it requires 
the participant to discover the interpenetration 
of reality and promote the reconciliation of the 
abstracted and fragmented alien constituents of 
every context. The greater the synecdoche, the 
more comprehensive the perception of total real-
ity. 
The more effective the synecdoche, the more 
favorable must be the terms and thus the more 
sympathetic the activity of coding and reconcil-
ing. Sympathy here implies at base love and rev-
erence of life. This thus includes satire. The 
artist who uses synecdoche to transform organic 
reality into inorganic appearance of reality (such 
as "pussy"), or what is really a process into 
what is a function, or life into product, or cele-
bration into sneering--is a creature who fears 
reality. He sees in truth (i.e., reality), not 
a context but rather a threat. He does not want 
truth, for truth would force him to begin living; 
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living requires love of and respect for all life-
forms. Such a perverted artist does not want to 
love or to live, because living and loving require 
spiritual commitment; and such a twisted artist 
has only, at best, a quivering and wounded spirit--
at worse, a destroyed spirit. Thus, in retalia-
tion (in revenge) he wishes the same for all other 
forms of life. He does not want to perceive and 
conceptualize; he only wishes to force the impress 
of his miserableness onto the forms of life, to 
brand, hurt, wound, and destroy. He wishes to 
think for others, rather than to promote the think-
ing of others. He wishes others to become consum-
ers of his products, rather than producers of their 
own. 
Synecdoche as Reflection 
Synecdo~he is reflection upon situationality 
and the subsequent conceptualizing of the partic-
ular out of the whole, the precipitation of the 
part to emerge from total submersion and to ac-
quire the power to intervene both in the arrogance 
of the whole and the ignorance of the audience. 
Thus, first we have perception, then, conception 
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by the artist, next emergence from the total by 
the part (and intervention in the total and in 
the audience by the part), and then conscious 
reflection upon the entire process and present 
situation by the audience. La.tent thought has 
become patent. In synecdoche, the content thus 
continually expands and renews itself in the di-
alectic process of thesis ) antithesis; 
the componentalizing of thesis and its definition, 
and resolution; and the final synthesis--all of 
which leads to dialogue between thesis and anti-
thesis: synthesis is the dialogic process per-
fected (i.e., completed). 
Thus, the artist, by the process of synec-
doche, sets context in motion and direction by 
setting up the part and the whole in a dialectic; 
the synthesis comprises the dialogue. The audi-
ence, by participating in the process (as first 
observers and then participants) also engage, as 
the tip of an isosceles triangle, with the other 
two angles, in a dialogic process. The product 
(i.e., the result) is a. further process: first, 
thinking, and then celebration (i.e., apprecia-
tion). These two latter processes lead the audi-
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ence to awareness; awareness in turn, leads to 
emancipation from non-thinking ignorance and in-
tellectual apathy. 
Synecdocheic Symbol Versus the Copied 
Gimmick 
This contrasts with the carpenters of cre-
ativity (who try to foist off on to the student, 
at best slavish imitation of the product of ar-
tists and at worse, a mere copying of the product 
with at the most substitution of terms). Thus, 
in one student playvrrightrs pitiful copywork about 
a woman rag collector, we have the theft of Tennes-
see William's effective use of synecdocheic symbol 
of the ashes--all to the applause of the student's 
professor, the academic dean mentioned earlier.8 
In William's play, The Rose Tatoo, the ashes are the 
symbolic pa.rt of the heroine's love, admiration, and 
passion for her dead husband (in addition to their 
identity as the literal remains of the same husband). 
After the revelation to her that her husband in 
life had been unfaithful to her, her love and 
admiration and passion for him become, suddenly, 
8This play was the final half of the student 
playwright's Ph.D. thesis in the theatre department 
at a Big Ten university. 
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mere 11 cold ashes." (This situation is now com-
parable to the "cold ashes" of the husband's love 
for her while he was yet alive.) What magnificent 
shift in motion and change of direction! The whole 
had become the part (love and passion and a man 
to ashes); but then the part became the whole: 
cold dead ashes represents the sum of her love 
and passion for her dead husband. 
However, in the student's play, the ashes 
are merely a sum total in themselves, a gimmick. 
The student playwright was successful in copying 
everything except William's talent. 
This carpentry is antidialogical and antidi-
alectical: the professor of playwriting denosited 
into the student playwright, who in turn tried to 
deposit in (or on) the audience. The student was 
trying to realize "artistically" his professor's 
view of the world (of drama).9 Regardless of whe-
ther the professor's view was muddy or clear, such 
attempt was doomed axtistically before it began. 
9rn a private conversation with this author, 
the professor proudly took the credit for sug-
gesting the gimmick of the ashes. It took, he 
boasted, three hours, for the gimmick of the ashes 
to come out of a conversation-exhortation he was 
132 
In contrast to this anti-dialectic and anti-
dialogical product-carpentry and deposit-method 
of education, the program content of the dialec-
tic and dialogical process-method is constituted 
and organized by the student's (the artist's) 
view of the world. The teacher, in this method 
does not oppress and dominate the student-artist 
by imposing his view of the world upon him; but, 
rather, in this system of education, the teacher 
liberates the student-artist by keeping out of 
his way and by supporting the student's efforts 
with love and appreciation for the struggle going 
on between the student and his context. In this 
latter method, the student's content constantly 
expands and renews itself because it is part of 
the process of the student expanding and renewing 
himself (and thus his perceptions). At most, 
the task of the teacher in this method of educa-
tion is to work as a paz:tner to the student only 
in the sense that he represents, by student invi-
having with the student playwright. Neither the profes-
sor nor the student saw fit to give any credit to 
Williams, from whom they had copied a product (i.e., 
the ashes). 
tation, part of the student's context. The pro-
fessor returns the context to the student, not 
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as a solution, but as a problem. Such education 
is possible only when there is present mutual 
understanding and trust; any condescension or 
insecurity-based false feelings of superiority 
on the part of the teacher automatically and ir-
revocably destroys any possibility of productive 
work of merit on the part of the student. The 
student must be a volunteer in this educative set-
ting; coersion and repression are murderers of 
creativity. The student-artist begins by gather-
ing series of data about his context and about 
himself. This is best done in the mind and heart 
of the student-artist, not on paper or canvas. 
Meanwhile, the teacher does not accompany 
the students on their individual journeyings into 
themselves and into their contexts; the teacher 
stands back and awaits the individual student's 
return. This is not to be misconstrued. The tea-
cher does not stand up in front of the class and 
lecture and deposit rules into. the student. The 
teacher does not teach only from a book. The 
teacher teaches from the context of the commun-
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ity. He takes his students to the courthouse and 
observes trials; he ta.kes them to the local jail; 
to communes; to drug rehabilitation centers; to 
retirement homes; and on and on and on. But on 
these voyages, although he accompanies the students 
physically, he does not accompany them intellec-
tually, spiritually, emotionally, psychologically, 
and artistically on their individual journeyings 
within themselves. In short, we have two simultan-
eous journeys: the group journey into the com-
munity context, and each individual journey into 
the self. 
The teacher never intrudes upon the student's 
creative process at least until there is a by-
product left a.s the process continues; the teacher 
never looks at an unfinished work. How horrible 
and devastating and destructive when an art teacher 
looks over the shoulder of a student as the stu-
dent draws or paints; how criminal when a teacher 
asks to see the first act or chapter of a work 
in progress, or the first draft, or an outline! 
Either such a teacher is vastly ignorant of and 
totally insensitive to the artistic process and 
of the artist in artistic heat or deadly vicious 
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in either a subconscious or conscious attempt to 
destroy any possible creative effort. The latter 
is far more common than one could dread. Little 
people trying to teach Godly creativity tend to 
try to prevent anyone from surpassing their own 
littleness. The student must become aware of this 
and avoid such evil people. 
When an artistic by-product is ready and 
the student-artist is ready to share it, the 
teacher must act as a sympathetic observer, with 
at least an attitude or pretense of respect to-
wards what he sees. While it is of course nor-
mal for the teacher to .come to the class with 
values that influence his perceptions, this does 
not mean that he may transform nor impose upon 
another's artifact. Who can judge a work of art? 
Without the help of the passage of time? Time 
only can truly evaluate. The greater the work, 
the more original the creator; the more original 
the artist, the greater the work of art, and the 
less the audience (teacher included) can immedi-
ately understand or appreciate it. And then ap-
preciation comes before understanding. The tea-
cher is always just part of the audience; he is 
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not a boss. A truly original work of art is al-
ways an immediate shock to our sensibilities; such 
a work must educate and cultivate its audience's 
taste; education and cultivation both always re-
quire time to accomplish their ends. The greater 
and more original the work, the greater must be 
the education and cultivation; the greater the 
task of education and cultivation, the more time 
and effort required. A little humility on the 
part of audience (teachers especially) goes a 
long way. Arrogance equals stupidity. A tailor 
run mad with pride has no business being toler-
ated by any students. They must not tolerate such 
outrage. When so outraged, they must stand up 
quickly and vote no with their feet. Megalomania 
has no place in the arts or in education. Let 
it stay where it belongs, in business, politics, 
and religion. 
The only dimension of the teacher's values 
that it is hoped that the student-artists will 
come to share and will want to share is a critical 
perception of reality, which implies a correct 
method of approaching ontology and metaphysics 
with a view to unveiling them. Such critical 
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perception cannot be dictated nor imposed. There-
fore, from first to last, creativity is pursued 
as an educational process and as a cultural per-
ceptualizing and conceptualizing activity. 
Synecdoche .§§.~Bridge of Thought 
During the joint process of activating and 
exciting the creative process, both teacher and 
student must critically view the particular area 
of context chosen as though it were a vast, uniQue, 
organic, throbbing, living mass to be coded by 
means of perceptions. They must not forget the 
region of temporary rejection, but also must not 
let it intrude unduly. They must regard the area 
of context chosen as a holism, and by perception-
after-perception, attempt first to discretize it, 
and then to separate a part out from the whole by 
analyzing the partial and total dimensions that 
impress the part and the whole with their iden-
tity and ideation. Through such a process, both 
teacher and student increase their awareness of 
how part and whole intereact, interpenetrate, and 
symbiosize (and also potentially to mutually war 
and destroy); this perceptionalizing will later 
(shortly) enable them to conceptualize a new re-
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lationship of part and whole, or perhaps more ac-
curately, faithfully reconstruct one of an infin-
ite number of already existing though hidden re-
lationships. The artist is to perceive and then 
in a work capture the very syntax of the relation-
ship of part and whole (the very structure of their 
interpenetrative "thought"). Just as each entity 
has an Idea and soul, just so is each entity's 
relationship with another entity or within the 
whole characterized by thought, by thinking. 
Thought here is the process of intending 
and purposing, and thus is the bridge between 
part and whole and between one and another. Sy-
necdoche is the articulating of one aspect of 
thought between part and whole • 
.Artistic Perception 
In all areas of education, we are after ar-
tistic perception. 
Creative Stenosis 
The artist (or anyone) narrows his attention 
and focus down upon one (or more) moments of the 
thought of the contextual area which he has cho-
sen. It is essential that the student observe 
and perceive the context under varying circumstan-
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ces. Here is one area in which the teacher can 
help. No essential activity of the context must 
escape the attention of the student; he must be 
awake and alert and seeing. 
Such observation comprises the first stage 
of artistic perception. 
Artistic Evaluation 
The next step is artistic evaluation. The 
student (not the teacher) must now iecide which 
components in the context are to be emphasized. 
This exposition challenges his previous precon-
ceptions and prejudices. 
Coding 
The resulting synthesis is the coding of the 
reality, which is the third step. After the recon-
sidering through critical reflection of the selec-
ted components, the student codes his analysis of 
the reality and reinserts it dialogically, into the 
disjoined whole, thereby making a new totality, by 
having transformed (by coding) a part of it. 
The more the artist divides parts from wholes 
and reintegrates the new whole, the more closely 
he approaches the synthesis of the principal and 
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secondary contradictions which involve the cre-
ative process. By approaching (a.nd effecting) 
these syntheses of contradictions, the artist 
becomes more able to organize the constructs of 
content. Certainly, if the content-constructs 
reflect syntheses of part and whole, meaningful 
thematics are born. Artifacts produced by this 
process have life, whereas "artifacts" ordered 
from an oppressive and dominating authority (whe-
ther educational institution or Hollywood or Broad-
way or lover) are stillborn. The basic thing, 
starting from the critical perception of these la-
tent syntheses of contradictions and the fulfill-
ment of conceptualized reconciliation (which are 
both microcasms and correlatives of the contra-
dictions within society, within man, within na-
ture, within the cosmos, and within the relation 
of God and man), is to study, look, and reflect, 
thereby developing levels of awareness of these 
contradictions. 
Contradictions. Intrinsically, these con-
tradictions contain the unlimited processes; the 
artist, by not being circumscribed by the mono~ 
lithic boundaries of an Idea, and able to see 
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contradictions within a whole, and able subsequently 
to entertain both realities, thus is able to in-
corporate harmoniously the ontological and axi-
ological ambiguities of life and substance. Such 
ability springs man loose from the fatalism and 
fatality of boundaries and of limits. Through 
subjective perceptualizing and conceptualizing, 
man liberates himself from objective realities. 
Such an unlimiting-process as a mental re-
ality can transport individuals from and to dif-
ferent contextual areas, just as it transports 
parts from wholes. Synecdocheic awareness is true 
and real consciousness of reality; impenetrable 
blocks of context are the result of mental obli-
quy. The apprehension of the complex of contra-
dictions is an act, not only of perceptive abil-
ity, but perhaps more so of courage. 
The trick is to select a contradiction that 
most appropriately develops, by its synthesis, 
the proposed thematics of the artist. The codi-
fication of a contradiction will become the medi-
ation between artist and audience, besides that 
of between nature and artist. 
Such selection of contradictions must adhere 
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to certain principles. The first such -principle 
is that the terms of the contradiction must be 
familiar to the audience, so that the members can 
easily grasp the situation. Secondly, the contra-
diction must be neither overly explicit nor overly 
implicit. The first instance would lull the audi-
ence to such a degree that the members would not 
be prepared to grasp the synecdoche of the terms 
of the contradiction. The second instance, overly 
implicitness, would so bewilder the audience that 
the members, again, would not be ready to grasp 
the synecdoche because their unfamiliarity with 
the terms of the contradiction would prevent their 
connecting the synecdoche (seeing it as a "natural" 
evolutionary result of the contradiction) with 
the contradiction. Synecdoche is a challenge, 
but a graspable and attainable challenge. 
Defamiliarization of the Familiar. The sy-
necdoche itself then reverses this familiar pro-
cess by defamiliarizing the familiar. We are 
all familiar with a hand; the expansion of the 
idea of hand to include the entire person and 
all the complex relationships between two inti-
mate people (or two people on the brink of the 
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intimacy of marriage) comes as a pleasant (and 
here, mild) shock of surprise and astonishment. 
Once the wonder of it has subsided, the third step 
------>• the familiar whole (the familiar part 
----·>• fusion as one ----~>~ astonishment 
£defamiliarization of the familiaE7') is accomp-
lished: the familiar-become-defamiliarized now 
becomes familiar. But the aura of the process of 
change never completely leaves the phenomenon. 
Thus, there is always that surprised appreciation 
lingering around the use of a synecdoche, no mat-
ter how much used and how traditional it has be-
come. 
In the process of decoding the synecdoche, 
each person in the audience externalizes his re-
sponse by becoming a member of the audience which 
decodes the synecdoche. Each becomes a member 
of the reflecting community. By achieving this 
awareness, the audience comes to perceive reality 
differently; by broadening the boundaries of their 
perceptive faculties, the members discover, to 
their delight, the joys and growth in participat-
ing in a dialectic and dialogical relationship 
with one another (in their mutual awareness and 
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appreciation), with the artist, and with reality. 
The same process is true of the artist: by 
perceiving the contradiction and then conceptual-
izing bis synthesis of the synecdocbe, and then 
sharing it all with bis fellows (this last is 
crucial), the artist also externalizes his response 
to reality and thus realizes bow he himself has 
acted while experiencing the process of percep-
tion of contradictions, conceptualizing his syn-
thesis of it in a synecdoche, and then sharing 
the fruit of his artistic growth with his fellow 
man--and thus realizes how nature and God feel 
and experience: Out of contrarities did God fa-
shion the world. In addition to becoming more 
of a man (by expanding his capacities for percep-
tions and feelings, and his abilities in concep-
tualizing and then realizing in artifactual form), 
the artist also approaches, as we have already 
pointed out elsewhere, the level of godhood. 
Synecdoche makes for more awareness of the 
old reality at the same time that it makes for 
awareness of the new reality (the old transformed 
by art into the new). It concentrates systemat-
ically the often digressory nature of the human 
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intellect upon the synthesizing process. It links 
the relationship of their unfelt needs to the ful-
fillment of those needs. 
Synecdoche as Simultaneous Projection 
Synecdoche is the simultaneous projection 
of different situations; the auxiliary becomes 
the essential; and thus it communicates to the 
artist and audience the reality of totality. 
Individuals who were submerged in their contexts 
as merely parts, now rise above the fragmentary 
relationships with their contexts and perceive 
that even in the lowliest of parts can be and is 
contained the whole. The last becomes first; 
the lowliest, the highest; and the smallest, the 
greatest. And best of all, none of this at the 
expense of the first, the highest, and the great-
est. 
The education of the student-artist (and 
of all students) can begin only with the freedom 
and encouragement to enter into a dialectic and 
dialogical relationship with reality. The artist 
is our guide; we must not allow teachers to des-
troy our guides by simplistic and stupid criti-
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cisms and comparisons of their products (their 
artifacts). Students need to be shown the pos-
sibilities of the creative processes and then en-
couraged to participate in them. Contradictions 
must not be avoided, as they are today. Rather, 
contradictory themes must be investigated and 
celebrated for the richness of their patent and 
latent syntheses and interpenetrations with other 
themes of contradictions f.ound in reality. We must 
not allow teachers to sacrifice this vast and im-
mense richness and powers to the fear of ignor-
, 
ant personal expose. The important thing in true 
education is for the student to feel free to go 
to reality as master of his own thinking and to 
accept reality and its present realizations and 
latent potentials as co-equals. 
Common Forms of Synecdoche 
Paraphrase, praecis, quotation, summary, and 
plagarism are all aspects of synecdoche. Each 
has two potential aspects: first, each can be 
a subtraction by us from the work of another so 
as to augment our own; and, secondly, each can 
be an addition to the work of another at our ex-
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pense (or, stated in another manner, either an 
expression of part as the whole, or the expres-
sion of the whole in a part [of U§..7) • 
First, each of these common forms of synec-
doche has the potential for being an expression 
of part of the whole. That is, in paraphrase, 
for example, we take all of another (all of his 
style and his content) and reduce this all to a 
part: to idea. That is, we try to take all of 
the idea of another, but not all of his content 
and not any of his style. We substitute our own 
style for his. (See Figures 15 and 16.) 
Another's content 
6f. ... .._ ____ ,... _____ full of his ideas. 
Another's con-
tent reduced 
to this __..1,,,111111~7 
idea. 
Figure 15. Paraphrase 
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Or, 
Another's content of ideas. 
___ !CJ\ I 
i 
Another's carrier (style) of 
his content of ideas. 
My reduction of an-
other's content 
of ideas to an 
idea. 
My carrier (style) of another's 
idea. 
Figure 16. Paraphrase, Another View 
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By synthesizing our style with his central idea, 
we proclaim our equality of worth with the other 
author's. The whole now becomes compounded: I 
and the other author; the whole is now represented 
by two compounded parts: his idea and my style. 
This process is a derivative one: the original 
author perceived an aspect of reality and then 
conceptualized it into his construct (into a new 
form); I take his construct and modify it into 
my construct (but with his contribution still 
perceivable to the audience's eye). Thus, I have 
accepted his perception of reality (instead of 
making my own perception). I am therefore the 
helpmate of the original author; but the original 
author is also my helpmate. The whole of the 
author is implicit in the part which I have taken 
from him. In my work of art or of craft, such 
synecdoche produces echoes of greatness, which 
help to enrich my work. 
However, this special process of synecdoche 
is an incomplete one because I have by-passed 
part of the complete process: I have not perceived; 
another has perceived for me. Thus, while such 
incomplete synecdoche enrichens my work, still, 
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I must use it with caution and restraint, lest 
my work ends up with incompleteness as its dom-
inant effect. In other words, it is 11 artistic" 
(effective) to use the work of my fellow artists 
and craftsmen to enrichen my work; it is quite 
another thing to use my fellow artist or crafts-
man to comprise all--or at least, the main thrust--
of my project. I can use (and should use) another 
to help me, but not to substitute for the lack 
of my own original perceptions and initial con-
ceptionalizing. 
This is where the works of Gleckner and Bru-
stein, for examples, fall short: they merely 
"stylize" (and sometimes further develop) the 
original perceptions and conceptions of others. 
To briefly illustrate: the importance of view-
point in William Blake was first pointed out and 
presented by Northrop Frye in 1947; Gleckner then 
took this c.oncept from Frye and puffed it up and 
further developed and refined it.10 
Praecis is similar to paraphrase, differing 
10Brian Wilkie, "Blake's Innocence and Ex-
perience: An Approach," Blake Studies, Vol. 6, 
No. 2 (Spring, 1974), p. 119. 
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only in that we take--not the whole of one seg-
ment of another's ideas--but just part, and then 
add our style. Summary carries praecis even fur-
there. 
All of the above general process is the first 
aspect of synecdoche: appropriating the content 
of ideas and then supplying the style. This a-
mounts to a subtraction from the original and an 
addition to the derivative: A - a~ B + a. 
The other aspect of these types of synecdoche 
is this subtraction from one so as to add to the 
ideas of another. 
The simplest form of this aspect is the pro-
cess by which we, in our words (our own style), ex-
plain to another what is not apparent to him when 
he considers the original; in this way, we go be-
yong the expression of the original author. Or, 
in the case of the classroom, the teacher or pro-
fessor, in his own words, gives part (the main 
ideas, or some relevant or pertinent portion) of 
some author to the students, who do not have the 
time (or have not had the time) to re.ad the orig-
inal for themselves. 
In quotation, we take a part of the whole 
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of another's work, and in so doing bring to bear 
upon our text the entire weight of, not only the 
text from which we have borrowed, but also, in 
the instance of a well-known artist or thinker, 
his entire corpus of work and his reputation as 
well. 
Plagiarism can be in the letter or the spirit 
of the law: in the letter of the law, we quote 
or paraphrase from another without properly i-
dentifying (i.e., without acknowledging the source 
of our theft.)11 The spirit of the law is fulfilled 
when we paraphrase, quote, praecis, or summarize 
without pro"per acknowledgement but such proper 
acknowledgement is not needed. When we borrow 
something that is well known, we do not need to 
explicitly acknowledge the source because every-
one knows so well the source and is well a.ware 
of our borrowing. 12 An example of this is Die-
kens' use, in Little Dorrit, of the quotation, 
"'tis distance lends enchantment to the view. II . . ' 
11when we borrow--quote, paraphrase, praecis, 
or summarize--without using quotation marks or 
proper acknowledgement of the original source, 
it is theft. 
12we are not concerned here with legal defini-
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from Thomas Campbell's The Pleasures of Hope. 
This line was so well-known and famous in that 
day that Dickens could rely upon his reader's 
supplying of the footnote. Such practice enriched 
his work and it has enriched and can enrich the 
works of others. 
Style can also be plagiarized: Ruark aped 
Hemingway's unique style (as did a whole host of 
people); Weaver appropriates style from Jews with-
out Money and Some Call it Sleep to infuse his 
fine short story "The Day I Lost my Distance"; 
Cassill appropriates Faulkner's convoluted, ramb-
ling style of his mature years, for parts of his 
Pretty Leslie. 
Quotation, paraphrase, praecis, and summary 
are beautiful techniques, not only in art, but 
also in rhetoric, freshman composition, and sci-
ence; in using them artistically or at least skill-
fully, we go into partnership with our fellow 
artists and craftsmen; we celebrate their worth 
by joining it to ours. But these techniques can 
never be substituted for our own lack of intelli-
tions. 
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gence or talent. They can compl.ement and enrichen 
but not take the place of. 
Pedagogical Implications 
The very practice of teaching itself takes 
the form of synecdoche: for example, we teach, 
in English, the Romantic Period; but the poets 
taught are only a selected few. A part (a few 
of all the many poets who wrote at that time and 
in "that way") is presented as representing the 
whole. This is true in all of the disciplines. 
We teach Shakespeare by requiring the reading 
of Hamlet, Julius Caesar, and several others. 
But what about Titus Andronicus? That is Shake-
spear also. How many teachers present a part 
of Stanislavski enti tlei ":The Method" as the whole 
of Stanislavski? 
But what subject can any man (or woman) mas-
ter in his lifetime even if he spends every waking 
moment studying it, muchless present it all to a 
class within the time limits of a course. Peda-
gogical synecdoche is a time-saver. 
In educational supervision, any one method 
of observation considers necessarily merely a 
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part of the teacher's teaching methods; yet this 
part usually is used to judge the whole. Flan-
ders Verbal Interaction Analysis, for example, 
observes and records only seven categories of 
verbal modes.13 Body language, and so forth, 
a:e not even remotely considered.14 
Models are instances of the use of synecdoche 
in theory. Models "are miniature representations 
that summarize15 data and/or phenomena and thus 
act as an aid to comprehension. 11 16 Some examples 
are the working model (of the structure of mole-
cules, solar system, et cetera); the conceptual 
model (systems); mathematical model (E=mc2, and 
so forth); and graphic models (sentence di-
agramming, maps, and such).17 No area of learn-
ing or culture or everyday thinking is free from 
13Ned A. Flanders, Interaction-Analysis in 
the Classroom: A Manual for Observers (Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan;-1965). 
14see Hyman, "Teaching Strategies • , 11 p. 
241, and all of Hyman (ed.), Teaching: Vantage 
Points for Study, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: J.B. 
Lippincott Co., 1974). 
15rtalics mine. 
16zais, p. 91 • 
17rbict., p. 92. 
the influence of synecdoche.18 
Summary 
Synecdoche, the third level of creativity, 
is the process by which we present the whole by 
means of a part (with the whole implied in the 
part) or the part by means of the whole (with 
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the part implied in the whole). Such a process, 
by elevating in importance the part, nevertheless 
also glorifies the whole. It entails, first, 
a perception of the possibility, and, secondly, 
a realization in a construct of the perception. 
18Michael A. McDanield, "Tomorrow's Curricu-
lum Today," Learning for Tomorrow, p. 111. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE FOURTH LEVEL OF CREATIVITY 
CLASSICAL MODELING 
From memory men can get 
experience; for by often re-
membering the same thing 
they acquire the power of 
unified experience. Exper-
ience, though it seems quite 
like scientific knowledge 
and art, is really what pro-
duces them; for, as Polus 
rightly says, experience 
brought art, and inexperi-
ence, luck. Art is born 
when out of the many bits 
of information derived from 
experience there emerges a 
grasp of those similarities 




Classical Modeling differs from quotation, 
paraphrase, praecis, and summary in that it con-
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tinues from the point at which these latter forms 
leave off: these latter merely reproduce the 
perceptions and conceptualizings of others; clas-
sical modeling, however, accepts the perceptions 
of the community (and of other artists) but then 
conceptualizes its own artifacts. Romanticism 
excitingly and adventurously and daringly sweeps 
away the conventions of traditional perceptions 
and codifications; classicism accepts these con-
ventions, separates them by dialectic, and then 
resynthesizes them into a new conceptualization. 
The Original Classical Modelers in 
Western Culture 
The Greeks accepted the myths of their society 
but reconceptualized them individually and uniquely. 
Sophocles was not the only Greek tragedian to 
write a version of the Oedipus story; the Romans, 
in turn, used the Greek plays as their models 
(as their given perceptions of the context of 
the dramatic and comic spirits) and reconceptual-
ized their own works from them; and then in turn, 
the plays of Plautus and Terence pro-
vided models for the Renaissance drama-
tists, and playwrights in Italy, France, 
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England, and elsewhere translated and 
imitated the Roman plays, adapting their 
plots and characters to new and original 
creations. Ariosto, Moliere, Shakespeare, 
and Ben Jonson ar£ among the many drama-
tists who ••• Lbuilt their works upon 
the works of the Roman artist~7.1 
This was because the Romans 
had nothing of their own that deserved 
the name of literature and so, when 
they came into contact with Greek cul-
ture and Greek literature, they were 
naturally eager to imitate and adapt 
the Greek masterpieces. The Romans 
may have lost some strength and realism 
by their generous use of Greek writers 
but they doubtless saved much time by 
entering quickly on their heritage, 
and early writers like Naevius and Plau-
tus brought vigor and originality to 
the lit~rary types taken over from the 
Greeks. 
Similarly, all modern writers are indebted 
in some way, either directly or indirectly, to 
the Greeks: 
The beginnings of Roman literature 
are sometimes criticized as imitation 
and translation but it is worth recall-
1George E. Duckworth, The Nature of Roman 
Comedy: A Study in Popular Entertainment (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. v. 
2Ibid., p. 4. 
ing that the Greeks by the third. cen-
tury B.C. had already invented, devel-
oped, and brought to a state of perfec-
tion almost every conceivable literary 
form--epic, drama (both tragedy and 
comedy), lyric, elegy, epigram, pas-
toral, history, oratory, philosophical 
dialogue and treatise. The literature 
of ancient Greece is the one truly o-
riginal European literature and in a 
broad sense all later literatures of 
western Europe are and must be imita-
tive in that they are all indebted to 
Greece, directly or indirectly, for 
their literary forms.3 
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The artists who choose to be indirectly in-
debted to their culture and community are Roman-
tics; those, hqwever, who choose to be directly 
indebted are Classicists. 
Acceptance of Heritage 
Classical modeling entails the submerging 
of the artist into the powerful heritage of art 
and the influence of the entire milieu of his 
society so that his own unique personality may 
steep and color itself: 
there must be interaction with one's 
environment: social learning, social 
invention, and a progressive and devel-
3rbid., pp. 3-4. 
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oping wholeness, harmony, integration.4 
In this way, he does not primarily concern him-
self with the problems of values and perspectives--
these are givens (unless of course he is utiliz-
ing only the forms and not the .contents), but 
only of the different levels and kinds of value 
perspectives involved in perceptions. Thus, he 
builds upon the work of others: "One's succes-
ses are always related to and built upon the find-
ings of others."5 
Recognition of value-concerns forms the de-
sign of hi$ priorities established among the ba-
sic referents of perception. Thus, content is 
a set of value judgments that prizes cultural and 
social heritage over idiosyncratic interests. 
Value Commitments 
At another level, the recognition and accep-
tance of cultural justification entail value 
commitments. Communal value positions result 
4Harold H. Anderson, "Creativity as Person-
ality Development," Creativity and its Cultiva-
tion • • • , p. 14. 
5Eyring, p. 8. 
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in the describing of content constants in both 
similar and different patterns, but mostly similar 
patterns. This can be illustrated easily with the 
three basic artistic positions one may take: a 
realistic (a factualist or irnitationist), Roman-
tic (an essentialist or valuist), and Classicist 
(a formalist or modeler). 
Theory of creativity is essentially an attempt 
to construct a theory of value processes, whereas 
designs (artifacts) of creativity are patterns 
of value judgments and processes. The task of 
justifying the creative pattern is not completed 
simply by making the judgments. In Classical mod-
eling, values must be clearly identified before 
the specification of process rather than used as 
results of the pattern-making process. 
The Two Levels of Value 
Thus, there are two levels of values that 
we must focus on at this time as illustrations 
(recognizing of course that there are still other 
cogent value levels as well) and these are con-
siderations of value at both the theory and design 
levels: these two levels are structural perspec-
tives and rational values. 
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At the level of structural perspectives, 
we approach the world or mediate reality through 
fundamental and traditional perceptual structures. 
We are from the very beginning asserting an or-
ientation to ontological traditions. That is, 
if the artist accepts the community's (or soci-
ety's) orientation, he mediates reality through 
the values of society (including society's other 
artists). 
Also, at the rational valre level we mediate 
reality. We may dispute the value of a given de-
sign, but we never dispute that the design has 
or has not value; we dispute only on the grounds 
that the design may not meet the criteria of a 
good design, or we dispute the criteria that have 
been applied to examine the specific design. 
In either of these cases we have non-disputable 
orientations upon which are founded our logical 
and value activities. Perhaps these foundations. 
are a kind of communal propaganda, but the propa-
ganda--if such it be--has already been securely 
personalized so that it is more than merely cog-
nitive in its effect upon us. 
When we move to the level of perceptual de-
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signs, the value components are even more given. 
It is clear that artists who promulgate such sup-
posed value designs as ontological and axiological 
givens are basing and deriving considerable thematic 
direction on and from these "outer" value positions 
which they have internalized. Thus, value designs 
appear clearly here as a~source of content and as 
directionals of significant elements in the con-
structs of the value designs. Perceptions thus 
are not the problem, but rather their realizations 
into "realistic" forms. 
It is clear that communal orientation has 
clarified the problems of value, a luxury the 
Classical artist enjoys over the Romantic. It 
is probably primarily this success that gives 
Classical modeling its unified linear character. 
We are often, for example, creating at the same 
or similar value and design levels and thus, not 
only sympathize with, but more often coincide with 
one another's affecting and perceiving. And it 
has clearly been realized that the most fundamental 
level, structural perspectives, is also grounded 
in a some sort of communal value matrix. Thus, 
we assume that we all share the same basic vision 
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of life. 
Communal and Artistic Consensus 
This fundamental acceptance that we are all 
working with the same basic structures and that it 
is sufficient simply to reason together for every-
thing to become clarified and agreeable leaves 
us in the enviable position of starting from a 
given position, rather than having to begin by 
finding or creating our own position. Classical 
modelists thus have a running jump on the Roman-
tics, who first must construct their own race 
track. 
Obviously knowledge cannot be divorced from 
human interests; neither can fact be abstracted 
from value. Classical modeling has as one of its 
constitutive basics, communal consensus. It is 
inimicable to the orientation of the positivistic 
methodology of science, which has misled us into 
denying the knowledge base of the arts, thus re-
ducing the understanding of meaning and percep-
tion to a monologic constriction: 
••• monologic ••• means the abstrac-
tion of fact from value and the creation 
of theory explaining facts in an empir-
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ical-analytic fashion. The process 
of verification is a linear one called, 
variously, for example, education, in-
duction, or abduction. A formalized 
language (e.g., calculus) is used to 
facilitate objectivity. 
Hermeneutic understanding of mean-
ing arises in the context of different 
cultural life expressions such as or-
dinary language, human actions, and 
nonverbal expressions. All of these 
experiences carry symbolic meanings, 
which, however, need a dialogic inter-
pretation rather than monologic veri-
fication. The methodology is circular 
rather than linear in that the inter-
pretation of meaning in hermeneutic 
understanding depends on a reciprocal 
relation between "parts" and a diffusely 
preunderstood "whole" and the correc-
tion of the preliminary concept by means 
of the parts. It is a method that dis-
covers the empirical content of indi-
vidual conditions of life while inves-
tigating grammatical structures.6 
The grammar of ontological and axiological designs 
is a given: the forms of structures of the per-
ceptual designs are interdependent; the arrange-
ments of the systems of thematics is a customary 
one; the systems of rules is nonnegotiable; and 
the elementary principles of the field of know-
ledge are unchallenged. For the Romantics, gram-
mar is still evolving; the burden of communica-
tion lies primarily with the audience; the Roman-
6Macdonald, "Curriculum and Human Interest," 
pp. 286-7. 
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tic is a pioneer searching out the rules, prin-
ciples, and arrangements of systems of thematics. 
For the Classical Modelist, the grammar of 
the systems and designs of life are the alpha and 
omega of conception, just this side of parturition; 
this grammar is a parturifa.cient medicine for the 
creative act--for the creative fait accompli. 
Facts are never separate from the values 
and grounds of activity and even more importantly 
from value. Thus, facts do not fetter but rather 
liberate. The Classical Modelist is free; at the 
same time, he welcomes the limits of facts; thus, 
the greatest Classical Modelists of them all, 
the Greeks, held fundamental convictions that, 
while, on the one hand, freedom was their most 
precious possession,7 yet, on the other hand, 
believed "that limits were good. 11 8 
For the Romantic, however, who has to assign 
his own individual values to facts, facts tend 
to fetter and to destroy: "Thoughts keep alive. 
7Edith Hamilton, The Echo of Greece (New 
York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1957), p. 16. 
8 lb id. , p. 18 • 
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Only facts kill--deeds! 11 9 
Classical Modelists are intellectualists: 
they consciously and rationally use the forms 
a.nd constructs of others (the physicalities, if 
you will) upon which to build and into which they 
infuse their great spiritual feelings. In this 
way, they fulfill our human natures and thereby 
more nearly synthesize the two parts of man, which 
more fully completes both. 
The Romantics, by having to construct first 
their ontology and then to infuse it with axio-
logical thematics, are exhausted, their work lim-
ited by the sheer exertion of such total and vast 
creativity. The Classical Modelists, by using 
an already existent foundation, find their work 
of creativity easier: it is, in fact, an immense 
stimulus to creative activity. 
Classical Modelists tend to combine and syn-
thesize the knower and the already-known (the 
already realized and manifested) with fact and 
value. The one is the cause of the other; the 
great natural teleological concatenation is ex-
9Eugene O'Neill, Welded, 1931, Act II, Scene 
2. 
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ploited into practical means-ends continuities. 
Both serve a critical interest, since both accept 
the status quo as descriptively given and as in-
tegral with the knower. The methodology of this 
synthesis is self-reflective. Thus, the artist 
begins with a metaphysical construct that is em-
pirically (and conventionally and traditionally) 
verifiable and which provides a systematically 
generalizable schema that accounts for the inter-
penetration of part and whole and spirit and fact. 
This allows the audience to make contribu-
tive exegetical suggestions to themselves concern-
ing life by way of the mediating artifact, exe-
getical suggestions that, without the artifact, 
they would not be able to make. These suggestions 
are verified by the individual's and the communal 
acceptance and adoption of them into their conscious-
nesses. In this methodology the created object 
participates in the creative process as both the 
subject and as the means; it is both the message 
and the metaphor. 
One basic proposition about this level of 
creativity is that at all perceptual levels and 
specifically at the levels of structural perspec-
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tives and rational values, the basic phenomenon 
that underlies creativity is the existence of com-
munal vision and interest that precedes, accompan-
ies, and results in the creative process. 
In this way, three basic cognitive interests 
are satisfied: first, outside control is achieved 
without outside oppression; this is achieved be-
cause the thematics and designs are givens for 
the artist (and gladly accepted as such by the 
artist)--they thus control the shape and direc~ 
tion of his creative process and activities. 
This is made possible because of consensus: both 
the artist and his community agree that the the-
matics and designs are correctly structured and 
valued; their mutual perspectives are not just 
confluent, but rather congruent. Thus, consen-
tial control results in the emancipation of the 
artist: he is free to conceptualize as he desires 
the already-existent perceptualizations. 
At the level of structural perspectives in 
creativity where our artist transcribes the lim-
its and variables of which the thematics and de-
signs are composed and sets the ground rules for 
conceptualizing, he is perhaps most implicitly 
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influenced by human concerns sifting through the 
perceptual forms prescribed by his community (i.e., 
tradition, environment, and personality). He is 
more able and willing to categorize by creating 
his work at different levels. Here, the major 
creative thrust in the critical cognitive interest 
is in the supportive realm. Control potential 
is in only the facts, but nevertheless takes on 
a more institutionalized or formalized aspect. 
The control aspect is associated with both sub-
ject matter and form; when it degenerates into 
an association with only forms or societal insti-
tutions, then the result is neo-classical model-
ing. 
Consensus Versus Individuation 
Whereas much of Romantic creativity entails the 
search for perceptual patterns concerning the place 
of individual as part of the societal whole but be-
coming, by abstraction from that whole, a fragmen-
ted whole (alienated and lonely), Classical Model-
ing creativity concerns itself muchly with the con-
ceptualization of the problems of given social (in-
cluding the cosmic society) issues designs and 
thus reflects a fundamental interest and preoc-
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cupation with consensus, or reconciliation of 
conflicting elements within the social boundar-
ies and expectations, as opposed to the Romantic 
preoccupation with individuation and the coming 
to terms of an individual with his alienation 
and aloneness. 
Reconciliation and Synthesis 
For the Classical Modelist, the resolution of 
conflicts as artistic problems are not determined a-
head of the process of reconciliation or at least 
the movement of thematics in that direction (of recon-
ciliation), but the~ priori expectations of concili-
atory dialogue and dialectic are a built-in fea-
ture directing the process towards consensus in 
culmination. Such designs reflect a practical con-
cern for reconciliation rather than the more hard-
to-attain concern for synthesis, although synthe-
sis is also a good, albeit a less immediate one.. 
Romantics, on the other hand, tend to leap over re-
conciliation in their obsessive quest for synthesis. 
The Romantic pattern of thematic design, 
individual subject centered, or abstracted needs, 
is more closely associated with emancipatory in-
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terest. In this instance, the process of develop-
ing individual and part potential or of strengthen-
ing self-realization is embedded in a creative 
interest in liberating individuals and parts from 
whole limitations and in creating new relation-
ships and contexts. This fundamental preoccupa-
tion gives movement and direction to the concomi-
tant implied values of the constitutive segments 
and processes. 
Process Context 
In both situations, Romanticism and Classi-
cism, we have a process context. In both, reflec-
tion is a central preoccupation: in Romanticism, 
it is primarily reflection on self; in Classicism, 
it is primarily reflection on object. Both levels 
of creativity are political in thematic movement 
in that in both processes the artist is attemp-
ting to facilitate his own and also his audience's 
idea of the nature of true life by creating social 
(part with whole) processes and conceptualizing 
an environment, for sythesis. All that is pro-
posed, has to do (finally) with emancipation of 
life. The means employed in each instance--the 
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correct position and process--actually posits 
that some fragment of actual consequences--a frag-
ment arbitrarily chosen because the heart has been 
wounded by it--authorizes the use of processes 
to fulfill it, without the consequences of the 
choices predetermining the consequences. It thus 
enfolds in a striking manner the truth disclosed 
in the process that values dependence and inter-
dependence of part and whole as distinct from 
causal efficiency. 
By accepting and beginning with the patterns 
and thematic designs already institutionalized 
by society, the artist is already deeply rooted 
in "fact" as means rather than as ends, and thus 
his activities are a part of the whole and are 
already synthesized with the whole--to an extent. 
He already has ready at hand his raw materials--
perceptual designs--and is ready to begin work: 
No human activity operates in a vacuum; 
it acts in the world and has materials 
upon which and through which it produ-
ces results. On the other hand, no ma-
terial--air, water, metal, wood, etc.--
is means save as it is employed in some 
human activity to accomplish something. 
When "organization of activities" is 
mentioned, it always includes within 
itself organization of the materials 
existing in the world in which we live. 
That organization which is the "final" 
value for each concrete situation of 
valuation thus forms part of the exi-
stential conditions that have to be taken 
into account in further formation of 
desires and interest or valuations. 
In the degree in which a particular 
valuation is invalid because of incon-
siderate shortsighted investigations 
of things in their relation of means-
ends, difficulties are put in the way 
of subsequent reasonable valuations. 
To the degree in which desires and in-
terests are formed after critical sur-
vey of the conditions which as means 
determine the actual outcome, the more 
smoothly continuous become subsequent 
activities, for consequences attained 
are then such as are evaluated more 
readily 5s means, in the continuum of 
action. 1 
The artist images a picture that emerges 
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from apparently frenetic communal activity and 
which enjoys a growing acceptance by the powerful 
and restrictive bureaucracy of society, as an 
ideal of excellence and a source of inspiration. 
It becomes a dominant metaphor for educational 
and reconciling theory in present day. It becomes 
a "standard product" because it has been fashioned 
according to the design specifications and fac-
tual basis of the existing structure and process 
10newey, On Education ••• , p. 107. 
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of present society. It becomes an institution 
of thematic design, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, a lubricating process for the vast and cum-
bersome machinery of society, whose business it 
is to transform the wild and crude mass of emerg-
ing adulthood (children) into useful social com-
ponents, and also to maintain order within and 
between adults in the face of the chaos of life. 
When the social structure is a good one, as 
in Classical Greece, creativity is predominantly hon-
est and truthful in its propagation of useful 
communal patterns and processes; when the social 
structure is oppressive, creativity becomes an 
evil process, aiding by self-justifying propaganda 
in the process of subjection and oppression. 
The artifacts resulting from Classical Modeling, 
in these opposites of societies, are also opposites 
in value and intrinsic worth. Compare and con-
trast Aeschylus with Pope. 
Classical Modeling in a just society streng-
thens the community-centered society and with it 
the ideal of the individual (and the individual 
artifact) as the legitimate legacy of the past 
and present, and as the essential outgrowth 
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of previous good. It strengthens the individual 
by giving him a measure of recognition in and 
as an essential of a community-centered society. 
By basing a work of art upon the designs of soci-
ety and the perspective structure of another work 
of art, the artist responds to change by making 
it a process of what already exists, and thereby 
transforms both without destroying either. 
Certainty and Familiarity 
The great virtue of Classical Modeling is 
two-fold and complementary: first of all, it 
is certainty and familiarity. The design and 
perspective structures are familiar to the audi-
ence. However, the unique conceptualizations into 
new constructs by the artist of these familiars 
defamiliarizes them sufficiently to produce mild 
shocks of astonishment and pleasure, but not so 
much that any audience is dismayed by losing its 
thematic orientation. 
Every Classical Greek knew the story of Oedi-
pus. What they came to the theatre for was to 
see how each artist reconceptualized the common 
knowledge-possession by all into a new vision. 
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This is also the appeal of present-day traditional 
Eastern theatre and drama. 
An essential aesthetic of "narrative" art 
is the necessary preparation at the beginning 
of the work of art for the audience to know at 
least generally the direction in which it is go-
ing, the direction of the thematic universe of 
the work of art. This has been called foreshad-
owing. Classical Modeling makes use of form with 
which the audience is familiar, and thus the audi-
ence recognizes immediately the direction of the 
work's thematic universe. Classical Modeling 
makes this necessary chore of foreshadowing by 
the artist very easy; and it makes the chore of 
participation on the part of the audience also 
very easy. 
Within the boundaries of such a directed 
thematic universe (of the work of art) great !a-
riety, diversification, intensity, and abundance 
are, not only possible, but terribly desirable--
in fact, difficult to avoid, for an artist with 
at least a little talent. The possibiltiy of cog-
nitive dichotomy, because of disorientation or 
ignorance, between ends and means is sharply re-
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duced. The efficiency of the artistic process 
and also the audience process is greatly enhanced, 
leading to more immediate satisfaction of both 
than is possible--or at least probable--in the 
Romantic process. The sense of delight in the-
matic activity (within the work) is strengthened 
by a sense of urgency in arriving at an organism 
resulting from the creative process. The thrill 
of the pursuit is seen by the audience as concomi-
tant to the ecstasy of completion. The wonder 
of the journey is enhanced by the relentless (be-
cause recognized as such) progress of the thematic 
direction of movement. 
Classical Modeling humanizes the thematic 
designs and reconciles means and ends, fulfills 
intellectual and emotional curiosity, and rewards 
both artist and audience for their knowledge of 
existing thematic patterns and their insights 
in synthesizing the given (the traditional) with 
the new. The autonomy of the individual (and of 
the new) is reasserted and celebrated by recog-
nizing its relationship to the whole of the past 
and of the old and the traditional. Opression of 
the new by the old and of the individual member 
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and work (the part) by the whole (of society and 
the corpus of past created works) is avoided and 
by-passed by the recognition and celebration of 
the new and of the individual and of the part 
as a further extension, reflecting growth, and 
glorification of the old, of the whole, of the 
traditional. The particularization of a conceptu-
alization of traditional perceptional designs 
does not trivialize the whole but rather synthe-
sizes both particular and general into a new gen-
eralization of cognition and celebration. Hist-
ory and product are justified by the glorifica-
tion of progress and process. 
Thus, communal experience is exhalted. From 
this experience, one is able to identify the ma-
jor activities of life and to isolate present 
problems and connect to them past solutions or 
at least past consolations. Classical Modeling 
becomes communal activity analysis, its complex 
requirements of equally complex skills being di-
vided up into component parts and then the reflec-
tion of these parts reincorporated back into the 
whole of the experience of the society. This 
gives training to both the artist and the audi-
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ence in valuating. 
Control, and New from the Old 
Because control is a given (the communal 
perceptual design and perspective constructs are 
the compounded basis for Classical Modeling), no 
energy is wasted on seeking or rejecting outside 
control. The outside control has been synthesized 
with inner control. The consequence is not stand-
ardized outcomes, but rather brotherly journeying; 
it is not positivistic and autocratic and subjugating 
cause and effect, but rather mutual heuristic 
activity. Classical Modeling is an affable inter-
action between part and whole, between new and old, 
between manifestation and immanentization. Clas-
sical Modeling is the emergence of new conclusions 
by means of old assumptions. Classical Modeling 
provides !or the continuance of continuity of 
life and the world. A new orthodoxy is not im-
posed but rather a variety of new mutations and 
new conceptualizations and methods arise to help 
us appreciate the richness and interprenetration 
of life, which are useful for revealing to all 
of us the subtleties of consequences. Classical 
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Modeling provides a fresh vantage point from which 
old questions can be appreciated and new ones solved. 
It provides a trusted vantage point from which we 
can with confidence, safety, and security view 
lands for individual and communal exploration and 
conquest. 
The old and acceptable contents and contexts, 
whether values or empirical dimensions and conclu-
sions from past-experienced reality, in the process 
of new conceptualized narration become rejuvena-
ted and revivified. Stagnation is avoided. Com-
munal reality becomes agitated into motion again, 
kinetic, generalized, and dynamically unpredict-
able (within certain broad confines). A topic a-
lien to the community is revealed and explained 
by commonly shared terms. Contents and contexts 
become again attached to reality, connected with 
the totality that originally engendered them and 
gave them their significance. Words, concepts, 
and designs are again filled with concreteness 
and relevancy, and become solid, reconciled, and 
enfranchised. 
Style 
The creative emphasis in Classical Modeling 
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is on style: emphasis shifts from ontology to 
axiology. Because the end of the particular work 
is already foreseen, the sensibilities of the 
audience (and previous to that, the artist) be-
come attuned to a primarily aesthetic orientation, 
based on admiration for the direct experiencing 
of a predictable conclusion, simply and efficiently. 
Style is fundamentally aesthetic; it is achieve-
ment and restraint realized by valuation of in-
text by context. Romanticism, to the contrary, 
being primarily concerned with establishing an 
ontology rather than with refining style, tends 
to be characterized by excesses. 
Classical Modeling, by concerning itself 
with communal objectives (rather than primarily 
personal objectives of the artist), thus frees 
the artist to infuse these objectives with his 
own individual personality and therefore, in sub-
stance, transform these objectives, in fact, into 
subjective forms. This contrasts dramatically 
with the behavioral objectives of imitation or 
copying, which are held strictly separated from 
personal and subjective 11 contamination"--all in 
the name of science and objectivity. 
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Thus, imitative and copying (e.g., behavioral) 
objectives--which by their very nature are imper-
sonal (i.e., objective--separate, distinct from 
the subject)--are replaced by subjectives, which 
concern style. Style is the exact antithesis of 
objectives: objectives are fragmentations, ab-
stractions; style infuses the whole and synthe-
sizes pa.rts with parts a.nd parts with wholes and 
wholes with parts, and wholes with wholes; objec-
tives (especially behavioral objectives) are non-
committal; style is sharing--it is open; objectives 
justify the means; style is the means--it is sow-
ing, without worrying about the harvest, knowing 
that, with good sowing, the harvest will come of 
its own accord; objectives are the hell-for-leather 
getting there "tomorrow"; style is enjoying real-
ity and life, the enjoying of "today"; objectives 
are non-restraint; style is restraint; objectives 
represent a mechanistic control over; style, or-
ganic autonomy; objectives are clear-cut; style 
is characterized by ambiguities; objectives are 
characterized by standards and by comparisons; 
style, by values; objectives represent kinesis 
(activity); style, praxis; objectives are pedes-
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trian, the attainment of the lowest level of in-
formation; style is knowledge; objectives repre-
sent a hieraxchy; style is collegial--a partner-
ship of artist and material, of process and pro-
duct, of product and audience; objectives is ego 
plus the exploitation of abstractions; style, 
ego plus partnership of holistic context; objec-
tives entail a struggle to win the battle, to over-
come obstacles so as to attain the objectives; 
style is peace: overcome nothing--rather, become 
all, incorporate all; objectives are one-dimen-
sional; style, muti-faceted; objectives are egois-
tical; style, altruistic; objectives are hard, 
shiny little products; style, expressive activi-
ties and process; objectives represent the unwill-
ingness to take a chance--they equal insecurity; 
style is a willingness to take a chance, and thus 
equals security and serenity; objectives are iso-
morphic; style, polymorphic and idiomorphic; ob-
jectives is a closed system (entropy)--style, an 
open one (negentropy); objectives are as narrow 
and confined as Wordsworth's thimble--style as 
inclusive as the world; a person takes objectives, 
but a person gives style. 
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Style surrmounts objectives; it does not as-
sume nor presume; it is. Style enables the artist 
to clothe and then to present beautifully ambi-
guities. Ambiguity, as we have seen, is the na-
ture of life. One has no intellectual maturity 
until he is able to deal comfortably with ambigu-
ities and apparent contradictions.1 1 Style com-
bines with kinesis to aid in praxiology and praxis. 
Behavioral objectives, in whatever form, have no 
restraint: .ill! contraire, they are to be achieved, 
period; their attainment is everything. This is 
a positive charge only. Attainment plus restraint, 
however, represent complementarity. With restraint 
one is both under and in.control. Nature itself 
is characterized by restraint (except for such 
things as tornadoes, erupting volcanoes, and so 
forth); good society and good manners are charac-
terized by restraint; also good government and 
good business are characterized by restraint.12 
11Aubrey Menen, The Mystics (New York: Dial 
Press, 1974), pp. 113 and 133. Consider also 
Keats' Negative Capability. 
12An example of the lack of restraint in 
business is the glutenous price gouging by the 
cartel of seven American oil companies, which is 
destroying the Detroit automobile industry (the 
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Style equals value; style equals tbe man (Le style 
est l'homme). Style is the connective between ar-
tist and his content; it is the synthesis between 
discrete forms; the reconciliation of part and 
whole. It is the avoidance of applying a stan-
dard because it, the standard, makes a judgment. 
There are three characteristics of style. 
It is, first of all, a particular spiritual qual-
ity existing under specified and special spirit-
ual conditions; it is a. value. In the second place, 
style is a measure of general quality. Finally, 
style defines content with respect to quality. 
But it is an internal attribute as well as a pub-
lic one. It follows, because of the presence of 
an intrinsically and yet publicly ascertainable 
attribute, that both subjective and objective 
frames, as well as reflections and critical judg-
ments, of the idea are possible. Style is the 
critical judgment placed upon a process by the 
artist; it involves a venture, courage, a hypo-
thetical processing. It is directed outwardly 
to an artifact, yet it originates from within and 
capitalistic basis of the .American economy). 
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is very, very personal. It is concerned with an 
individual object; it is intrinsic even though 
originating from without the object; rather than 
being imposed upon, it is infused throughout. 
It is the organization of the thematics of the 
work. It is not an imposition of an external 
pre-established rule from one external to another. 
The artist, because of the element of venture, 
reveals and gives of himself in his creating. 
Style need not precede artistic action; style 
may .grow out of action. Unfortunately, our cul-
tural tendency to eschew content and praise style 
makes it sometimes difficult to perceive that style 
cannot be justified in its own abstracted right 
and why in a broad sense it may be considered 
only as a synthesized producing form of artistic 
activity. 
Exegetical Dissection 
Are there ways of appreciating style and con-
tent that are free of the kinds of criteria that 
require dissection? Of course. Dissective exe-
gesis is appropriate for some types of critical 
analysis, but it is in no way adequate and final 
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for conceptualizing the majority of our most cher-
ished creative aspirations. When it is appropri-
ate to formulate specific and component types of 
exegetical exercises that aim at particular and 
definable parts and problems, the use of dissec-
tive exegesis may be warranted: one must under-
stand the crucial role of olfactory receptors 
in the communication between different creatures 
before he can understand the establishment of re-
lationships; one must understand and recognize 
ana.gnorisis before he can perceive and comprehend 
peripetia. But one should not--either as audience 
member, or as artist, or as teacher--attempt to 
exclusively, nor initially, nor finally, appre-
ciate, create, or teach thus reductively. To do 
so robs our goals of the very qualities of per-
ceptualizing that we are seeking to foster. 
The above problem-solving approach (exeget-
ical dissection) is effective on low-level crea-
tivity, teaching, and appreciating. But, finally, 
it is expressive activity that we are after. 
Problem-solving if finite; expressive activity, 
infinite. The first is inward looking; the lat-
ter, outward. In the former, it is true, the 
190 
shape of the problems, their solutions and their 
forms are highly variable and varied; in the lat-
ter, the activity is determined by the expression, 
and thus is more integral to the process and re-
mains a synthesized part and form of both content 
and process. Alternative solutions are possible 
in exegetical dissection; in expressive activity, 
there is always one solution more preferable to 
all the rest. 
In exegetical dissection we have critical 
control; in expressive activites, we have creative 
artistic support and the providing of resources. 
In exegetical dissection, fragmentation and re-
ification; in expressive activities, the discov-
ery and promotion of teleology, interpenetration, 
and holism. In the first, formal considerations; 
in the latter, both formal and informal--essence; 
end in itself, the beginning; referrant. The one 
is n egoistic" ( the critic assumes prominence). and 
ruthless and mechanistic; the other, altruistic 
and empathetic and humanistic. The one is one-
dimensional: the particular dissectional task 
at hand ••• and optimism is the official pro-
gram (i.e., the exegesis will be successful); 
the other embodies complementarity(+, -, o): 
negative capability is one of the ideals. In 
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the first, ends predominate (exegetical dissec-
tive conclusions that are 11 successful 11 are a must); 
in the second, means and process predominate. 
In the former, the tendency is towards assigning 
the role of scapegoat (i.e., accountability--of 
both critic and artist--is foremost: was he--
am I--successful? ••• is the work--or the scene, 
or character, or song, or observation--successful?); 
in the latter, communion of a community is what 
is important. In the former, an external, segmen-
ted hierarchy and bureaucracy results: we have 
first an audience waiting ••• then an artist com-
ing forth to try to satisfy ••• then his attempt 
to satisfy (i.e., his work) ••• then the exeget-
ical dissection to determine success of the work 
••• the result~ this results in the hierarchy: 
the audience is least important because its reac-
tions, finally, are unimportant--the judgment of 
the critic takes precedence (in similar fashion, 
what the students feel about a teacher is, finally, 
unimportant; what is important is what the "critic 11 --
that is, the administrator--feels)--likewise, the 
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contribution of the artist is unimportant unless 
the critic says otherwise; the top role is that 
of .the critic (or administrator, or officer): 
he has the final pronouncement on the work, the 
artist, and the audience. This results in a real 
bureaucracy: for example, four theatrical critics 
in New York City have the power of life and death 
over a stage production; three out of the four 
must pronounce the work worthy in order for it 
to continue. This bureaucracy is connected to 
others in other cities and in other arts. For 
an artist (or teacher) to succeed, he must sub-
mit himself and his work to this bureaucracy of 
critics (or administrators) and submit his fate 
and the fate of his work to their hands. Whereas, 
in expressive activities, the audience, artist, 
and work f:orrn an internal organism, a unified 
collegial democracy (with each one equal in voice 
and importance). Dissective exegesis separates 
art into us (the audience, the work, and the ar-
tist) and them (the critics), whereas expressive 
activities joins all into "we." The first raises 
.. 
to preeminence the organization (of critics and 
criticism); the latter, the individual constitu-
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ents (the people). 
D.issective exegesis, in practice, tends towards 
extrapolating from previous works so as to give 
the creator a set of criteria or specifications 
and mandating a specific outcome before the pro-
cess. In such situations the potential answers 
are known beforehand. What is not known nor con-
sidered is the problem; what constitutes appropri-
ate problems remains to be seen only after the 
mandated solutions have been delivered. In such 
cases, the criticism is not criticism at all, nor 
are the supposed-critics really critics. What 
we do have is reviewing and reviewers. In all 
reviewing, this type of solution-solving activity 
is the norm. 
Such reviewing (dissective exegesis) is synec-
doche at its worst: a part (a dissected and ab-
stracted part) is foisted off on to the audience 
and really onto the artist himself as the whole 
work. Even the reviewer (the pseudo-critic) seems 
unaware of this confusion of part and whole. It 
is a monstrous perversion of ontology: the whole 
can and should contain the part, but never should 
nor can the part contain all of the whole. (Re-
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viewing is a ridicule of itself and has no place 
in a Classical epoch.) 
In true creativity (including true criticism) 
the solution to the artistic problem is never def-
inite before it is realized. Thus, the problem 
is a genuine one, not one conjured up merely to 
justify the predetermined solution. The solution 
should always be, on the one hand, ineluctable 
(given the problem), and yet, on the other hand, 
at least a mild astonishment and surprise--until 
the synthesis of it with its problem is perceived. 
After the synthesis, the reaction then is one 
of appreciative astonishment. This is as true 
for the artist, in his creating, as it is for 
the audience. 
General Thematics and Individualized 
Particulars 
This is self-evident in Romantic sensibility. 
But how is this reconciled with Classical Modeling, 
in which the entire outline and outcome are com-
munally known to and shared by all before the ar-
tist ever applies himself to his individual ren-
dition of the community knowledge? 
Shared general thematics are not the same 
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as individualized particulars: all the Greeks 
knew that Oedipus had been exposed to die as a 
baby, but had grown up as a prince, had murdered 
his father and married his mother and sired four 
children. But what was not known was Cedipus' 
reaction to all of this, and whether he had died 
or·whether he had died and been resurrected, or 
whether he had not died at all but had instead 
been whisked off in a divine apotheosis to become 
a benign, governing, guarding spirit (daemon). 
One version of the Iphigenia myth has Iphigenia 
being sacrificed (murdered) by her father, Aga-
memnon, so that the gods would let the Greek fleet 
set sail for Troy; another version has it that 
the gods substituted a deer and that, while the 
Greeks were blinded and sacrificing the deer to 
Artemis, Iphigenia was whisked off to an island, 
where she lived as a priestess. 
Pure Romantic creativity would "write" the 
play, including its plot; the Classical Modelist 
would accept an already-written play (or at least 
its plot outline) and add his originality by the 
way in which he had characters act their parts. 
Thus Aeschylus and Sophocles use existing 
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communal myths to praise the gods, whereas Eurip-
ides uses the same materials to scathingly attack 
them. Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides use 
their communal mythology to produce monumental 
celebatory tragedies; whereas, Aristophanes uses 
the very same mythology to create screamingly 
funny comedies and satires. The contemporary 
play Equal Toilet Stools takes a. tragic chapter 
out of the history of black persecution and dis-
crimination and murder in the United States and 
Classically models it by casting it into the form 
of Aristophanes' Lysistrata. This thus coalesces 
the past and the present, synthesizes life and 
art and history, tradition and daring experimen-
tation. Compare this with the episode on NBC's 
"Little House on the Prairie, 11 13 in which this 
same Greek play, Lysistrata, is 11 adapted. 11 But 
in this instance, the original Greek play is not 
used to make a contemporary and original comment, 
but rather, the television hacks merely exploited 
the plot, simply watering it down to fit the men-
1 3-r,ionday, January 5 , 1 981 • 
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tality of their insipid series. 
On the other hand, Equal Toilet Stools uses 
Lysistrata as a vehicle for incredibly original 
and devastating satire of a modern societal ill; 
Little House Q!! the Prairie used it as a substi-
tute for having to think up anything original. 
The same thing is true when the movie script 
Flight 747 takes the Medieval morality play Every-
!!!§!! and applies it to Every Artist. Flight 747 
acts therefore, not as a. diluent, but rather as 
an intensifier, expander, and synthesizer. The 
opposite happens in the case of the movie Heaven 
Can Wait. This film seems to obviously take form 
and components, not from the first play, Every-
!!@:!1, but from the contemporization of Everyman, 
Flight 747 (in addition to an earlier version of 
Heaven Can Wait). But, unfortunately, Heaven Can 
Wait copies nothing else except plot and compon-
ents; nor does it add anything of its own. The 
result is a simple little private movie that has 
already been consigned to the dust heaps. 
These examples most beautifully illustrate· 
what William Blake says [about Classical Model-
ing,7: 
No one can ever Design till he has 
learn'd the Language of Art by making 
many Finish'd Copies both of Nature 
& Art & of whatever comes in his way 
from Earliest Childhood. The differ-
ence between a bad Artist & a Good One 
Is: the Bad Artist Seems to copy a 
Great deal. The Good one !eally does 
Copy a Great deal •••• 1 
1,98 
What Blake means, of course (besides a great many 
other things), is that great artists take other 
works of art (other than those of their own) and 
incorporate them int·o their own work, whereas, 
hacks merely steal from the works of others be-
cause they lack the imagination or ambition to 
do original work. 
Heaven Can Wait seems to merely have copied 
clever and imaginative ingredients from another 
work; Flight 747, with expressive activities, 
uses a previous work, Everyman, as part of its 
raw materials, to be worked up in new and excit-
ing and imaginative and brilliantways. 
Expressive activities is an engagement with 
process. It is an intentional, courageous engage-
ment undertaken--not to provide the creator with 
mammon--but llto provide a fertile field for per-
14Annotations to Sir Joshua Reynolds's Dis-
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sonal purposing and experiencing. 11 15 Flight 747, 
although a universal, or if you will, a cosmic 
portrayal of the ever, the timeless, agony of 
the artist, is, nevertheless, infused and satur-
ated with the personal, autobiographical expe.r-
iences of .QQ§_ artist. 
There is great merit in the courageous en-
gagement of cultural sharing to provide a personal 
mode of expression, not knowing in advance how 
the personal mode will make use of the communal 
property. Such a practice prevents the single-
mindedness of the politician's pursuit, which 
forever focuses on lucrative objectives that are 
easily obtainable. 
The artist takes communal activities that 
are seminal for him, and allows them--infused 
with his personality and autobiography--to gen-
erate whatever thematics are appropriate to them. 
Community sustains our creativity and provides 
for depth of achievement. Our obligation, in 
return, is to infuse this heritage with as pure 
courses, L1807-97. 
15Eisner, p. 103. 
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a creativity as we are capable of. 
Dangers of Community 
Here is the danger: if an "artist" submer-
ges himself in his community, he may become a prop-
agandist for that community, such as true with 
the Hollywood or Broadway hack. Not only are 
their objectives--to make money--determined by 
their community, but even the form of their ac-
tivities is likewise determined. What product 
that comes out of either of the above-factories 
is not based upon a previous "successful" product, 
most usually also of either of those two factor-
ies? Even worse, their content--when not explicitly 
based on another propagandistic work--is based 
on the community itself, on a glossy, sentimental 
version of that community life, such as Light@ 
the Sky, l Love Lucy, et cetera, ad infinitum. 
These very same dangers exactly are present 
in the classroom and in the educational institu-
tion. 
Community as Inspirational 
"Mitochondria" 
The point of Classical Modeling is not to 
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have the artist submerged in his community (al-
though this of course can be done successfully, 
as in the examples of Aeschylus, Shakespeare, 
and Stevens, among others), but rather to have 
the community penetrated into the thought and 
feeling and expressive processes of the artist. 
How best to illustrate this? 
By this means: whatever is true in the na-
tural world has its counterparts in various forms 
in the intellectual, moral, and societal worlds. 
Therefore, having society penetrate as a benign 
help in the artist's life and creative processes 
is the counterpart of what in nature? Of many 
things, of course. Let us examine one. In a 
strict biological sense, the human organism can-
not function, cannot even exist, without being 
penetrated by its surrounding community of micro-
scopic organisms; the living human organism is 
a living organism only because it shares its bound-
aries with its community of other organisms: 
A good case can be made for our 
nonexistence as entities. We are not 
made up, as we had always supposed, of 
successively enriched packets of our 
own parts. We are shared, rented, oc-
cupied. At the interior of our cells, 
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driving them providing the oxidative 
energy that sends us out for the improve-
ments of each shining day, are the mito-
chondria, and in a strict sense they 
are not ours. They turn out to be lit-
tle separate creatures, the colonial 
posterity of migrant prokaryocytes, 
probably pimitive bacteria that swam 
into ancestral precursors of our eukary-
otic cells and stayed there. Ever since, 
they have maintained themselves and 
their ways, replicating in their own 
fashion, privately, with their own DNA and 
RNA quite different from ours. They 
are as much symbionts as the rhizobial 
bacteria in the roots of beans. With-
out them, we would not move a muscle, 
drum a finger, think a thought.16 
These mitochondria 
are stable and responsible lodgers •••• 
the other little animals, similarly estab-
lished in my cells •••• My centrioles, 
basal bodies, and probably a. good many 
other more obscure tiny beings at work 
inside my cells, each with its own spe-
cial genome, are as foreign, and as es-
sential, as aphids in anthills. My 
cells are no longer the pure line enti-
ties I was raised with; they are eco-
systems more complex than Jamaica Bay.17 
No man can be an island: 
We live in a dancing matrix of viruses; 
they dart, rather like bees, from or-
16Thomas, p. 2. 
ga.nism to organism, from plant to in-
sect to mammal to me and back a.gain, 
and into the sea., tugging along pieces 
of this genome, strings of genes from 
that, transplanting grafts of DNA, pass-
ing around heredity as though at a great 
party. They may be a mechanism for 
keeping new, mutant kinds of DNA in 
the widest circulation among us.18 
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And this is what the components of the com-
munity do in an artist: dart around from artist 
to artist, from artist to citizen, and so forth, 
pollenating all, and resulting in beautiful blos-
soms and honey, and causing new yet mutant artis-
tic forms. We do not have the huge breaks in 
tradition as we did in modern art. :rhus the con-
tinuity of audience participation is sustained 
/ 
and maintained, preventing outbreaks of elitism. 
Artists who choose alienation from their 
communities risk loss of orientation, as can be 
seen in the lives of such artists as Herman Mel-
ville, Sean O'Casey, and Ezra Pound, among others. 
Certainly, "The individual isolated from the sur-
rounding social environment is not and cannot be 
whole. 11 19 
18 Ibid., p. 4. 
19Buchen, p. 143. 
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Thus, the culturally unified organization 
of the community is a kind of single cell, just 
as the earth is: 
I have been trying to think of the 
earth as a kind of organism, but it is 
no go. I cannot think of it this way. 
It is too big, too complex, with too 
many working parts lacking visible con-
nections. The other night, driving 
through a hilly, wooded part of southern 
New England, I wondered about this. 
If not like an organism, what is it 
like, what is it most like? Then, sat-
isfactorily for that moment, it came 
to me: it is most like a single ce11.20 
And, if we are to understand the Classical 
Modelist in his relationship to his community and 
to his society, we must view him as a single cell, 
with the components of his society and his culture 
entering his artistic self and germinating and 
pollinating his genes. And so, when the moment 
of artistic and creative conception occurs, the 
process and the product are programmed by the "DNA" 
in his genes, which previously had been programmed 
by the liviruses" of his community and culture. 
Further, if we are to understand society, 
we must likewise view it as a single cell, with 
the individual--especially the artist--as a for-
20Thomas, p. 4. 
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eign yet still necessary part of.the cell--as vi-
ruses that program and enrichen the DNA of the 
society's genes. 
The same is true of, not only educational 
institutions, but in fact of the classroom itself. 
Such an awareness might serve to deflate some of 
the pomposity and arrogance of some faculty; some 
public school teachers might better come to terms 
with their classroom invironments if they had 
such an understanding. \'/hat would such compre-
hension do for the students? 
Viewing both of these phenomena together, 
we see the holism and complementarity: "We do 
not have solitary beings. Every creature is, 
in some sense, connected to and dependent on the 
rest. 11 21 
The individual creator, by joining with his 
community and with his tradition of art and cul-
ture, not only augments his own individual powers, 
but also becomes part of a larger, functioning 
organism, and by becoming a part of it, increases 
its intelligence and productivity. A counterpart 
21rbid., p. 6. 
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is found in the world of the insect, in both ants 
and termites, for example: 
A solitary ant, afield, cannot be con-
sidered to have much of anything on his 
mind; indeed, with only a few neurons 
strung together by fibers, he can't 
be imagined to have a mind at all, much 
less a thought. He is more like a gangel-
ion on legs. Four ants together, or 
ten, encircling a dead moth on a path, 
begin to look more like an idea. They 
fumble and shove, gradually moving the 
food toward the Hill, but as though by 
blind chance. It is only when you watch 
the dense mass of thousands of ants, 
crowded together around the Hill, black-
ening the ground, that you begin to see 
the whole beast, and now you observe it 
thinking, planning, calculating. It 
is an intelligence, a kind of live com-
puter, with crawling bits for its wits.22 
Termites are even more extroardinary in the 
way they seem to accumulate intelligence as they 
gather together. Two or three termites 
in a chamber will begin to pick up pel-
lets and move them from place to place, 
but nothing comes of it; nothing is 
built. As more join in, they seem to 
reach a critical mass~ a quorum, and 
the thinking begins.2J 
The same thing is true in our world of ar-
22Ibid., pp. 12-3. 
23Ibid., p. 13. 
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tists and thinkers. 
Golden Age 
When artist-and-thinker-counterparts similarly 
gathered together in ancient Athens, the result 
was the Golden Age of Greece. When several pro-
fessors joined together, we had the New Criticism; 
when some more professors of like mind joined 
together at the Univexsity of Chicago, we had 
as a result the New Chicago Critics. The gather-
ing together of American expatriates in Paris in 
the 1920's resulted in perhaps the greatest out-
pouring of great white American art. The congre-
gating of blacks in Harlem during the same_ per-
iod gave the world the greatest flowering of black 
art in its history. 
However, with the exception of Classical 
Athens, none of these produced a Golden Age in 
this or any other country. Why? What is the 
difference between Classical Athens and these 
more-modern instances of man's creativity? In 
Athens t.he entire community appreciated what was 
happening and participated in it with both accep-
tance and enthusiasm. In these later instances, 
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however, bourgeois society (in its mean material-
istic mentality), not only did not participate 
with acceptance, appreciation, enthusiasm, and 
love, but, in fact, rejected these sub-communi-
ties of artists a.nd·thinkers, and alienated them 
from the center of communal a.ctiYity. And in the 
case of the Harlem Renaissance, white bourgeois 
society went even further, and exploited the blacks. 
For a true Golden Age, the creative nucleus 
must be accepted and loved by the community as 
a whole. Interpenetration by and synthesis of 
both groups must result in a holism of mutual 
participation of both in each other's affairs 
and concerns and most of all in mutual love and 
respect. 
Creative people will always tend to congre-
gate together for the same reason that creatures 
like termites gather together: as a group they 
achieve a critical mass and thus are able to ac-
complish great things individually. This is the 
reason that creative people tend to move to "cen-
ters" of art, so that they can live close too-
ther artists. It is not choice; it is a neces-
sity for creative survival and productivity. 
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When a society (or even a university depart-
ment--in any field) accepts its creative people, 
and they all interact in mu~ual appreciation, we 
have the beginnings of a phenomenon such as Clas-
sical Greece (the Golden Age of Mankind), in which 
the flowering and perfection of all creative, crit-
ical, scientific, and educational aspects (music, 
painting, architecture, sculpture, pottery, drama, 
theatre, humanism, politics, and so forth) reach 
an apotheosis unparalled in the history of the 
world. 
Pedagogical Implications 
A classroom is a community also. Within 
that classroom (any classroom)--if it is one of 
mutual respect, appreciation, and love--fantas-
tic things can be accomplished. For example, 
a beginning English teacher in a highschool in 
Gary, Indiana, in one semester, in all of his 
classes, both the "good" and the "bad" (one of 
these ninth-grade classes was composed of students 
from the ages of 15 to 19, some of whom had al-
ready been in juvenile homes), had poetry read-
ings to jazz recordings, singathons of poems set 
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to music, and the publication of a thick volume 
of original poems. Every single student (even 
the most-hardened, long-haired, hippie juvenile 
delinquent) participated in every one of these 
events. Was it all "fun and games"? Two students 
won essay contests. Besides completing in full 
the entire departmental syllabus, every student 
read three outside books: On the Bea.ch, Exodus, 
and Dr. Zhivago. :Even the "dumb 11 students who 
could not read, read these novels and understood 
them beautifully. 
This all happened because the teacher knew 
his tradition and art and humanities (and was 
creative himself and understood creativity) and 
because this teacher was a loving young man who 
believed sincerely in the worth of all human be-
ings as individuals and who expressed and commun-
icated this love and appreciatio~ to his students, 
to the juvenile delinquents as well as to the 
students from "good" families. And the students· 
responded in kind. All this in one semester of 
teaching. 
Happy ending? 
Well, this young teacher's colleagues, af-
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ter initial astonishment and disbelief, banded 
together (at least several of them) and presented 
a united front to the administration, and, after 
an aborted dismissal attempt of the teacher that 
first spring, did succeed the next year after. 
The larger community of the highschool faculty 
did not accept the sub-community of this individ-
ual classroom of humanism and creativity. 
With a more intelligent and humanistic and 
creative faculty and administration, all things 
are possible. 
Conclusion 
Classical Modeling, the fou:cth level in our 
taxonomy of creativity, represents a maturity 
of both artist and community. For the artist, 
his identity is not threatened by his use of his 
heritage and tradition. His inner security and 
self-confidenceat:'e great enough that he sees his 
culture, not as a threat, but instead as a chal~ 
lenge (which he gladly welcomes), a challenge 
of using this culture as raw materials so as to 
better realize his creative promptings. The the-
matics and codes of his community and culture 
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he accepts as the bases of his own individual 
conceptualizations. The artist accepts these, 
not blindly as a stooge or hack, but because they 
are generally valid. 
Thus, the first prerequisite of an atmosphere 
in which Classical Modeling is possible is that 
the community have legitimate and valid thematics 
and codes. This means that the value system of 
the community is a correct one. 
The artist (instead of being scorned by a 
bourgeois mentality as a lazy trifler who refuses 
to work for a living or feared by religion, big 
business, or corrupt politics as a reformer or, 
worse, a revolutionary and either ostracized or 
exiled or murdered) is welcomed and .installed 
in his rightful position as revered and honored 
and loved prophet (one who renews and freshens 
and reinterprets the basic thematics and codes 
of the community). This he does so that all may, 
in a communion of joy, love, and appreciation, 
celebrate the validity and worth of their lives 
and endeavors in the face of chaos. 
Classical Modeling is the refashioning of 
community and cultural values into newer and fresher 
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and cleaner modes of perception. It is the mak-
ing of the new out of the old, without discarding 
the old but rather celebrating the old. It is 
the infusion of the group accomplishment by the 
individual spirit. It is, in fact, the active 
heart, mind, and soul of a culture and tradition. 
CHAPTER V 
THE FIFTH LEVEL OF CREATIVITY 
THE REORGANIZING OF OUR INNER CHAOS 
I am certain of nothing 
but of the holiness of 
Heart's affections and 
the truth of Imagination. 
--What the imagination 
seizes as Beauty must be 
truth--whether it exis-
ted before or not--for 
I have the same Idea of 
all our Passions as of 
Love; they are all in 
their sublime, creative 
of essential Beauty. 
--John Keats 
Introduction 
The reorganizing of our inner chaos has tra-
ditionally been called "mysticism." Mysticism 
is the apotheosis of creativity: it is percep-
tion and conceptualizing to the highest degree. 
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It is also a perfection of Classical Modeling 
in that by means of it the artist returns to be-
come--for the short duration of the experience--
a part of his true community, the Universal Mind 
and Soul; it is also a record of the artist's 
return to his true community; also, the artist, 
by returning home to his true community and par-
ticipating in his true community glorifies and 
strengthens it. We have seen earlier how synec-
doche begins the process of synthesis; we shall 
see now how mysticism completes it by joining 
part to whole completely in a true unboundaried 
holism. Finally, mysticism, because of its great 
participation in feeling and soul, is Romanticism, 
but Romanticism no longer separate and fragmented 
and alienated; it is now Romanticism joined once 
again with its true community and context: itself--
whi.c:h is a part of the Universal Mind and Soul, 
and to which all now alive or who ever have lived 
or ever shall live, belong. 
Inner Chaos 
Each human being has within himself an inner 
chaos.1 That there is a chaos of inner life and 
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that this chaos has expression (that is, language) 
is as incontrovertible and as provable as that 
there is wind blowing across the face of this earth. 
Just as we know where there is a fire and the 
reason for the fire (that is, its supply of com-
bustionab1es), just so we know when there is in-
ner language and its reasons (i.e., its supply 
of comestibles); we know when the fire has gone 
out and we know when the inner chaos of life has 
ceased. 
Untimate reality transcends what can be ex-
pressed in words. 2 In the beginning (sometime, 
somewhere) was consciousness (or, mind: a mem-
ory; being mindful of • ·. • • ) ; 3 how this conscious-
ness, or mind, became manifested in individual 
boundaries is debatable. But this consciousness 
was universal, perhaps completely detached orig-
inally from form. Let us assume that it was. 
This 
1Moffett, p. 278. 
2Burtt, p. 194. 
3Richard Maurice Bucke, Cosmic Consciousness: 
A Study in the Evolution of the Human Mind, with 
an Introd. by George Moreby Acklom (New York: 
E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., Publishers, 1901), 
universal mind ••• has always exis-
ted, is unborn and indestructible ••• 
and has neither form nor appearance. 
It does not belong to the categories 
of things which exist or do not exist, 
nor can it be reckoned as being new 
217 
or old. It ••• transcends all lim-
its, measures, names, speech, and every 
method of treating it concretely •••• 
It is like the boundless void which can-
not be fathomed or measured •••• 
It is bright and spotless as the void, 
having no form or appearance whatsoever 
•••• This universal mind is no mind 
Lin the ordinary sense of the wor17 
and is completely detached from form 
•••• It is void, omnipresent, si-
lent, pure; it is glorious and myster-
ious peacefulness, and that is all 
which can be said.4 
Thus, man is a transcendent being because 
he has "the Divine within," a "true Self" or "At-
man" or "Oversoul," awareness of which the indi-
vidual may come to have through experiencing al-
tered consciousness, thus recognizing it to be 
one with the Divine.5 
How can we explain the origin and nature of 
this original consciousness? We cannot; but we, 
as others, can try. Some have told us that 
p. 67. 
4Burtt, pp. 195-7. 
5Harmon, p. 122. 
the earth was without form, and 
void; and darkness was upon the face 
of the deep. And the Spirit of God 
moved upon the face of the waters. 
And God said, Let there be light: 
and there was light.6 
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Others believe that this consciousness was orig-
inally a kind of absolute music, a harmony that 
encouraged all beauty and meaning. This would 
explain the urge of all creatures to make music: 
If, as I believe, the urge to make 
a kind of music is as much a character-
istic of biology as our other fundamen-
tal functions, there ought to be an ex-
planation for it. Having none at hand, 
I am free to make one up. The rhyth-
mic sounds might be the recapitulation 
of something else--an earliest memory, 
a score for the transformation of in-
animate, random matter in chaos into 
the improbable, ordered dance of liv-
ing forms. Morowitz has presented the 
case, in thermodynamic terms, for the 
hypothesis that a steady flow of energy 
from the inexhaustible source of the 
sun to the unfillable sink of outer 
space, by way of the earth, is mathe-
matically destined to cause the organ-
ization of matter into an increasingly 
ordered state. The resulting balanc-
ing act involves a ceaseless clustering 
of bonded atoms into molecules of higher 
and higher complexity, and the emergence 
of cycles for the storage and release 
of energy. In a nonequilibriu.m steady 
state, which is postulated, the solar 
6Genesis 1:2 and 3. 
energy would not· just flow to the earth 
and radiate away; it is thermodynamic-
ally inevitable that it must rearrange 
matter into symmetry, away from prob-
ability, against entropy, lifting it, 
so to speak, into a constantly chang-
ing condition of rearrangement and mo-
lecular ornamentation. In such a sys-
tem, the outcome is a chancy kind of 
order, always on the verge of descend-
ing into chaos, held taut against prob-
ability by the unremitting, constant 
surge of energy from the sun.7 
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This constant surge of energy from the sun 
continues to bombard us (in the form, not only 
of light radiation, but also in the form of light 
energy converted into caloric energy). Our in-
ner being, always on this verge of chaos, yet 
struggling to retain an order, must have an out-
let. Input must be balanced by output for an 
organization (even of atoms and molecules) to 
retain a steady equilibrium (a dynamic stability). 
Too little input, and the result is inplosive en-
tropy in the form of tabescence; too little out-
put, and the result is explosive entropy in the 
form of disintegration and dispersion. Song (mu-
sic, or creativity in action) from the artist 
7Thomas, pp. 27-8. 
is output: 
••• I am open to wonder whether the 
same events are recalled by the rhythms 
of insects, the long, pulsing runs of 
birdsong, the descants of whales, the 
modulated vibrations of a million lo-
custs in migration, the tympani of gor-
illa breasts, termite heads, drumfish 
bladders. A "grand canonical ensemble" 
is, odly enough, the proper term for 
a quantitative model system in thermo-
dynamics, borrowed from music by way 
of mathematics.8 
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In our present human condition, some of us 
refuse to believe in anything that is not compre-
hendable by our physical senses. Whereas our sen-
ses can be open doorways to this Universal Mind, 
they can also be closed doors, preventing us from 
beholding this Mind: 
This pure mind, the source of ev-
erything, shines on all with the bril-
liance of its own perfection, but the 
people of the world do not awake to 
it, regarding only that which sees, 
hears, feels, and knows as mind. Be-
cause their understanding is veiled 
by their own sight, hearing, feeling, 
and knowledge, they do not perceive 
the spiritual brilliance of the orig-
inal substance. If they could only e-
liminate all analytic thinking in a 
flash, that original substance would 
8Ibid., p. 28. 
manifest itself like the sun ascending 
through the void and illuminating the 
whole universe without hindrance or 
bounds.9 
221 
Thus, the nature of the senses and their appropri-
ate functions must be realized and understood, 
or they become hindrances: 
Therefore, if students of the Way only 
regard seeing, he~ing, feeling, and 
knowing as their [irope"£7 activities, 
upon being deprived of these perceptions, 
their way towards [a.n understanding 
o{l mind is cut off and they find no-
where to enter. You have but to recog-
nize that real mind is expressed in 
these perceptions, but is not dependent 
on them on the one hand, nor separate 
from them on the other. You should not 
start reasoning from such perceptions, 
nor allow yourthinking to stem from 
them, yet you should refrain from seek-
ing universal mind apart from them or 
abandonning them in your pursuit of 
the Dharma. Neither hold to them, a-
bandon them, dwell in them, nor cleave 
to them, but exist independently of 
all that is above, below, or around. 
you, for there is nowhere in which the 
Way cannot be followed.10 
We shall soon take up our inquiry on how 
to make use of the senses to help reverse our 
inner chaos of language, and to give articulation 
9Burtt , p. 1 97. 
1orbid., pp. 197-8. 
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to it. There are two approaches: the one, myst-
ical; the other, intellectual. But first, we 
must consider further the nature of this inner 
chaos. 
Mind 
When several or more molecules form a chain, 
and this chain appropriates a tiny bit of the 
Universal Mind and thus becomes an independent, 
living organism, the inner chaos is already in 
existence. Whenever a part is taken from the 
whole and assumes holism within its own boundar-
ies, intrinsic chaos in inevitable. How can a 
part become a whole without inner chaos? One 
necessary function of this part-become-whole is 
to attempt to bring order to itself. 
Mind (that is, having the quality of being 
mindful, aware, of) is always considered to be 
an organizing faculty of joined-into-a-form (i.e., 
in a functioning form) molecules. It is indeed 
the faculty of infusing molecules--by way of neur-
ons--with awareness and purpose, by freeing the 
individual cells of autocratic functioning deci-
sions; it is especially the faculty of maintain-
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ingconsentaneous purpose among the diverse mole-
cules. If there continues an idiosyncratic diver-
sity of purpose among the molecules, there results 
inevitably dissolution or disintegration (as in 
the case of cancerous cells, which do not heed 
the consentient purpose of the rest of the cells 
of the body as communicated by the "mind"). When 
cells do not act unitedly in purpose, when they 
cease to exist consensually, the tendency is for 
groups of cells, one after the other to go down. 
We call this death: "Death is not a sudden-all-
at-once affair; cells go down in sequence, one 
by one.n11 
When death does occur, the part of the uni-
versal mind either goes back to the whole or it 
becomes infused in another chain of molecules: 
••• there is still that permanent 
vanishing of consciousness to be ac-
counted for. Axe we to be stuck for-
ever with this problem? Where on earth 
does it go? Is it stopped dead in its 
tracks, lost in humus, wasted? Consid-
ering the tendency of nature to find 
uses for complex and intricate mechan-
isms, this seems to me unnatural. I 
prefer to think of it as somehow sep-
11 Thomas , p. 58. 
arated off at the filaments of its at-
tachment, and then drawn like an easy 
breath back into the membrane of its 
origin, a fresh memory for a biospher-
ical nervous system •••• 12 
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If a present action (or process) does not 
represent a previous one, if an occasional action 
does not manifest a continual explosion of a pro-
cess, a continuing narrative, there is no life. 
Imagination 
What is needed is a freeing of the conduit 
of mind so that perception and memory become hab-
its, continuing ways of functioning. The fund-
amental process corresponding to mind is not sur-
prise but instead, fulfillment. The value of an 
action is measured by the extent of its imagin-
ary roots. Thanks to the imaginary, actions and 
process are essentially continuous. And this is 
what imagination is: the activation of the part 
of the universal mind so that it stimulates and 
infuses, as a holistic radiation, its particular 
chain or chains of molecules. Imagination seeks 
12Ibid., p. 61. 
out "behind the visible images the hidden one, 
going to the very root of the image-producing 
force. 11 13 
First, we have boundaries, which we call 
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form; and this form incloses an Idea. Such an 
Idea is an individual. This is the reason, there-
fore, that the notion of individuality is always 
attached to the notion of form. And why not? 
Is there not an individuality in depth 
w.hich makes matter, even in its smallest 
particles, always a totality? Contem-
plated in the perspective of its depth, 
matter is not merely the lack of a for-
mal activity; it is precisely the prin-
ciple which can detach itself from form. 
It remains itself in spite of any defor-
mation or fragmentation. Furthermore, 
matter can be imbued with values ori-
ented in two directions: in the direc-
tion of depth, and in the direction· of 
height. In the former, it appears as 
something unfathomable, as a mystery. 
In the latter, it appears as an inex-
haustible force, as a miracle. In both 
cases, meditation on ~atter develops 
an open imagination.14 
In the human realm of mind and process, imag-
ination is the very experience of renewing memory 
13Bachelard, p. 11. 
14Ibid., pp. 11-2. 
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and memory of perception and conceptualizing. 
More than any other power or attribute, it deter-
mines the human worth. Therefore, imagination 
(the activation of the bond between the part and 
the whole of the universal mind) is not a faculty 
nor ability as such, but rather is the human ex-
istence itself. Without it, we merely exist. 
With it, we live--in the very fullest meaning 
of the word. 
This imagination, adhering to materialism 
(that is, to matter, to a chain or chains of mol-
ecules), forms the temporal fabric of both intel-
lect and spirituality and consequently develops 
the dialectic and dialogue of materialism plus 
intellectuality and spirituality, which forms 
the very fabric of reality. 
Image 
Subsequently, or perhaps, more often, concomi-
tantly, this dialectic and dialogue that we call 
reality produces a spark that we call an image. 
A chain of these images, corresponding to the 
chain of material molecules, join together in 
a definite form so as to assume the characteris-
tics of a present perception. This chain of im-
ages is never stable nor complete. Thus, the 
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imagination is essentially an aspiration to new 
images, fulfilling the natural need, newness, and 
renewal. 
Mysticism 
To be able to perceive--in a flash of intui-
tion--ima.ges and perceptions is truly a blessed 
gift (one which we call mysticism). Those who 
are so enabled should continue to do with cour-
age and thankfulness. Sometimes, however, the 
dross of sin (sin being the "unnatural" activi-
ties and state of mind of an individual) clogs 
our minds, and we lose (if we ever had) this bles-
sed mystical ability to either perceive and to 
justly valuate what we have perceived. 
There is a lot of silly debate over mysti-
cism, despite its existance for at least as long 
as man has kept records of his experiences. Let 
us take a commonsense look at the process of nature 
which has been called mysticism. All that mysti-
cism means is that we rejoin our minds (a part) 
to the universal mind (the whole).15 
15The following discussion of mysticism is 
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Mystics do not believe that Nature is God's 
.:Imagination (or, if we prefer, we may substitute 
here "universal mind") any more than that Man is 
God's Imagination. Instead, he believes that 
God's Imagination dwells in Nature; this Imagin-
ation is·the Wisdom and Spirit of the universe. 
The first-hand experiencing of and communing with 
this wisdom and spirit of the universe constitu-
tes a mystic vision. These mystic visions are 
a result of the joining of a hurnan's imagination 
(a very small bit of God's Imagination, or the 
Universal Mind) with the whole of the Supreme's, 
the Omnipotent's Imagination. Several conditions 
and factors are necessary for this mysterious un-
ion. Not all of the following conditions are 
to be found in every occurrence of a mystic ex-
perience, but usually they are present during 
such times. 
First .of all, the prime requisite is the 
intrinsic gift of Imagination. Perhaps all pee-
taken, for the most part, from this author's 
"Fair Seed-Time: Wordsworth and the Night" 
(Unpublished master's thesis, Indiana University, 
1960), pp. 16-32. 
229 
ple have this gift; certainly it is active in 
creative individuals to some extent. Those in 
whom Imagination is active are connected "in a 
mighty scheme of truth," and each has 
his own peculiar faculty, 
Heaven's gift a sense that fits him to per-
ceive 
Objects unseen before.16 
Imagination is the Divine Vision; spiritual love 
cannot act nor exist without Imagination. The 
Imagination (of Man, Nature, and God) is twofold: 
sensitive and creative. The sensitive is the 
"passive or attentive," the incoming phase or 
function; the creative is the "active," or out-
going, function.17 The two combined constitute 
an organization and process in a state of steady, 
dynamic equilibrium. 
The sensitive phase of the Imagination re~ 
eeives the mystic visions, recognizing their na-
ture but not their revelations.18 The revelations 
16The Prelude, XIII, 303-5. 
17Newton P. Stallknecht, Strange Seas of 
Thou~ht (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1958 , p. 46. 
1 8 Ibid • , p • 4 9 • 
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are revealed later by the more important creative 
phase: 
The highest vision is superinduced upon 
this in a state of ecstasy, in which 
the light of sense goes out and the 
soul feels its kinship with that which 
is beyond sense •••• And this great 
spiritual experience comes generally 
not immediately after the sense exper-
ience which has inspired it, but per-
haps years later, when the original 
emotion, recollected in tranquillity, 
is rekindled.19 
In later years, dwelling upon the vision, the~-
ative phase of our Imagination brings about an 
"'ennobling interchange' between the inner and 
outer powers • 1i 20 The mystic's Imagination unites 
"the finite-mind with its environment 11 21 in both 
the sensitive and creative phases. But in the 
creative phase his Imagination "imitates, even 
perhaps participates in, the divine creation, 
which is also an imagination •••• n22 The mys-
19Ernest De Selincourt, The Prelude, Or Growth 
of~ Poet's Mind El William Wordsworth, Edited 
from the Manuscripts~ Introduction, Textual 
and Critical Notes (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1926), p. 541. 
20stallknecht, p. 49. 
21Ibid., p. 126. 
22Ibid., p. 33. 
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tic's Imagination is "an integral part of an or-
ganically interrelated universe. 11 23 And "it is 
in this elemental commerce of his imagination 
with a kindred creative power 11 24 that a mystic's 
religion is to be found. 
The sensiti~e phase makes "sense out of this 
undifferentiated manifold of sensation by organ-
izing it into individual objects or things. 11 25 
The creative phase permits the soul of the mystic 
to "see things as they are not seen by the senses 
and give them a significance which they do not 
in themselves possess, 11 26 "transfiguring the beauty 
of the natural scene, adding to it 'a virtue not 
its own. 111 27 The creative phase therefore con-
23M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lam{: 
Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 104. 
24willard L. Sperry, Wordsworth's Anti-Cli-
~ (Cambridge: Harvard Univer.sity Press, 1935), 
P• 201. 
25Frederick A. Pottle, "The Eye and the Ob-
ject in the Poetry of Wordsworth," Wordsworth: 
Centenary Studies Presented at Cornell and Prince-
ton Universities, ed. Gilbert T. Dunkliii"l"Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 27. 
26R. D. Havens, The Mind of.§: Poet: A Study 
of Wordsworth's Thought with Particular Reference 
to The Prelude (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 
1942°)," p. 169. 
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tributes to the "sense-impression given from with-
out1128 and thus eventually to the Imagination 
of the Universe. Again, it is usually a long 
time before the creative phase is activated.29 
The sensitive phase of Imagination is the 
perceptualizing phase; the creative, the concep-
tualizing. 
The mystic finds in his Imagination "the very 
heart of the moral life":30 
Imagination can ••• foster, what both 
Wordsworth and Spinoza call "intellec-
tual love," which is the emotional sup-
port of the highest achievements.31 
This is why mystics usually do not have to live 
by man's morality: the Universal Mind by means 
of the mystic visions stimulates the mystic's 
27c. H. Herford, Wordsworth (New York: E. P. 
Dutton, 1930), p. 102. 
28H. w. Garrod, Wordsworth: Lectures and 
Essays (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1927)~. 
130. 
29January Searle, Memoirs of William Words-
worth (London: Partridge and Oakey, 1852), p. 
34. 
30stallknecht, p. 101. 
31 Ibid. , p. 24. 
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Imagination and thus fortifies his soul. 
Secondly, solitude is usually necessary for 
mystic visions. Solitude is necessary simply be-
cause there is less distraction: it isolates 
the mystic, "physically and spiritually, from 
worldly concerns; ••• Lif subdues7 the trivial 
and the transitory. 11 32 It is necessary because 
"a mind distracted by the many cannot apprehend 
the One. 11 33 Solitude also intensifies the indi-
vidual's "consciousness of the enduring land ever-
lastin_gl in the external world, and of the Eter-
nal, the One, which lies behind it. 11 34 
Thirdly, silence (or relative silence) is 
usually necessary for the same reason that soli-
tude is necessary. Also, to the mystic, silence 
is a Power; it belongs "with those eternal things 
wherein only we can find the joy and rest for 
which we were created.n35 "Outward stillness 
32Havens, p. 3. 
33Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism: A Study in 
the Nature and Development of Man's SJiritual 
Consciousness (London: Penguin, 1927, p. 173. 
34Havens, p. 3. 
35Ibid., p. 58. 
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lf..s7 essential to inward work. 11 36 
Fourthly, some aspect of the visible is ne-
cessary. The Visible is that part of Nature which 
can be beheld by the senses. The Visible is a 
necessary screen between man and the Invisible, 
the Universal Mind. Man could not live behold-
ing constantly before him the Invisible. The 
Visible, in addition, is necessary to make the 
mystic aware of beauty, awe, fear, or the like,37 
so that his sensitive Imagination will begin to 
function. To grasp the Spirituality of Nature 
and thus the Universal Mind, it is first neces-
sary to grasp the concrete of Nature (including 
human nature). One cannot separate entirely, 
cannot abstract, any part of the cosmic Universe 
any more than one can set up a particular object 
in Nature as an individual--Nature is in solido.38 
The Invisible (the Universal Mind) is the reflex 
image of the Visible (i.e., the physical). The 
36underhill, p. 83. 
37stallknecht, p. 99. 
38Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the 
Modern World (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927), 
p. 121. 
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two a.re connected. To reach one, the mystic must 
traverse the other. The surface self, the Visible 
(the physical), is called the Animus; the other, 
the Anima.39 These two aspects are opposites, 
but opposites that are connected. Boehme declared 
that the Absolute God is voluntarily 
self-revealing. But each revelation 
has as its condition the appearance 
of its opposite: light can only be 
recognized at the price of knowing 
darkness •••• Hence if Pure Being 
--the Good, Beautiful and True--is to 
reveal itself, it must do so by evok-
ing and opposing its contrary: as in 
the Hegelian dialectic no idea is com-
plete without its negative.40 
So that to attain 
union with the One • • ·• • This union 
is to be attained, first by co-opera-
tion in that Life which bears him up, 
in which he is immersed. He must become 
conscious of this "great life of the 
All, "merge himself in it • • • • Hence 
there are really two distinct acts of 
"divine union," two distinct kinds of 
illumination involved in the Mystic 
Way: the dual character of the spir-
itual consciousness brings a dual re-
sponsibility in its train. First, there 
is the union with Life, with the World 
of Becoming: and parallel with it, 
39underhill, p. 67. 
40rbid., p. 40. 
the illumination by which the mystic 
"gazes upon a more veritable world." 
Secondly, there is the union with Being, 
with the One: and that final, ineffa-
ble illumination of pure love which is 
called the "knowledge of God." It is 
through the development of the third 
factor, the free, creative "spirit," 
the scrap of absolute Life which is 
the ground of his soul, that the mys-
tic can (a) conceive and (b) accomplish 
these transcendent acts. Only Being 
can know Being: we "behold that which 
we are, and are that which we behold." 
But there is a spark in man's soul, 
say the mystics, which is real--which 
in fact is--and by its cultivation we 
may know reality.41 
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In communion "with nature the self can reach a 
new dimension of optimism and a new recognition 
of the creative way of~life. 11 42 Communion with 
Nature also permits "communion with the creator. 11 43 
As with the Imagination, Nature is, not only pas-
sive, but also active.44 
41 Ibid., p. 41 • 
42clark Moustakas, "Creativity, Conformity 
and the Self," Creativity and its Cultivation 
••• , p. 94. 
43catherine MacDonald MacLean, Dorothy and 
William Wordsworth .(Cambridge: The University 
Press, 1927), p. 109. 
44Arthur Beatty, William Wordworth: His 
Doctrine and Art in Their Historical Relations, 
Uni. of Wis. Stud. in Lang. and Lit., No. 17 
(Madison, 1922), p. 52. 
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Fifthly, well-developed senses are a neces-
sity, 45 and moreover an activity .;of these senses. 
"The natural world speaks not to the intellect, 
but to ••• our senses. 11 46 The senses are ne-
cessary to bring to an intense point one's aware-
ness of the beauty47 and awe of Nature and the 
Universe and the awareness of something bigger 
than the Universe. The senses nourish the .§_fil!-
sitive, but they prevent the creative (as shall 
be pointed out a little later). A door is both 
an obstacle and a means of entering. So it is 
with both the senses and the Visible. Senses 
are "useful servants" but dangerous guides.48 
The mystic must transcend the 11 sense-world.n49 
To be sure, 
The full spiritual consciousness 
of the true mystic is developed not 
in one, but in two apparently opposite 
45Herbert Read, Wordsworth (London: Faber 
and Faber Ltd., 1930), p. 93. 
46stallknecht, p. 62. 
47rbid., p. 62. 
48underhill, p. 6. 
49rbid., p. 35. 
but really complementary directions:--
"· •• io vidi 
Ambole corte del ciel mani.feste. 11 
On the one hand he is intensely aware o.f 
and knows himself to be at one with that 
active World of Becoming, that immanent 
Li.fe, from which his own life takes 
its rise. Hence, though he has broken 
forever with the bondage of the senses, 
he perceives in every manifestation of 
life a sacramental meaning; a loveliness, 
a wonder, a heightened significance, 
which is hidden from other men. He may, 
with St. Francis, call the Sun and Moon, 
Water and Fire, his brothers and his 
sisters: or receive, with Blake, the 
message of the trees •••• he can 
truly say that he finds "God in all 
and all in God • • • • 11 
On the other hand, the full mystic 
consciousness also attains to what is, 
I think, its really characteristic qual-
ity. It develops the power of appre-
hending the Absolute, Pure Being, the 
utterly Transcendent: or, as its pos-
sessor would say, can experience "pas-
sive union with God." This all-round 
expansion of consciousness, with its 
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dual power of knowing by communion the 
temporal and eternal, immanent and trans-
cendent aspects of reality--the life 
of the All, vivid, flowing and chang-
ing, and the changelss, conditionless 
life of the One--is the peculiar mark, 
the ultimo sigillo of the great mystic, 
and must never be forgotten •••• 50 
Sixthly, some sort of stimulus is required. 
"Imagination and stimulation are linked. 11 51 U-
soibid., p. 36. 
51Bachelard, p. 68. 
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sually this stimulus is joy and delight. Joy 
and delight aid in bringing about intense passion 
and excitement. Sometimes in place of joy and 
delight, fear and terror work the same result. 
Seventhly, passion, emotion, is absolutely 
necessary.52 Passion is necessary because "From 
Nature doth emotion come. 11 53 Nature and the Uni-
verse are alive, full of movement and passion. 
The Invisible also is alive and full of passion: 
0 Soul of Nature! That, by laws divine 
Sustained and governed, still dost overflow 
With an impassioned life •••• 54 
Passion therefore "is the link which connects 
the sensible world with the Imagination and makes 
possible their action upon each other. 11 55 Emo-
tion is also important because "the unsatisfied 
psyche in her emotional aspect wants ••• to 
love more • • • • n56 All emotions are ancillar-
52Jerome s. Bruner, "The Conditions of Cre-
ativity," Contemporary Apnroaches to Creative 
Thinking ••• , pp. 12-3. 
53The Prelude, XIII, 1. 
54The Prelude, XII, 102-4. 
55Havens, p. 34. 
56underhill, p. 45. 
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ies of the one central emotion, love. To excite 
one ancillary enough is also to excite its main 
stem, love. And love is that essential bond, 
pathway, to the One: 
Love's characteristic activity--for Love, 
all wings, is inherently active ••• 
·. --is a quest •••• Intimate communion, 
no less than worship, is of its es.sence. 
Joyous fruition is its proper end.57 
The proper work of emotion is 
the movement of desire passing over 
at once into the act of concentration, 
the gathering up of all the powers of 
the self into a state of determined at-
tention, which is the business of the 
Will •••• This act of perfect concen-
tration, the passionate focussing of 
the self upon one point, when it is 
applied "with a naked intent" to real 
and transcendental things, constitutes 
in the technical language of mysticism 
the state of recollection: a condition 
which is peculiarly characteristic of 
the mystical consciousness, and is the 
necessary prelude of pure contemplation, 
that state in which the mystic enters 
into communion with Reali_ty. 58 
Emotion makes the mystic feel a strong attraction 
towards 
57rbid., p. 46. 
58Ibid., pp. 48-9. 
the supersensual Object of his quest: 
that love which scholastic philosophy 
defined as the force or power which 
causes every creature to follow out 
the trend of i t·s own nature. Of this 
must be born the will to attain commun-
ion with that Absolute Object. This 
will, this burning and active desire, 
must crystallize into and express it-
self by that definite and conscious 
concentration of the whole self upon 
the Object, which precedes the contemp-
lative state.59 
Eighthly, night though not essential 1$ 
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a most potent agent because it aids in detaching 
the mystic from his context and from his own I-
dea. This is essential in creativity in genera160 
and mystic visions in particular. Night aids in 
blocking out the Visible which lays hold of the 
senses and the Intellect and stimulates them and 
keeps them functioning. The senses function in 
terms of the Visible. If nothing is visible, 
then Man cannot see; if he cannot see, his sight, 
a sense, is not functioning. The sense which 
Man most relies upon is his sight. He must~ 
to believe. The Night does away with this some-
59rbid., p. 49. 
60Mary Henle, "The Birth and Death of Ideas," 
Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking ••• , 
pp. 45-6. 
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time-most pernicious sense. This is why Man is 
afraid in the night, why he is afraid of the dark: 
he cannot~. He can hear better, he can smell 
better, he can sense better--but he cannot see. 
One might wonder if darkness should be substitu-
ted for night as a requisite of mystic experien-
ces. It depends. Night is darkness. But dark-
ness is not necessarily night. To shut oneself 
up in a dark room is not the same as wrapping 
the mantle of night about oneself. A dark room 
is man's darkness--artificial. Night is God's 
darkness--natural. This is the difference. A 
difference as great as that between an artificial 
and a real flower. All the difference in the world. 
Ninthly, a suspension, not a dimunition, of 
the senses is necessary. When such a suspension 
occurs, anything beautiful or impressive "is car-
ried to the heart with a power not known under 
other circumstances, 11 61 and the mystic's soul 
lives "in union with the life of the Universe. 11 62 
61Thomas De Quincey, Recollections of the 
Lake Poets, ed. Sackville-West (London: J. Leh-
man, 1 948 ) , p • 144 • 
62Mary Moorman, William Wordsworth,!. Biog-
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The senses and the Visible are the steps to the 
Invisible. The steps are necessary to reach the 
threshold, but they must be passed over. So long 
as there is one more step to be taken, the sum-
mit has not been reached and the seeker thus can-
not con~eive of God; consequently he always asks, 
"How can it be so?" The Imagination of man is 
of God. With it only can a man hold true inter-
course with God. Imagination has nothing to do 
with the bodily senses. The mind, the intellect, 
does. It is through the senses that the intellect 
exists and grows. Thus, to remove this block 
between man and God, it is necessary to remove 
the senses. Passion and emotion are what accom-
plish this. But, it must not be forgotten that 
the senses are the necessary steps to reach the 
Invisible: it is through the senses that passion 
and emotion originate. Once a mystic attains 
the threshold of the Invisible, the intense pas-
sion and emotion of the moment suddenly suspend 
the functions of his senses. In this moment it 
raphy: The Early Years, 1770-1803 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 65. 
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is that he beholds the Invisible; this is the 
moment of contemplation perfection: 
in such strength 
Of usurpation ••• the light of sense 
Goes out, but with a flash that has revealed 
The Invisible world •••• 63 
When this happens to the mystic, such a profound 
and holy calm overspreads his soul that his bod-
ily eyes are completely forgotten and what he 
sees 
Appeared like something in myself, a dream, 
A prospect in the mind.64 
And his "inner eye" awakera and sees: an au.xil-
iary brightness comes from his imagination and 
bestows new splendor and beauty on life. 
Contemplation is 
for the mystic a psychic gateway; a 
method of going from one level of con-
sciousness to another. In technical 
language it is the condition under which 
he shifts his "field of perception" 
and obtains his characteristic outlook 
on the universe •••• in some men 
another sort of consciousness, another 
63The Prelude, VI, 599-602. 
64The Prelude, II, 351-2. 
"sense," may be liberated beyond the 
normal powers we have discussed. This 
"sense" has attachments at each point, 
to emotion, to intellect, a.nd to will 
•••• the "mysterious eye of the soul" 
by which St. Augustine saw "the light 
that never changes. 11 65 
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During this contemplation, the unnatural bound-
aries of the human being (the mystic) dissolve, 
and he flows into the Universal Mind and the Uni-
versa.l Mind flows into him: 
The fully developed and completely con-
scious human soul can open as an anem-
one does, and know the ocean in which 
she is bathed.~is act, this condi-
tion of consciousness, in which barri-
ers are obliterated, the Absolute flows 
in on us, and we, rushing out to its 
embrace, "find and feel the Infinite 
above all reason and above all knowledge," 
is the true "mystical state." The value 
of contemplation is that it tends to 
produce this state, release this trans-
cendental sense; and so turns the "lower 
servitude" in which the natural man 
lives under the sway of his earthly en-
vironment to the "higher servitude" 
of fully conscious dependence on that 
Reality" in Whom we live and move and 
have our being.b6 
Contemplation is that moment or moments, or longer, 
65underhill, pp. 49-50. 
66Ibid., p. 51. 
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in which the trinity of the Will, the Emotion, 
and the Intellect of the mystic combines and fully 
asserts itself and thus crosses that threshold 
and beholds and holds communion with the Invisi-
ble. 
Reversal of Inner Chaos 
It is during such moment or moments that the 
mystic's inner chaos is reversed; and the reason 
that it is reversed, at this time, is the follow-
ing: the reason for it being chaos in the first 
place is that it has been separated, abstracted, 
alienated from a whole--it has been made to assume 
the ontology of a whole whereas in truth it is 
merely a part, and an infinitesimal part at that. 
As a part, it has been required to represent the 
whole. This unnatural and illogical synecdoche 
has thrown it into chaos. During the mystic ex-
perience, however, it is once. again joined to its 
whole; once again, it is oneiric. Thus the inner 
chaos is revers·ed because the part is no longer 
the whole but part of the whole. 
Penultimate Summary 
To conclude, this formula--solitude 
+ relative silence+ some aspect of the Visible 
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+ keen awareness by the senses+ stimulus of ei-
ther joy and delight or fear and terror+ intense 
passion and emotion+ sensitive activity of Imag-
ination+ the Night+ a sudden suspension of the 
senses+ contemplation= mystic experience+~-
ative activity of Imagination= mystic revelation--
is applied without difficulty to most mystics' 
experiences. During these mystic experiences and 
by means of them, inner chaos is reversed. 
Taxonomy of Mysticism 
Thus, we have here a taxonomy of mysticism. 
(See Figure 17.) w'hat place does such a taxonomy 
have in our curricula and in our lives? Its place 
is wherever we shall allow. Why do schools and 
teachers and professors and administrators--indeed 
all of us--so often, pursue simplistic, mechanical, 
and rational solutions to complex educational and 
life problems? Part of the answer lies with the 
assumption of the superiority of reason on the part 
of those who are in charge of curricula. 
This ~ssumption, based on fear, is rooted hist-
orically in the fall of Classical Greece and has 
continued its academic power and influence, with 
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Each student, in whatever grade and in what-
ever subject must have the opportunity for soli-
tude and relative silence: "schools need a vari-
ety of places, all under supervision, so that 
students may choose quiet or less quiet places. 11 67 
Solitude allows each of us to become aware that 
he is in a very true and literal sense alone. 
And, when each of us is aware that he is alone, 
"totally alone, not belonging to any family, any 
nation, any culture, any particular continent, 
there is that sense of being an outsider. 11 68 
When each of us is aware that he is an alien, 
then he begins to long to go home, to return to 
the Universal Mind. 
This solitude and silence can be also inner; 
that is, the student does not require a silent 
Classroom all to himself (although it would be 
nice). In India, where there is no such thing 
67Trump and Vars, p. 238. See also both of 
the following: Clark E. Moustakas, Creative Life 
(New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1977),~ 
97; and, Bachelard, p. 35. 
68 Menen, p. 163. 
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as societal or familial silence and solitude (be-
cause one always lives with a host, a multitude, 
of relatives in a restricted space), an individ-
ual achieves inner solitude and silence by sitting 
down in a comfortable position, closing his eyes, 
and meditating. This can be accomplished anytime 
and anywhere: 
"You £_an meditate anytime, anY!'!'.here," 
she [the swami Yogeshwaranand~7 tells 
her pupils, as do all the genuine tea-
chers of the Upanishads. But she adds 
something peculiarly her own. "And 
when you do," sge says, "Home is just 
where you are." 9 
And home is what we are all looking for, but few 
find. Students come from organizations that some-
times loosely (and humorously) are called "home." 
and come in contact with teachers, many of whom, 
not only themselves come from unhappy homes, but 
now are also a part of an unhappy home (i.e., 
an unhappy marriage). And each (student and tea-
cher) does his best to punish the other for it, 
when the unhappy home of each is neither's fault. 
Therefore, the teacher must not keep an eagle 
69rbid. , p. 226. 
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eye open for any student who might be daydream-
ing. Daydreaming is not a mystic vision; neither 
is meditation (as such). But both are headed 
in the right direction. Daydreaming by a student 
may be nothing more than a sexual fantasy; or, 
it may be an escape from the brutal boredom of 
the class. But it may also be a dreaming, a rev-
erie of flight,70 that trajectory back into 
the nucleus of childhood which remains 
at the center of the human psyche. 
That is where imagination and memory 
are most closely interwoven. That is 
where the childhood being weaves toge-
ther the real and the imaginary and 
lives in the fullness of imagination 
the images of reality. All these images 
of his cosmic solitude react in depth 
within the being of the child; separa-
ted from his being for men, there is 
created, under the world's influence, 
a being for the world. That is the be-
ing of cosmic childhood. Men pass by, 
the cosmos remains, an ever-primal cos-
mos which the greatest sights of the 
world will never efface through the en-
tire course of life. The cosmic na-
ture of our childhood remains in us. 
It reappears in our solitary reveries. 
The nucleus of cosmic childhood exists 
in us therefore as a false memory. 
Our solitary reveries are the activi-
ties of a metamemory. Our reveries 
which turn toward childhood seem to 
r~veal a being pre-existing our own 
[i.e., the Universal Min.£7, an entire 
70Bachelard, p. 96. 
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perspective of antecedence of being.71 
Thus, if anything, we should allow students to 
daydream (if not at least tacitly encourage them 
to). 
Thus, 
We may therefore give as a general law 
that every child who shuts himself in 
desires imaginary life: it seems that 
the smaller the retreat in which the 
dreamer confines himself, the greater 
the dreams •••• Lit is beautiful and 
most worthwhile~ this dialectic of the 
dreamer withdrawing into his solitude 
and initiating waves of reverie in search 
of immensity.72 
Dreaming in reverie is a giant step towards con-
templation: "We dream before contemplating. 11 73 
If we, the teachers, should happen to say 
anything of interest74 to the student, the stu-
dent will undoubtedly promptly withdraw his at-
tention from his daydreaming and return it to 
the classroom. And in his return, he will bring 
back with him lingering fragrances and memories 
71 Ibid., pp. 96-7. 
72Ibid., p. 99. 
73Ibid., p. 36. 
74You notice that I did not say "relevance. 11 
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of eternity. 
We must not forget that every thing carries 
within itself (or as its shadow) its potential 
opposite. Therefore, the potential opposite of 
our taxonomy on page 248 is the one in Figure 
18. 
Everyone seems concerned with each revealed 
taxonomy but appears unaware of its shadow. How-
ever, with lack of concentration and activeness 
on the part of the teacher (or learner), the shadow 
taxonomy proves itself the stronger, and before 
one is quite aware, exerts itself and usurps the 
place and power base of the revealed taxonomy. 
Instead of being the latent shadow, it becomes the 
patent taxonomy. We must be attentively aware of 
each shadow taxonomy and its potential power. 
It is, in fact, the lurking power and influ-
ence of the shadow taxonomy that so often sets the 
intellectual and affective tone and direction of 
the learning situation. It does so negatively. 
When this negativity is properly respected and ap-
propriately set off in opposition to the positive-
ness of the revealed taxonomy, its power can be 
useful and complementary. When its lurking and 
shadowy presence is disregarded, however, the re-
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Whichever taxonomy is in effect in a classroom 
(and there is always some taxonomy in operation) 
is the direct result of the conscious, subconscious, 
or unconscious choice .of the teacher. 
Rational Reorganization of Inner Chaos 
We can by-pass the mystical experience and 
still reverse, by rational means, our inner chaos. 
We must realize that, just as there is in organ-
ization the natural tendency to move towards chaos, 
so is there in chaos the natural tendency to move 
towards organization. Chaos longs for any move-
ment from without to aid its. te.ndency to move 
towards organization. We can provide such initi-
ative by rational means. But such undertaking 
requires great faith and courage; faith that 
such is the tendency and longing and possibility 
of our inner chaos, and courage to proceed on 
this faith alone. 
We know that whatever is truly bound in this 
world by faith is bound in the next world also. 
And whatever occurs on one level of our existence 
is paralleled on all levels of our existence. 
Therefore, here is our procedure; we shall 
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illust~ate by the written medium, but it is just 
as easy to proceed in this manner in film, audio, 
studio art, music, and so forth. We take another's 
reversal, or organization, of inner chaos and com-
munally use it as a like polarity to draw and 
pour into patterns and matrices of organization 
our.own inner chaos. Ideally, we select a piece 
of writing that we have never read nor even seen 
before. This calls for the optimum of faith 
and courage on our part. It also allows our in-
ner chaos to organize on its own terms and accord-
ing to its own potentials and logic rather than 
having our conditioned intellects try to impose 
patterns· .. of organization upon it. And, also, by 
this means we avoid merely parallel copying. 
For our example here, I pull the short stor-
ies of Hemingway off of my bookcase at my right 
elbow and open it at random to a short story that 
I have never read. The very first word of the 
title is 11 Mr. 11 It is essential that we take only 
one word at a time; we must not look beyond one 
word at a time. Again, this calls for faith and 
courage. Since we are trying to reverse our in-
ner chaos, we shall reverse each word of the al-
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ready-written piece of writing, until our inner 
chaos has reversed itself enough to continue on 
its own (on its own momentum) the process of re-
versing itself, its own chaos. We do not know 
what the reversing will produce because we do 
not know the nature of our chaos. We use this 
knowledge to determine our procedure of ration-
ally reversing another's model. When we reverse 
our written model, we provide by our process of 
reversal.§.£ opposite, not the opposite, but.§:!! 
opposite. There is no specific opposite for any-
thing, only a choice of opposites. 
When we isolate one word and provide an op-
posite, the opposite may seem to our conscious-
ness to be an arbitrary one. We know, however, 
that nothing is arbitrary, but rather that every-
thing, even the most trivial choice, reflects 
our innermost and essential nature. Each rational 
choice, reflects our subconscious; and--since all 
things are interpenetrative, including our own 
being--our subconscious is connected, not only 
to our consciousness, but also to our inner chaos. 
Therefore, our conscious choice of a reversal 
(of an opposite), reflects, at least to a very 
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small degree, our subconscious choice--which in 
turn, reflects perhaps to an even smaller degree, 
the choice--or at least the consent--of our inner 
chaos. The more that we--with faith and courage 
in our total being (including our subconscious-
ness and inner chaos)--strive, with all our be-
ing to unite our fragmented selves, the more easy 
the process becomes and the more willing and able 
our subconsciousness and inner chaos are to syn-
thesizeand engage in this process. 
Therefore, my choice of an opposite for "Mr." 
is some form of young-man designation, since "Mr." 
refers to an older man. It is a title of respect. 
If we condescend, we use one's first name. There-
fore, L shall substitute a first name for "Mr. 11 
Which one? My own. Since I know me better than 
I do anyone else. Or something close to my own 
first name, "Denver." What cities do I know are 
close to the city of Denver? Hays. Provo. Au-
rora. Hays is a masculine name (Aurora, a fem-
inine). Let me proceed. The next word in the 
title is "and." My choice of a reversal (an op-
posite) of "and" is "but. 11 So far I have "Hays 
but •••• " The next word is "Mrs." My oppo-
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site choice is "Miss. 11 So far: "Hays but Miss." 
Or, I could reverse the "Mr. 11 to "Master" 
(a young, unmarried man). Or to "Miss, 11 a young 
unmarried woman as the opposite of an older man. 
Or, "Mrs." as an opposite of 11 Mr." All of these 
possibilities I shall hold in suspension for a 
while. 
The couple in Hemingway's story is married. 
I shall reverse them to an unmarried state: "Mas-
ter but for Miss Aurora." The first word of Hem-
ingway's first line of his first paragraph is 
"Mr." I reverse to "Master." Let me proceed, 
one word at a time: and (but for) Mrs. Elliot 
(Miss Aurora) tried (didn't try) very (not very) 
hard (hard) to (to) have (keep her) a (from hav-
ing a) baby (baby) (from being a parent). 
And so we continue. The way we are heading, 
we are going to have a story about a young man 
who had his youth taken away from him because 
he got a young girl pregnant. That is, he was 
forced into premature adulthood. Our own story 
is almost ready to take off on its own. When 
it is so ready, we must let it go. And then, if 
at any time, we are unable to proceed on our own, 
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we can go back to our original impetus-model or 
another one to get our story going again by means 
of reversed parallelism. 
Another example might be the following: 
The opening paragraph of Anna Sidak's "The Tribes 
of Night 11 75 is as follows: 
••• it seemed I lay awake long moments 
••• listening, as I listen now, in a 
stillness broken only by the ticking of 
the clock. Neath the parlor's closed 
door wrote a pencil of slender light 
••• It was the summer of the dry wells; 
the sheets were damp, the pillow sod-
den under my head. In the distance 
coyotes howled and, in the barnyard, 
King answered, challenging; ears thrown 
back, good eye closed; the craters of 
his forehead shadowed in the moonlight, 
King having got to be the way he is 
two years this May. "They told me he 
was going around in circles down in the 
field," Clay said. "I went down there. 
His collar was gone. I put him in the 
back of the pickup and he turned around 
and around to make a nest for himself 
in the scrap of lumber I had there. 
The ve.t kept him ten days. He couldn't 
save the eye. 11 King still gentle for 
all of that. The cattle, tormented 
beyond endurance by the flies of that 
summer, were restless and gaunt. Those 
yet blinded pawed at the earth and end-
lessly shook their heads as the stit-
ches slowly dissolved and, in the north-
west, a shelf of thunderheads swept 
75Beyond Baroque 782: A Magazine of Nascent 
Literary Trends, Vol. 9, No.-2 (July, 1978), p. 12. 
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down • • • 
Reversing this word by word (and then editing), 
I come up with the following: 
••• I knew that you sat sleeping out 
there, for short moments at a time, 
out there, all around me ••• speak-
ing, as you speak even now, in a sound 
made whole only by the ticking of the 
trickles of the ice-cold stream. The 
top of the open window of the tent's 
foyer drew a painter's brush of fat 
darkness ••• It was the fall of the 
early snow powder in the Grand Tetons; 
the sleeping bags were wet, the socks 
sodden on my feet. In the nearness, 
silence whispered and, in the campground, 
sleepers answered, agreeing, heads laid 
back, weak nearsighted eyes closed; 
the wrinkles of foreheads smoothing 
a bit in the darkness; campers having 
got to be the way they are in a life-
time of few years. This August. The 
whispering: 11 I told you autumn was 
going away jerkily in swirling white 
quadrilaterals up in the aspen forests, 
above your heads," Eartha whispered 
to me. 11 You came up here. And found 
my girdle. You took hold of me on the 
front of my chemise but I stood still, 
uncomplainingly, and stiller still, so 
as to destroy the void in yourself of 
me, on your soul where flowers should 
have been. 11 I answered, 11 Thank you. 
We're not very nice to you. The for-
est ranger kept watch over you for se-
ven days, but he couldn't save your 
wild life, not even that tree that that 
wretched fellow cut do~m with his hat-
chet." The Queen still wild for all 
of this. The people, however, placa-
ted beyond reason by the absence of 
flies that fall, were restful and fat. 
Clouds still with clear sight looked 
down at Eartha and finitely nodded their 
minds as the moon-lit incisions quickly 
healed and, to the northeast, a cherry-
blossom of snow quietly fell on the 
Tetons. 
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Imagine my surprise, when after I had reversed 
my model, to discover that I had written a para-
graph about my camping out in Targhee National 
Park, Wyoming, a few years ago! 
This is one process of reversing our inner 
chaos, and in so reversing it, organizing it into 
a coherent expression. 
Summary and Conclusion 
We began our consideration of the fifth le-
vel of creativity (reorganizing, or reversing 
inner chaos) by explicating a mystical approach 
to organizing our inner chaos, and we ended it 
by investigating a rational reversing approach. 
This is the highest, and most difficult, 
and most complex level of creativity. 
CHAPTER VI 
TRANSPOSING A BEHAVIORAL OBJECTIVES MODEL 
INTO A CREATIVE PROCESS MODEL 
We read the thoughts of the 
heart, we catch the passions 
living as they rise. Other 
••• writers give us very 
fine versions and paraphra-
ses of nature: but Shake-
peare, together with his 
own comments, gives us the 
original text, that we may 
judge for ourselves: This 
is a very great advantage. 
--William Hazlitt 
Introduction 
Much of what is written about in modern cur-
riculum and instruction theory and practice con-
cerns either, on the one hand, systems approach 
and instructional technology, or, on the other 
hand, humanistic, existential process. It seems 
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to me, that most of the specific models proposed 
are of the former persuasion. There are many 
such instructional or systems curriculum design 
models: 
~ 
those of Gagne, Banathy, Hoetker, and 
Briggs come quickly to mind. All of these models 
are primarily concenied with behavioral objectives, 
resources, evaluation, and the like.1 
Let us take a look at a systems management 
model; let us arbitrarily select one such model 
that is used extensively in media technology, 
Kemp's instructional design. At first glance, 
it seems to be (and is) a progeny of Tyler's model, 
which means that it has a reputable origin. Kemp's 
model is as follows, in Figure 19.2 
It is good to arbitrarily select a model for 
close scrutiny because so mu:::h of education is 
arbitrary. Oppositional strategy follows gener-
ally two main courses: the first is to meet the 
opposition (or opposite force) head-on; the other 
is to avoid and circle around behind. (So much 
of education is merely circling around behind 
and avoiding at all costs a coming to grips with 
the situation.) One form of the collision strategy 
1see Apple (1979), especially Chapter 6, and Koett-
ing (1979), especially Chapter 3, for an explication 
and critique of systems management and instructional de-






Figure 19. Kemp's Behavioral Objectives Model 
is to adopt the modus operandi of the opposition. 
This shall be our method. 
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Control 
The overwhelming attribute of this model is 
of course teacher (power structure) control over 
students. This, certainly, is a characteristic 
of behaviorism in general. Thus, such models 
~ 
as this one of Kemp's, are authoritarian, elitist 
hierarchies; Kemp's model represents bank deposi-
tory, oppressive education: the teacher makes 
his version of reality, much abreviated from the 
original of life, of course, and orders (and co-
erces and tries to force) the students to master 
it; the teacher (as an agent of the school) is 
the one who decides what general goals are to 
be pursued; next, in Kemp's model, it is the tea-
cher who decides what are the capabilities (i.e., 
the degree of student stupidity) of the class; 
then the teacher decides on the subject content; 
then the teacher preassesses the achievement lev-
els of the students; then the teacher decides on 
the appropriate activities and support systems 
necessary or at least, in her eyes, desirable 
to achieve the general and specific objectives; 
and then the teacher evaluates how well the stu-
dents employed the teacher's activities to achieve 
the teacher's objectives. The objectives are 
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the controlling force of the entire model. And 
the objectives are set by the power structure 
(teacher and/or administration). 
This model, while good for teaching students 
extremely low-level, Pavlovian-type of stimuli 
and responses, comes up lacking if learning (as 
opposed to information) is desired. It is good 
because the teacher can justify his existence in 
a tangible way to the administration: if students 
succeed (more of them than fail), then teacher 
really is a good teacher; if more students fail, 
however, than succeed, then it is easy to put the 
blame on the students (i.e., "The objectives were 
clear; the students just were not intellectually 
capable"). The administration in turn has tan-
gible statistics to present when trying to get 
pay raises for themselves or a bond issue passed. 
Behavioral objectives are also good because they 
give teachers something "intellectually" within 
their capabilities for conversation with other 
teachers at lunch or in the Teachers' Room or 
in a bar. (They are also good for trying to strike 
up a relationship in a bar: "I'm just not appre-
ciated: I knock myself out presenting clear and 
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concise objectives and really interesting learn-
ing experiences, and the students--those little 
••• --they just don't care!") Such a model 
also enables the teacher to exist without having 
to think; it also helps with discipline by requir-
ing the students to busy themselves without the 
opportunity to think. It also gives the students 
a good reply at home in the evening (or on the 
weekends for college students) when mommy or daddy 
asks, "And what did you learn in school today?" 
It is a good model ••• for educational 
mediocrity • 
. For the teacher with enthusiasm and ability, 
however, we need something of more substance and 
with more challenge. 
Therefore, let us transform Kemp's model 
by liberating it from its product domination and 
oppression. We all know--or should--that life 
is made up--not of products--but of processes. 
Any product, not only is a by-product of a pro-
cess, but is itself also in a process of constant 
change. Ergo: what we need is a model for pro-
cess, not product. 
The center of Kemp's model is empty (in-
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deed!). However, Kemp did not explicitly put 
teacher in the middle of the wheel of his model, 
but there is where she is in practice. Shall 
we kick her out and put there instead the student? 
No. Better than that, let us have a collegial 
democracy, with both teacher and student there 
equally. (See Figure 20.) By arranging the learn-
ing situation into a democracy, we do not reduce 
the teacher's importance. To the contrary, the 
teacher--by allowing the students to rise to a 
position of co-equality, demonstrates his excit-
ing sense of self-confidence. 
Once having experienced the need for integra-
tion and interpenetration of power structure and 
students, one is hard pressed to neglect the power-
ful and enticing incentives for continuing such a 
practice (of such an ideal). Such a co-mingling is 
bound to have consequences because those individu-
als allowed such training will come to consider per-
sonally adequate and even desirable such a process 
in the educational institution. Co-equality and 
fraternity will not be lessons in idealism but ra-
ther standards-by which to judge their lessons. 
The lesson is contained within the learning situa-
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Figure 20. Beginning of Process Model 
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Liberation 
What follows is of course descriptive and 
suggestive, rather than prescriptive and legis-
lative. First of all, the teacher and students 
together discuss what possible processes they 
would like to play with; there are, as we now 
know, five levels of creative processes, applic-
able to any and all endeavors: these processes 
are, of course, imitation; transposition; synec-
doche; classical modeling; and the organizing 
(or reversing) of inner chaos. Thus we have the 
first satellite of the immanent galaxy of student-
teacher-process. (See Figure 21.) 
The essential characteristic of this first 
step of our process model is that it does not 
comprise the beginning of a planned, sequential 
series of steps that lead to ends that are known 
and expected in advance and that are completed 
with a maximum of management efficiency. There 
is a great difference in the quality of coal and 
diamonds. Coal has been produced with a vast 
greater efficiency (of time) than have diamonds. 
With predetermined outcomes to be achieved the 
managment model becomes in practice an instrument 
for a testing situation. However, we want a learn-
ing process rather than a testing situation. 
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Next, the teacher and his students consider 
both of their desires; this is not a search for 
consensus. It is a dialogue or, if need be, a dia-
lectic. If there are no areas of general interest 
at all, then this is the wrong teacher for this 
class (or the wrong class for this teacher). A 
mutual exploration is what is desired here. (See 
Figure 22.) 
In this step we are not seeking to follow 
a tradition; the thrust of our work is not tech-
nical either. Our thrust is a focus on who should 
form objectives--not on how· the objectives are 
to be formed. There is no worry about finding or 
creating the correct sequence of regimented tasks 
for students. There is no concentration on pro-
viding training or practice in basic skills. Ba-
sic skills become indistinguishable from desires. 
This is a step in the process of hope and 
desire. In this way schools cease from disguised 
baby-sitting and actually do function as educa-
tional institutions. There is no neutrality; 
none is desired. Direction is provided by inn~r 
necessities; and personal directions are shared 
and group activities become personal. There is 
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Figure 22. Second Step of Process Model 
275 
constraint or restraint • .Any constraint or re-
straint arises because of the exigencies of the 
time and place and personality and are thus na-
tural. 
Next, they mutually choose one or more spe-
cific processes, which they think may help them 
to attain their desire(s); the specific process 
is chosen from one of the five levels of creativ-
ity (such as imitation, or synecdoche, and so 
forth). (See Figure 23.) 
This specific choice is a natural one because 
it arises from the inner desire of the individual 
student and from the outer necessity of the area 
to be explored. It undoubtedly is not necessary 
to demonstrate, on the one hand, the hopelessness 
of an imposed objective and, on the other, the 
great and indescribable power of inner choices. 
Inner choice is the harmony of the personal with 
group; with the individual and society and nature. 
It is an engagement of personal inquiry and analy-
sis with outer phenomena; it is personal precision. 
Specific choice here is a narrowing of atten-
tion and attendant direction. It is the setting 














































Figure 23. Third Step of Process Model 
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Then teacher and students decide upon an ap-
propriate context to which they will apply the pro-
cess; appropriateness is determined by interest. 
(See Figure 24.) 
The consequences of personal appraisal of 
appropriate areas of one's context extend beyond 
the issue of what "subject matter" should be em-
phasized. In many instances they influence how 
perceptions and consequent behavior will be or-
ganized and how valuation will occur. If one 
conceives of context as a. kind of supermarket 
of materialism that is stocked at differing pri-
ces, then it appears reasonable to make out a 
shopping list in accordance with what one is will-
ing and able to pay, and in accordance with what 
one feels needs to be restocked in the larder·. 
This involves generally replenishing what one 
is already familiar with. 
We need to consider our context as an extended 
part of ourselves. We are not shopping, but ra-
ther are exploring ourselves. We are not adding 
to ourselves from without, but instead are actu-
alizing what we are. Since the process of con-
textualizing is an inner one, the rewards are also 
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Fourth Step of Process Model 
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Next, Kemp's pre-assessment is thrown out. 
Who cares where the students have been or are? 
We are interested only in where they are going. 
Thus, the individual student's (and teacher's) 
desires will dictate where he is and where he 
shall end up. The process decided upon by each 
student (and teacher) is a natural process, of 
course. (All creative processes are natural; 
and creativity is a natural possession by all.3) 
The specific application of a process will be by 
each student and thus within the capabilities 
of each student. (For example, every student 
can imitate; some probably can imitate better 
than others.) Thus, we next decide upon activ-
ities. (See Figure 25.) 
If a student should choose a process or activ-
ity beyond his development, so what? If failure 
results from inner miscalculation (rather than 
outer oppression), the result is merely a learn-
ing experience. 
3navid Ausubel, "Learning by Discovery: 
Rationale and Mystique," National Association 
of Secondary-School Principles, Vol. 43 (Sept.-






























Figure 25. Fifth Step of Process Model 
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The teacher must do everything that the stu-
dents do. Instead of peeking over shoulders with 
folded arms on bosom, the teacher instead will 
participate in the process activity. It is pref-
erable that he do so.4 If poetry is the process, 
then he too will compose. He will share his pro-
cess and progress with those of the students, not 
for comparison's sake, but instead for mutual 
encouragement. (See Figure 26.) 
This egalitarian and cooperative pursuit 
of process is indescribably beautiful. For the 
student, he has company--older and wiser and more-
experienced companionship--on his exciting and per-
haps frightening journey over strange seas of thought 
and feeling. For the teacher, life becomes again 
an alive participation rather than a progressively 
boring spectatorship. Every day, the teacher must 
anew take on the sweet and powerful struggle.of 
life and its processes. The student develops 
strength; the teacher strengthens already-devel-
oped virtues. 


























Sixth Step of Process Model 
283 
The teacher will provide support necessaries, 
such as, paper, camera, tools, and so forth, what-
ever the participants feel they need. Because 
"' this is one of the prime raisons d'etre of a tea-
cher, he should take this responsibility quite· 
seriously. This does not preclude the students' 
helping in this area also. In fact, their help 
and cooperation and participation are essential 
here also. (See Figure 27.) 
What must not occur is that administrators 
and teachers accept (or worse, progagate) the 
assumption that they are merely managers or fa-
cilitators. They must view themselves as co-work-
ers with students. As workers they must protect 
themselves from the easy (and lazy) way of assum-
ing exploitative managerial roles. They must 
constantly affirm their identity by combating 
the organization of outside oppressive power, 
whatever form it may take. Time and effort pre-
viously wasted on working out and defending both 
silent and articulated tentative agreements be-
tween distinct parties are now redirected toward 
synthesis and manifested accomplishments. Adver-






















Figure 27. Seventh Step of Process Model 
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And, last, is, not evaluation, but mutual 
celebration and enjoyment and reflection on the 
process and by-product. This not only completes 
the model, but also strengthens, among the partici-
pants, the general processes of creativity. There-
fore, it is, not only the final step in the model, 
but it is also, in a true sense, the first step 
in another sequence of the process of this model. 
(See Figure 28.) 
Celebration assures the departure from the 
preoccupation with standardized outcomes. The 
huge, puffed~up testing industry will be punctured 
and deflated, requiring teachers and administra-
tors (and students) to support the students' culti-
vation of their positive idiosyncracies. This all 
makes possible a truly individualized form of teaching. 
Celebration dismisses the consequences and 
thus rewards of curricular interest in control 
and measurement. This enables the process to 
operate of retaining complex tasks in toto, thus 
enabling and encouraging the refusal to break 
up such complexities into microunits of behavior. 
Such retention of total complexities renders cur-
riculum more natural and consequently more inter-











Figure 28. Completed Process Model 
286 
287 
All of the satellites in Kemp's model are, 
he claims, interdependent;5 in my process model, 
however, the satellites (and the sun) are inter-
independent while at the same time interpenetra-
tive. The differences, therefore, between the 
Kemp model and the Sasser model are dramatic and 
oppositional: Kemp's model is one for the program-
ing of automatons--Sasser's, a model for creativ-
ity; the first model is an instrument (at least 
it has been in practice) for the oppression of 
the helpless by the power structure--the other 
is a mutual liberation (the teacher from oppres-
sing, and the students from being oppressed); 
the one is a closed system (whose natural end 
is entropy)--the other is an open system whose 
growth is negentropy; one is totalitarian--the 
other democratic; the one is prison--the other, 
freedom; the one is preparation for life--the 
other, life itself; the one is constructed--the 
other, natural; and, finally, the one is fragmen-
ted and contrived while the other is organic and 
holistic. 
5 Kemp, p. 9. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The time which is contracts 
into a mathematic point; and 
even that point perishes a 
thousand times before we can 
utter its birth. All is fi-
nite in the present; and e-
ven that finite is infinite 
in its velocity of flight 
towards death. But in God 
there is nothing finite; 
but in God there is nothing 
transitory; but in God 
there £ill1 be nothing that 
tends to death. Therefore 
it follows that for God 
there can be no present. 
The future is the present 
of God, and to the future 
it is that he sacrifices 
the human present. 
--Thomas De Quincey 
Creativity and Freedom 
Creativity is both a natural and necessary 
process for the optimum realization and actual-
288 
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ization of the human condition; it needs to be 
encouraged, but even moreso to be allowed to func-
tion. Because it has been and is being tampered 
with and stifled and oppressed, in order to get 
it back to its natural state we need to theorize 
about it so as to discover how it best operates. 
And in so doing, we shall best be able to, not 
only foster and encourage it, but also to allow 
it naturally to function. Schools are an ideal 
place for teaching. What better endeavor for 
teaching is there than creativity, the basis of 
all things and processes? 
The Creative Taxonomy 
Creativity can be considered as a taxonomy, 
having five levels: imitation (realism), trans-
position, synecdoche (Romanticism), Classical 
Modeling (Classicism), and the reorganization 
of our inner chaos (mysticism). Although theor-
etically we may reduce creativity to this taxon-
omy, in practice there is of course more to it 
than just this; and also these theoretically sep-
arate levels in practice many times overlap. And 
the mystery of each of these levels is, ultimately, 
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that it is beyond our intellectual comprehension. 
Humanism 
Creativity is more probable when the creator 
is infused with humanism, a love and respect for 
and appreciation of all living matter and spirit 
and mind. Humanism provides, not only the psycho-
logical motivation for creativity, but more im-
portantly the bond between creator and his raw 
materials through which his creativity may flow. 
In recent years, critics have intensified 
some tough considerations and criticisms of ed-
ucation, one group even challenging the worth 
of schools to exist. These critics usually chal-
lenge either the subject areas or social and psy-
chological milieux of schools. S.uch criticism 
betrays the fragmentation, not only of the schools, 
but also of the critics' perceptions. These crit-
ics (and others) are on surer ground when they 
attack the inhumanity of the school systems. 
It is this lack of humanity and humanism that 
causes this fragmentation. All of life is a pro-
cess of education. We live to the extent that 
we learn. If we do not learn much, we are not 
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living much. When we cease to learn at all, then 
we cease to live at all. 
Flux 
Humans, although related to dogs and rats, 
are not dogs or rats. There is more to learning 
than salivating. Simple stimulus and response, 
although valid and proper for certain low-level 
aspirations, cannot contain the whole of the hu-
man condition and process of learning. To insist 
upon a foregone conclusion in the form of a prod-
uct is to attempt to freeze a segment of time into 
a space. Life is flux. Any attempt to freeze 
this flux can result only in death: 
life is flux, and ••• the only way 
for a human being to be an individual 
is to flow and change with this flux 
called life. However, whenever a hu-
man being "assumes" an "individuality" 
(such as that of teacher, priest, law-
yer, or whatever), he has frozen him-
self, and thus taken himself out of 
the flux, out of life, and therefore 
is no longer alive (i.e., in a state 
of flux). Madness also is death be-
cause it excludes one from reality 
(i.e., the flux of life).1 
1sasser, "Flux and Freeze in Pirandello's 
Henry IV (Unpublished essay), p. 1. See also 
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To change a process (life, learning, creativity) 
to a product is to reify it; and reification is 
death (or rnadness). 2 The silliness of teaching 
process as products becomes tragic when it is 
institutionalized. For example, when a univer-
sity department chairman (who is supposedly also 
a professional "artist") claims that creativity 
is a result of learning products (theme, denoue-
ment, climax, and so forth), then it is that only 
those students of his who are true dullards can 
surivive such reified and Pavlovian training to 
earn the degrees and then to go out, like little 
Skinnerian rats, and get the few available posi-
tions and proceed to continue wreaking such crim-
inal regimentation and ignorance and stupidity 
upon young, unsuspecting, and innocent people. 
Our "most immediate and gratifying memories 
[of schooling? include those times when classroom 
R. D. McMaster's introduction to his edition of 
Charles Dicken's Little Dorrit (New York: The 
Odyssey Press, 1969). 
2Alvin F. Poussaint, "A Negro Psychiatrist 
Explains the Negro Psyche," Who Am I? Essays 
~ the Alienated, passim. 
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learning became synonymous with creative produc-
tion.3 Creativity "is a basic human instinct 11 ;4 
true learning can only be creative. 
The Near Future 
Although the curriculum field of schooling 
is still cursed with interlopers, who believe in 
intellectual and creative abiogenesis (such as 
those who feel that rote learning equals creativ-
ity but who confess that they do not know what 
"creativity" is), or who believe that schools 
(on any level) are not the place for creativity, 
the time is opportune for the emergence of intel-
ligence and creativity. 
Fragmentation is an ugly condition, one that 
needs to be addressed by all of us, especially 
teachers; synthesis, interpenetration, holism, 
and oneirism--these are what a bleeding world 
and humanity need. This is what we all must strive 
for. The very nature of creativity is one of 
3James Morrow and Murray Suid, Media and 
Kids: Real-World Learning in the Schools (Rochelle 
Park: Hayden Book Co., Inc., 1977), p. 133. 
4rbid., pp. 133-4. 
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synthesis, interpenetration, holism, and oneir-
ism. 
Thus, our desire and search for a process 
of creativity and of teaching creativity (that 
is, "teaching" period) are not questions of econ-
omic or personal exorbitance or oppresssion or 
deprivation. Creativity requires no great legis-
lative effort. It is apolitical. We do not need 
monied programs for the gifted, talented, and cre-
ative; we need only teachers with humanism and 
intellect and creativity. We need theory to guide, 
where and if needed, these humane and intellectual 
and affective and creative teachers--on all levels. 
The constitutive subject areas must be subsumed 
under the broad process of creativity. Our schools 
are the places where humans may most easily confront 
reality and truth; therefore, our schools must op-
timize this encounter; they must liberate with 
process rather than oppress with reification and 
product. They must cease to be Abaddons. 
Since creativity is the basis for life, we 
must respect and nurture this process, allowing 
it free rein in all aspects of our lives. Those 
who are threats to creativity, we must have the 
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courage to strive against. Those who are crea-
tive ~nd who promote creativity, we must love 
and revere and strive to emulate. We must cele-
brate, continually, creativity. 
Scope and Method of Study 
Focusing upon the universal need for creativ-
ity, this study has presented the theory and phil-
osophy of creativity. It did so by dividing crea-
tivity into five levels, b.eginning with the simplest 
and progressing through to the most complex. By 
dividing creativity into its five general and compre-
hensible levels, its process is more easily obser-
ved. This study began with an assessment of the 
need of creativity in education (including curric-
ulum and development, the disciplines, and the 
fine arts) and adjacent areas, such as the field 
of business. It then defined creativity and sit-
uated it in the essence of the educative and per-
sonal development process. In the first part of 
the study, great reliance was placed upon the schol-
arship of the literature, striving to build a strong 
and valid base for the intuitive theorizing of 
the second part of the study. The placement and 
possibility of the utilization of each level in 
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the classroom situation was posited. The neces-
sity of humanism in the creative process was ex-
plored. The binary opposition between the product-
orientation of behavioral and systems management 
theorists and the process-orientation of the hu-
manist was full considered. 
Findings and Conclusions 
Close scholarly investigation of the litera-
ture reveals, on the one rand, a felt need for 
creativity in the general field of education (on 
all levels and in all fields) and in other fields, 
such as business, but, on the other hand, a lack 
of both a precise and concise yet complete defini-
tion of creativity and of a lack of specificity 
in curricular possibilities. Also, the heavy 
over-reliance in education of behavioral and sys-
tems management theory tends to preclude the prac-
tical appreciation and utilization of creativity. 
Most pressing of all, there is nowhere to be found 
a comprehensive theory of creativity. 
Creativity can be considered theoretically 
and philosophically. This study does so, present-
ing a taxonomy of its five levels and consider-
ing praxitical applications of the five levels 
in curriculum and in the disciplines and fine 
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arts. The five levels of creativity are imitation, 
transposition, synecdoche, Classical Modeling, 
and reorganizing o.f inner chaos. 
There is the possibility that appreciation 
and utilization of these five levels of creativity 
as components of joint teacher-student liberation 
have potential for revolutionary changes within 
the institution of education itself and also within 
the individual. 
Summary 
There is such a thing as creativity; it is 
natural and common to all; it is both desirable 
and necessary; it can be analyzed and theorized; 
it should be analyzed and theorized; it can be 
taught; it should be taught; it can be and should 
be the essence of all pedagogy; and school is one 
of the most opportune places in which to teach 
creativity. 
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APPENDIXES 
It might be useful, as a quick reference 
guide, to arrange each level of creativity into 
an individual taxonomy and all of the levels com-
bined into one taxonomy. Furthermore, it might also 
be useful to arrange the taxonomies into two dif-
erent kinds of compositions: the Christmas tree 
arrangement for former systems management advocates 
who still have trouble thinking and visualizing 
in terms other than behavioral objectives and 
straight-line endeavors; and the more organic, 
circular arrangement of sun and satellites. 
Therefore, Appendix A will contain the Christ-
mas tree arrangements of the taxonomies of the 
individual levels of creativity; Appendix B will 
contain the sun-and-satellite pictorial presenta-
tion of the taxonomies of the individual levels 
of creativity; and Appendix C will contain both 
kinds of arrangements of the combined levels. 
335 
APPENTIIX A 
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Figure 30. Transposition 
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Figure 32. Classical Modeling 
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Figure 33. Reorganizing of Inner Chaos 
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Figure 38. Reorganizing of Inner Chaos, Organic 
View 
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